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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Research significance 
 
This research is an attempt to analyze the transition reforms of certain 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members (namely, Russia, Kazakhstan, and 
Uzbekistan), and to propose some recommendations on their further improvement. Chiefly, 
the present study focuses on the development of one of the key institutions of the market 
economy – namely, the securities market in terms of its role in promoting competitive 
conditions in the financial services sector. Due to a variety of objective and subjective 
factors, banks have become the most dominant institutions in all CIS countries in terms of, 
both, accumulating and redistributing financial resources. Also, in all of the countries 
examined in the present research, a considerable part of the banking sector is owned by the 
state that, consequently, enjoys several privileges that are not available to its competitors. 
One of the leading market institutions capable of competing with banks in the financial 
sector is the securities market, but despite almost three decades’ worth of transitional 
reforms, the securities market remains underdeveloped across the CIS. As a result, 
companies and investors are deprived of access to alternative and competitive sources of 
business financing, and have no option but to deal with the monopolized banking system in 
those countries.  
Well- functioning securities markets enable and facilitate the mobilization of 
financial resources by bringing together those who need capital to innovate and grow, with 
those who have the funds to invest. More importantly, securities markets promote good 
corporate governance amongst their listed issuers by encouraging transparency, 
accountability, and respect for the rights of shareholders. The dramatic growth of stock 
exchanges from 50 to 160 in the last four decades alone demonstrates the important role 
that securities markets play in the development of economies. 1   In the case of CIS 
members, it is essential not only to improve the understanding of the role and function of 
securities markets but to also work towards creating the environments that ensure the 
development of well-functioning exchanges. 
Taking into account the considerations mentioned above, this research examines 
securities market development in CIS members through enhancing its business 
                                                 
1 “The Role of Stock Exchanges in Fostering Economic Growth and Sustainable Development” , Joint 
publication by UNCTAD and the World Federation of Exchanges (WFE/UNCTAD/2017), September 7, 
2017, 2, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/WFE_UNCTAD_2017_en.pdf  
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financing capacity by balancing the regulatory framework of the existing banking sector 
with that of a functioning securities market; by diversifying the ownership structure of the 
market; and by implementing comprehensive legal reforms towards the further 
development of the market.   
1.2. Problem statement 
 
A common challenge that all CIS countries face is the absence of a mechanism to 
allow securities markets to fulfill their potential at the level of the national, regional, and 
global economy. To be more specific, currently, the securities markets across CIS 
members cannot be reasonably considered as providing a real competitive source of 
business financing, an alternative system of mobilizing savings and allocation; an effective 
method of ensuring corporate governance, transparency, and accountability; or as 
providing a reliable means of attracting foreign investment. 
An analysis of the transition experience of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan 
suggests that some of the key factors behind the failure of reforms in CIS countries are 
institutional and legal. Moreover, even after almost three decades of reforms, these factors 
remain as the critical issues concerning the implementation of market economy principles 
in CIS countries. The problems covered by this research can conditionally be divided into 
two categories: namely, structural and regulatory. The fundamental issues concern 
systemic and institutional challenges that ought to be taken into account during the 
development of reforms. The present research particularly focuses on the following 
structural problems: the oligopolistic nature of the market; the lack of competition in the 
financial services sector; and the significant role of the state both in regulation and 
business.  
There ought to be particular attention to the analysis of the competitive neutrality 
problem in business financing between the banking sector and the equity market in CIS 
countries. In these countries, both, the banking sector and the securities market participate 
in business financing, however, due to different regulative approaches, bank credits 
dominate in providing finance to business. Banks enjoy considerable state support, 
subsidies, guarantees, and privileges. Huge differences in regulation not only create the 
monopolistic situation in favor of banks in business financing, but also indirectly restrain 
an institution in its infancy, as is the securities market, to develop and provide relatively 
affordable, long-term, and stable funding to business. So, the root of the problem lies in the 
disparity between the regulatory approaches on the part of the state towards the banking 
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sector and the securities market. Therefore, it seems unlikely that any plausible solution to 
the above problem could be achieved without a comprehensive examination of its causes. 
The regulatory issues of the development of the securities market in CIS countries are 
mostly connected with the drafting, adoption, and implementation of the necessary rules 
for the regulation of securities market relations. The content and form of the laws and 
regulations, along with law enforcement methods, are key issues in concerning the 
problems outlined earlier.   
The present research also indicates that there are analogous problems in the current 
theoretical underpinning of securities market regulation. Notably, the research highlights 
the problems of excessive efficiency in the world’s securities market; misbalance in 
theoretical supply; and moral value deficit syndrome. Based on the analysis of theoretical 
problems of securities market regulation the research proposes: the implementation of 
social business theory principles in securities market regulation, and through this the 
balancing of theoretical supply; and enhancing the scale and content of financial 
instruments in order to prevent further financial crises caused by the securities market.     
Further to the foregoing, the following principal research questions arise: 
- What are the main causes of the underdevelopment of the security market in 
CIS countries? 
- Could theoretical supply be the reason behind the development or 
underdevelopment of securities markets?  
- Does a country’s financial structure matter for the development of its 
securities market and for striking a balance between bank and securities 
market financing? 
- What is the role of the state in the development of the securities market in 
CIS countries?  
- What kind of legal and regulatory reforms are capable of eliminating such 
causes of underdevelopment, and of promoting the development of security 
markets in CIS countries? 
It is hoped that the above research questions may help address the main problems 
restraining the development of the securities market in CIS countries.  
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1.3. Statement of purpose 
 
The ultimate goal of the research is to ultimately contribute to the development of a 
fair and functioning market economy in CIS countries through the improvement of their 
respective securities markets. The analysis assumes that complex legal and institutional 
reforms will serve the development of not only the securities market but also its effects on 
inclusive economic growth in the region.  
It would be too naïve to assume that CIS countries’ securities markets would 
flourish in a manner similar to those of the UK or the US. Knowledge alone of the 
disparities in, among other things, legal system; economic development level; and social 
peculiarities are sufficient to discourage any such notion or expectation, hence why the 
main aim of these research findings presented here is to contribute to the achievement of 
fairness in financial market regulation of banks, the securities market, the state, and 
investors; to promote real competition on business financing; to ensure market 
transparency; and to establish free market relations in the financial markets of CIS 
countries through reducing administrative rules and implementing market principles.    
1.4. Methodology 
 
This research has been conducted through the use of literature review and 
publication research, comparative analysis and empirical study, and other techniques, 
including historical, qualitative, and quantitative research. The consequent thesis relies on 
data from the reports and reviews of IOSCO, the World Bank, the OECD, the EBRD, the 
IMF, the ADB, and other international organizations and other specific research.  
1.5. Structure of the dissertation  
 
   This dissertation consists of the introduction, five main chapters, and the 
conclusion. Chapter one, which is the introduction, presents the general features of the 
research, such as its significance, problem statement, statement of purpose, and its 
methodology. Chapter two provides background analysis on securities market genesis and 
its development in CIS countries. Chapter three examines the main theoretical approaches 
related to securities market regulation. Chapter four examines and compares the concepts 
of bank and securities market financing, as well as emphasizes the role of regulation in 
striking a balance between the role of banks and securities markets in business financing. 
Chapter five covers the role of the state in CIS countries, which is an issue that directly 
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affects their securities market development. The last substantive part of the dissertation – 
chapter six – proposes concrete measures for the further development of securities markets 
in CIS countries, in reference to Uzbekistan. And, lastly, the conclusion part provides an 
overview and summary of the research.  
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CHAPTER 2. THE ORIGIN, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
SECURITIES MARKET IN CIS COUNTRIES 
 
2.1. Background of SM origin and development in CIS countries  
     
This chapter provides the necessary information and analysis for understanding and 
considering the main research questions and discussions of the research. Notably, this 
section outlines the background to securities market formation and development in CIS 
countries through a brief history of the CIS; considers the necessity of securities market 
and its regulation in CIS countries; reviews the institutional and legal framework of 
securities market regulation, and analyzes certain problems of securities market 
development.  
2.1.1. A brief history of the establishment of the CIS 
 
The origin of the SM in CIS countries is directly connected to the collapse of 
USSR, the formation of the CIS as a regional organization, and the transition of these 
economies towards a market economy. In this regard, it is essential to outline the history of 
CIS establishment and the features of market economy transition in CIS countries.  
Overall, the history of the establishment of the CIS consists of two main stages: 
first is the adoption of the ‘Agreement of establishing the Commonwealth of Independent 
States’ by three Soviet republics, namely, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic, Belarus, and Ukraine, on December 8, 1991, in Belovezhskaya Pushcha 
(Belarus).  The second stage is the total expansion of CIS membership to include eight 
former Soviet republics, namely, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, representatives of which signed the Alma-Ata 
Protocol on December 21, 1991. 2  Thus, from the first year of existence, CIS could 
mobilize eleven out of the fifteen former Soviet Republics. 3 The Baltic states did not join 
the CIS from the initial stage; Georgia joined in 1993, however, due to conflict with Russia 
in 2008, left the organization in 2009. 4  Ukraine 5  and Moldova 6  are also considering 
                                                 
2“The End of the Soviet Union, Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth”, 
New York Times, December 23, 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/12/23/world/end-soviet-union-text-
accords-former-soviet-republics-setting-up-commonwealth.html. 
3 Some authors have summarized these stages as “[t]hree plus eight: from the USSR to the CIS”. Cf., 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Paige Sullivan (eds), Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States: 
Documents, Data, and Analysis, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., (Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 41. 
4 Radio Free Europe, “Georgia Finalizes Withdrawal From CIS”, August 18, 2009. Available at:  
http://www.rferl.org/a/Georgia_Finalizes_Withdrawal_From_CIS/1802284.html  
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withdrawal from CIS. In 2005 Turkmenistan reduced its ties with CIS to become what is at 
present the only associate member of CIS.7      
The formation of CIS was a starting point for further cooperation between member 
countries. Alongside the collapse of the USSR, the foundation of the CIS presented new 
opportunities for former Soviet states, particularly in the field of economic cooperation. 
Furthermore, in October 2000 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan 
further signed an agreement on the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EAEC); 8  in June 2001 China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan signed the Declaration of Shanghai Cooperation Organization;9 in September 
2003 Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine signed an agreement on the formation of 
CES (Common Economic Space); and, lastly, in July 2010 Russia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan agreed on the creation of a Customs Union.10  
Considering the aim, function, and the historical and other features of the 
organizations listed above, and for the purposes of this research, the CIS was selected for 
closer examination given that it is a key organization for describing and addressing 
elements of securities market regulation concerning the transitional economies of post-
soviet countries. However, one ought to bear in mind that currently the CIS mostly remains 
symbolic – when compared to other organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization – with a few supranational powers, nominally possessing a coordinating 
function for the trade, finance, lawmaking, security, and cross-border crime prevention 
policies of its membership. It would be unfair to deny the significant historical value of the 
advent of the CIS, and its potential for not only strengthening collaboration but also for 
promoting regional development, including financial market growth. This claim is 
supported by statistics for the CIS region11  in relation to the world: for instance, CIS 
                                                                                                                                                   
5 “Draft Documents on Ukraine’s Withdrawal from CIS Submitted to Verkhovna Rada”, TASS Russian News 
Agency, May 27, 2014. http://tass.com/world/733566  
6 Cristi Vlas, “Moldova refused to take over the CIS chairmanship in 2017, Russia will take it instead”, 
Moldova.Org, September 16, 2016, http://www.moldova.org/en/moldova-refused-take-cis-chairmanship-
russia-will-take-2017/  
7 “CIS: Turkmenistan Reduces Ties To ‘Associate Member'”, Radio Free Europe, August 29, 2005, 
http://www.rferl.org/a/1061002.html 
8 Agreement on Foundation of Eurasian Economic Community. 
http://wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/EAEC.pdf. (Last visited on February 1, 2019). 
9 Boris Z Rumer, Central Asia: A Gathering Storm?  (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015). 
10 Evgeny Vinokurov, “The Customs Union and the Single Economic Space: Towards the Eurasian 
Economic Union”,Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2012 . Almaty: Eurasian Development Bank, 
http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/CII%20-%20izdania/Yerbook-2012/a_n5_2012_05.pdf 
11 See Table 1 below.   
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comprises 16% of the world’s territory; 4% of its population, 4.8% of global GDP12 
(which, incidentally, is equal to Japan’s GDP); and 16% of global crude petroleum 
production and 25% of global gas production, while the share of the most significant 
producer, namely, the USA, is 13% and 21%, respectively.13  Macroeconomic and growth 
indicators demonstrate the significance of the CIS region and CIS studies, especially 
research concerning economic and social development, which may in turn encourage more 
contextual analyses with better insights into market economy development in the region, as 
for almost three decades, CIS members have been pursuing their economic development 
largely on the basis of the market economy as a means of reaching the levels of the 
developed world. The present, and other, research on the further improvement of the 
financial markets of CIS members aims at contributing to the achievement of developed 
market economies in the jurisdictions and regions of CIS members.    
Table 1. Comparison of CIS and world indicators (in %) 
 CIS USA China India Japan Brazil EU Rest of 
the 
world 
Territory 16 7 7 2 n/a  6 3 59 
Population 4 5 19 18 2 3 7 42 
GDP 4.8 17.1 14.9 6.4 4.8 3.1 18.6 30.3 
Electricity 
production 
6 18 24 6 4 2 14 26 
Crude 
petroleum 
production 
16 13 5 n/a n/a 3 n/a 14 
Gas production 24 22 4 n/a n/a n/a n/a 29 
Source: “CIS in the World 2015”14 
                                                 
12 See Figure 1 for detailed information on GDP growth for CIS members over the last decade. 
13 CIS in the World, 2015. http://www.cisstat.com/rus/graphik/gr-kratkyi2016.pdf 
14 Table 1 is based on data available throughout the following report: CIS in the World, 2015. 
http://www.cisstat.com/rus/graphik/gr-kratkyi2016.pdf 
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Figure 1. CIS Real GDP Growth rates, 2007–2017 (in %)
 
Source: World Economic Situation and Prospects 201615 
2.1.2. A market economy is a prerequisite for SM origin in CIS  
 
The centrally-planned economic model of the USSR and the property structure, 
which comprised only of state and personal property, left little if any room for the 
existence of not only the securities market but also the market economy as a whole. Hence 
why during that period in the territory of CIS countries there were no market economy 
institutions, such as the securities market. The only financial instrument of sorts, if it could 
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radical (or so-called shock therapy) methods of transition, while others opted for gradualist 
approaches. 16  For instance, Uzbekistan chose the gradual way of building a socially-
oriented market economy, which, according to some scholars,17 is largely reminiscent of 
the Chinese model of development, rather than of western models.18 While Russia19 and 
Kazakhstan20  at the first stage of transition had preferred a radical switch to a market 
economy, they subsequently sought to tune their policy. 
The market-based economic models adopted thus provided the main cornerstones 
for the foundation of the securities market in CIS countries, despite the content, methods, 
and the different transition outcomes across the countries concerned. Such cornerstones 
had included private property, which emerged as the result of small- and large-scale 
privatizations; joint stock companies, which appeared as the consequence of securitization 
and company law reforms; and securities market infrastructure, 21 which was the product 
of total transition reforms. Therefore, choosing market-based economic models and 
conducting transition reforms were the first steps that preceded securities market formation 
in CIS countries. The next steps concerned privatization and denationalization, which, 
established multiple forms of property rights including private ownership; reduced the 
level of state ownership; created joint stock companies; and eventually, formed securities 
markets as an indispensable part of the market economy. The nature of the emergent 
                                                 
16 See in details: Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia . Vol. 318. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2014); Richard Pomfret and Richard W T Pomfret, The Central Asian Economies Since 
Independence. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
17 For instance, in the literature it is mentioned that “the economic success of Uzbekistan resembles the 
Chinese—gradual economic reforms with the strong state institutions, good macroeconomic policy, and an 
export oriented industrial policy…”. See: Bakhtiyor Islamov and Doniyor Islamov. “The Central Asian 
States 20 Years After: The “Puzzles” of Systemic Transformation”, Acta Slavica Iaponica 35 (2014): 109-
134; Vladimir Popov, “An Economic Miracle in the Post-Soviet Space: How Uzbekistan Managed to 
Achieve what no other post-Soviet State has’, MPRA Paper 48723 (2014) 
18 See: Ulugbek Olimov,and Yadgar Fayzullaev, “Assessing Development Strategies to achieve the MDGs in 
the Republic of Uzbekistan”, United Nations Department for Social and Economic Affairs (2011): 1-55. 
19 See: Vladimir Popov, “Russia: Inconsistent Shock Therapy with Weakening Institutions”  in Transition and 
Institutions: The Experience of Gradual and Late Reformers edited by Giovanni Andrea Cornia and Vladimir 
Popov  WIDER Studies in Developmental Economics, United Nations University ,(Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Vladimir Popov, “A Russian Puzzle: What Makes the Russian Economy 
Transformation a Special Case”, World Institute for Development Economics Research Paper No. 29 (1996). 
20 For the features of the Kazakhstan transition path see: Каренов Р.С. «20 лет экономического перехода в 
Казахстане и перспективы индустриально-инновационного развития стран», Экономическое 
Развитие, Вестник КарГУ, 2011. (Karenov R.C. 20 Years of Economic Transition in Kazakhstan and 
Prospects of Industrial-innovative Development of the Countries ), http://articlekz.com/article/5594; and 
Есентугелов А. Экономика независимого Казахстана: история рыночных реформ, Под ред. К.К. 
Еженовой. – Алматы, 2008. – 356 с. (Yesentugelov A. Ekonomika nezavisimogo Kazaxstana: istoriya 
rinochnix reform. Pod.red.KK.Ejenovoy.- Almaty, 2008. 356 s.), (Esentugelov A. The economy of 
Independent Kazakhstan: the History of Market Reforms, (ed).K.K.Ejenova, Almaty, 2008, 356) 
21 The securities market infrastructure includes: securities as an object of securities market relations; market 
institutions (including the stock exchange, brokers and dealers, clearing, depository services etc) as a su bject 
of securities market relations; and the legal framework as a basis to facilitate the conduct of these relations.   
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securities market in each CIS country mostly depended on the content and quality of 
privatization, company, and other, law reforms pursued in each state, hence why it is 
necessary to provide an overview of the initial stages of transition reforms in certain CIS 
countries in order to better understand the notion and specifications of their securities 
market regulation cornerstones.  
2.1.3. Features of Transition and privatization in CIS countries  
 
Restructuring and privatization22  – the processes of creating a feasible financial 
sector, reforming state enterprises, and transferring their ownership into private hands – is 
one of the main ingredients of the transition process.23 The phenomenon of privatization 
may be witnessed in the economic development history of most developed countries, for 
instance, Germany in the 1960s; 24 Chile in the 1970s; 25 the UK in the 1950s and again in 
the 1980s; 26  the US in the 1980s; 27  and Japan in the 1980-90s 28 , all experienced 
privatization. After the Thatcher and Reagan reforms in the 1980s in the UK and the US, 
respectively, privatization spread throughout the world, particularly in the post-soviet 
countries that started to emerge in the early 90s. Despite the initial western inspiration, 
privatization in post-soviet states, including the CIS, was further conditioned by their 
idiosyncrasies and special features which were formative on the development of the 
securities market infrastructure both at national and regional level. Key features of 
privatization in the post-soviet republics, including in CIS, include: the absence of market 
institutions; the absence of an entrepreneurial class; scarcity of investment resources; and 
the domination of large enterprises and/or state monopolies in the structure of the 
economy.  
                                                 
22 This research considers the term privatization as the transfer of the ownership of state-owned enterprises to 
the private sector.   
23 The EBRD’s transition indicators concern eight components: namely, three measures on privatization and 
restructuring, three on market liberalization and competition, and two on financial markets reform. For 
further details see European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “Ten Years of Transition,” 
Transition Report 1999 (London: EBRD, 1999), 7. 
24 Katja Fuder, A Long Goodbye: Federal Industrial Entrepreneurship and Privatization Policy in Germany 
1945-1989, December 3, 2012 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/seminars/EH590Workshop/EH590MT2012/Katja -Fuder-EH-590.pdf  
25 The Heritage Foundation Report, How Chile Successfully Transformed Its Economy, September 18, 2006, 
http://www.heritage.org/international-economies/report/how-chile-successfully-transformed-its-economy 
26 Chris Edwards, “Margaret Thatcher's privatization legacy”, Cato Journal 37 (2017): 89.  
27 Report of the Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability of Illinois State, “Government 
Privatization History, Examples, and Issues”, October 2006,  
http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/2006Gov_Privatization_Rprt.pdf  
28 Hiromi Tamamura, “The actual state and effect of privatization in Japan,” In  East Asia Competition Policy 
Forum. 2002, http://www.jftc.go.jp/eacpf/03/privatization.pdf  
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 Privatization raises a range of ethical questions concerning how it may be 
socially unjust and unethical to privatize social and collective property, which had 
once been created and developed by the concerted efforts of several generations of 
the population under the previous economic model.29 
CIS countries faced different challenges from the first stages of transition due to 
their distinct economic, social, and geographical features, despite similarities concerning 
their common past, recent history, and economic structure. Several differences may be 
witnessed based on the speed and content of their respective privatization reforms that 
mostly relate to the features of their respective transition paths. For instance, in Uzbekistan 
privatization was incremental and through securitization. Russia experienced shock 
therapy and usage of the voucher scheme, and Kazakhstan had initially attempted shock 
therapy before amending its policy, and relying on coupons and securitization methods in 
its privatization reforms. Therefore, a brief review and comparison of the transition 
experiences of these countries may help one to better understand the characteristics of each 
transition, and of the cornerstones of SM formation in these countries specifically and the 
CIS region more generally.     
2.1.3.1. Russian transition puzzle and features of privatization in Russia  
 
Privatization in post-soviet countries – including Russia – required the 
establishment of private property and the infrastructure to facilitate private 
ownership of previously state-owned property, which are fundamental to any economy 
claiming to be market-based. The Russian privatization experience was mostly 
characterized by high-speed reforms and radical changes which had fundamental 
economic, social, and political consequences. The Russian experience further contributed 
to the world history of privatizations with a seminal case study termed the “Russian 
transition puzzle” in the relevant literature. 30 The main reason that the Russian experience 
                                                 
29 For instance, such kind of issue rose during the privatization reforms in Kazakhstan, where shares of state 
owned JSCs distributed free of charge in exchange of privatization coupons (the document certifying the 
right to receive a part of state property). This was considered as the distribution of property that was earned 
with the efforts of every citizen, who lived in USSR. See: Есентугелов А.Е. “Экономика независимого 
Казахстана: история рыночных реформ” (Yesentugelov A.Ye. “Ekonomika nezavisimogo Kazakhstana: 
istoriya rynochnykh reform”. “Esentugelov A.E. “The economy of independent Kazakhstan: the history of 
market reforms”). http://www.elimai.kz/malaya-i-massovaya-privatizaciya-gosudarsvetnnoj-sobstvennosti-v-
kazaxstane.html  
30 The Russian transition case provided several studies on the subject. For instance, Giovanni Andrea Cornia 
and Vladimir Popov, (eds). Transition and Institutions: The Experience of Gradual and Late Reformers. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Vladimir Popov, “Shock Therapy Versus Gradualism 
Reconsidered: Lessons from Transition Economies after 15 Years of Reforms”, Comparative Economic 
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has been considered unique and somewhat puzzling is the fact that it yielded inconsistent 
results with regard to the policy recommendation and forecasts that had previously been 
jointly proposed by the IMF, OECD, and EBRD in January 1991. In light of those 
recommendations, the following year Russia initiated sweeping mass privatization reforms, 
the main features of which could be observed in the speed and method of privatization.  
Concerning the speed of privatization, Russia tried to implement rapid and radical 
changes equipped with the support of the IMF and of western countries. The immediate 
impact of shock therapy included record levels of price inflation and a dramatic drop in 
GDP. Consumer prices rose by 1,345% in the first year of shock therapy after August 
1991. Price inflation was 896% in 1993, 220% in 1994, 190% in 1995 and as much as 48% 
in 1996. Between 1992 and 1998, Russian GDP declined by 44%, industrial production fell 
by 56%, and capital investment by 80%. By comparison, the fall in Soviet GDP during 
World War II had been 24%.31 The reforms quickly met with resistance. Vested interests 
successfully pushed for the public financing of loss-making enterprises, and large-scale 
monetization of public sector deficits continued for several years.32   
All these results appealed to neoclassical economic theory to justify the overall 
direction of policy33 and led to several empirical research studies34 to analyze the reasons, 
consequences, and projections on Russian transition. For instance, Professor Jeffrey Sachs, 
a member of the group of western advisors concerning the first transition reforms in 
Russia, stated that structural implementation reasons, not shock therapy itself, as 
responsible for the failure of the Russian reforms. 35  In the interview to the newspaper 
Novoye Vremya, Sachs mentioned that: “when we undertook the reforms we felt ourselves 
                                                                                                                                                   
Studies 49, no. 1 (2007): 1-31; Vladimir Popov, “A Russian Puzzle: What Makes the Russian Economy 
Transformation a Special Case”, (1996); Vladimir Popov, “Will Russia Achieve Fast Economic Growth?” 
Communist Economies and Economic Transformation  10, no. 4 (1998): 421-449. 
31 Peter Reddaway,and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy Of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against 
Democracy, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001). 
32 James Roaf, Ruben Atoyan, Bikas Joshi, and Krzysztof Krogulski. “25 Years of Transition.” (2014). 
33 Simon Deakin and John Hamilton, “Russia’s Legal Transitions: Marxist Theory, Neoclassical Economics 
and the Rule of Law” (2015), p.17. 
34 For instance, Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, Privatizing Russia, MIT Press, 1997; 
Vladimir Popov, “A Russian Puzzle: What Makes the Russian Economy Transformation a Special Case”, 
(1996); Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, “Russian Privitization And Corporate 
Governance: What Went Wrong”, Stan. L. Rev. 52 (1999): 1731; Vladimir Popov, “Shock Therapy Versus 
Gradualism Reconsidered: Lessons From Transition Economies After 15 Years Of Reforms”  Comparative 
Economic Studies 49, no. 1 (2007): 1-31; Bruce Kogut, and Andrew Spicer. “Capital Market Development 
And Mass Privatization Are Logical Contradictions: Lessons From Russia And The Czech 
Republic”, Industrial and Corporate Change 11, no. 1 (2002): 1-37. 
35 IMF economist Stanley Fischer, cited in Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, The Tragedy of Russia’s 
Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
2001), 301. 
 20 
to be doctors who had been called to someone’s sickbed. However, when we placed the 
patient on the operating table and opened him up, we found that his anatomical structure 
and internal organs were completely different, of a kind we never encountered in medical 
school”. 36  Other scholars linked the unsuccessful implementation of classical shock 
therapy in Russia mostly to Russian social and cultural particularities. 37  For Joseph 
Stiglitz, the failure of rapid privatization in Russia “was not an accident, but a predictable 
consequence” of the absence of competition policies and the institutional and legal 
infrastructure needed to support successful reform efforts. 38 Thus, the lack of experience, 
the peculiarities of the social structure that had evolved in Russia within the context of the 
planned economy system, as well as the choice of rapid privatization methods, all 
contributed to the emergence of certain drawbacks concerning the privatization process. 
Another feature of the Russian transition experience that deserves attention is the 
method of privatization: the voucher scheme had been the main privatization method, by 
which every Russian citizen was given a privatization voucher worth 10,000 rubles that 
could be sold, exchanged for shares in privatized companies, or invested in collective 
investment vehicles known as ‘voucher funds.’ It would seem that rapid, top-down, and 
mass privatization was successfully under way. At least, such a conclusion could be drawn 
based on the initial results of privatization, which involved the privatization of 47,000 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by 1993, and 90,000 a year later. 39 However, a drawback 
of the voucher scheme is that it laid down the foundations for the advent and growth of 
financial pyramid schemes that soon spread not just across Russian territory, but also 
across all post-soviet countries, including the CIS region. 40  Moreover, the voucher 
mechanism presented opportunities for money laundering, and led to the concentration of 
                                                 
36 Jeffrey Sachs writing in Novoye Vremya (1995) No. 28, cited in Roy Medvedev, Post-Soviet Russia: A 
Journey through the Yeltsin Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 84. 
37 Vladimir Popov, “A Russian Puzzle: What Makes the Russian Economy Transformation a Special Case”, 
(1996), 10. 
38 IMF, “Transition Economies: An IMF Perspective on Progress and Prospects”, November 3, 2000, 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ ib/2000/110300.htm#P159_24503,. 
39 Data derived from the following publication: Maxim Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny. Privatizing Russia. (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997). 
40 For details about the origins of financial pyramids during the transition period see: Белянин А. В. 
Финансовые пирамиды» в переходной экономике с точки зрения теории игр / А.В. Белянин, О.Г. 
Исупова // Российская программа экономических исследований: научный доклад, 2000. №10. 
(Belyanin A. V. Finansovyye piramidy» v perekhodnoy ekonomike s tochki zreniya teorii igr / A.V. 
Belyanin, O.G. Isupova // Rossiyskaya programma ekonomicheskikh issledovaniy: nauchnyy doklad, 2000) 
“Financial Pyramids In The Transition Economy From The Point Of View Of Game Theory”; and Гусев А. 
В. «Финансовые пирамиды в России как результат несовершенства институциональной среды» // 
Экономические науки. №5 (90). 2012, 48 с. (Gusev A. V. «Finansovyye piramidy v Ross ii kak rezul'tat 
nesovershenstva institutsional'noy sredy» // Ekonomicheskiye nauki.), “Financial Pyramids in Russia as a 
Result of Imperfect Institutional Environment”.  
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ownership in the hands of former managers and civil servants who had previously been 
running most of the former SOEs and who by that point had thus become oligarchs.41 
Western prescriptions, such as those of the IMF and of shock therapy advocates, allowed 
the former nomenclature and the financial ‘oligarchs’ to acquire Russia’s industrial and 
natural resources, and thus to heavily influence the country’s political destiny.42   
A brief analysis of the Russian privatization experience allows one to draw the 
following conclusions: the privatization timeframe turned out to be extremely brief for 
solving such a grandiose task that determined the quality of privatization. Also, the 
ownership change did not entail an inflow of foreign investment, and the privatization was 
not accompanied by sufficient financial, legal and structural reorganization; a significant 
part of the property passed into the hands of persons closely associated with the criminal 
underworld and with the former party nomenclature. Despite the drawbacks discussed in 
the foregoing, Russian privatization reforms lay the foundations of the market economy; 
private property institutions; private owner and shareholder class; and of the securities 
market infrastructure in the country.  
2.1.3.2.Features of privatization in Kazakhstan  
 
The Kazakhstan experience concerning the formation of the private property 
system and the establishment of market economy institutions deserves particular attention 
due to the unique and distinctive features of the privatization model pursued. The main 
features are as follows: firstly, unlike Russia, Kazakstan developed its model of 
privatization based on the experience of former east bloc/soviet satellite countries 
including Poland, Hungary, and, what had been at the time, Czechoslovakia. Secondly, 
Kazakhstan initially appeared to follow a neoliberal path, but the government quickly 
assumed a prominent role once again. 43 Thirdly, the lack of capable and robust institutions 
along with the dramatic economic reforms precipitated the failure of the neoliberal 
                                                 
41 For further details concerning the origins of Russian oligarchs, see: David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: 
Wealth and Power in the New Russia , (Hachette UK, 2011); Paul Khlebnikov, “Godfather of the Kremlin: 
Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of the Russian State”, (2000); Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: 
Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism. Crown, 2000; and Marshall I. Goldman, Lost 
Opportunity: What has Made Economic Reform in Russia so Difficult  (New York: WW Norton & Company, 
1996) 
42 The view of the present author as to the link between privatization methods and the emerg ing oligarchy in 
Russia is partly based on Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski. The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market 
Bolshevism Against Democracy. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), 479. 
43Kathryn H. Anderson and Richard W. T. Pomfret, Consequences Of Creating A Market Economy: 
Evidence From Household Surveys In Central Asia , (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2003), 75. 
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attempts in Kazakhstan. 44 Fourthly, the privatization method used in Kazakhstan differs to 
those of the Russian and Uzbekistan privatization approaches. Fifthly, the privatization 
policies were associated with widespread corruption and a sense of casino or crony 
capitalism similar to that which emerged in Russia between 1995–96. 45 Lastly, unlike the 
experience of Russia and other CIS countries, in Kazakhstan state- initiated public offerings 
were being sold mainly to strategic investors, rather than the public at large.46   
Below follows an analysis of the main reforms in order to gain a more precise 
picture of the Kazakhstan privatization experience and to draw the necessary conclusions 
for the subsequent research in the present thesis.   
In 1991, the Supreme Council of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) 
adopted the resolution On the Main Directions of Denationalization and Privatization of 
State Property in the Kazakh SSR (of February 16, 1991) and the Law on 
Denationalization and Privatization (June 22, 1991). Legally, privatization was understood 
as the act of transferring state property to the ownership of physical and non-governmental 
legal entities. Later, the President of Kazakhstan approved the Program of 
Denationalization and Privatization of Property in the Kazakh SSR for 1991-1992 (Stage 
1). 47  The program provided for the mandatory privatization of a number of specific 
enterprises; and reserved the opportunity to privatize enterprises on the initiative of labor 
collectives with the provision of benefits to labor collectives. Auction, tender, or a joint-
stock company were all approved vehicles of denationalization and privatization. The 
participation of foreign citizens and foreign legal entities in privatization was limited. At 
the initial stage of privatization, 4,770 entities, including 470 state farms, were withdrawn 
from state ownership.   
The second stage of the privatization program was launched by Presidential Decree 
No. 1135 on March 5, 1993. 48  It contained directions for the denationalization and 
privatization of the following: small-scale privatization of enterprises with up to 200 
                                                 
44 Каренов Р.С. «20 лет экономического перехода в Казахстане и перспективы индустриально -
инновационного развития стран», Экономическое Развитие, Вестник КарГУ, 2011. (Karenov R.C. 20 
Years of Economic Transition in Kazakhstan and Prospects of Industrial-innovative Development of the 
Countries) http://articlekz.com/article/5594. 
45 Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia. Vol. 318, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2014); Richard Pomfret and Richard W. T. Pomfret, The Central Asian Economies Since Independence , 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006), 6 http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8279.pdf  
46 Eurasian Development Bank Report, “The Securities markets of Russia and Kazakhstan: Prospects for 
Integration”, Almaty, 2010, 12. http://www.eabr.org/eng/ publications/AnalyticalReports/  
47 Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 549 of September 13, 1991. 
48 On the National Program of Denationalization and Privatization in the Republic of Kazakhst an for 1993-
1995 
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employees (sale at auctions and competitions); mass privatization of enterprises with a 
contingent of 200 to 500 employees (securitization); privatization of large-scale enterprises 
and selected industrial projects with the participation of domestic and foreign investment. 
At this stage, privatization of significant and unconventional assets and enterprises was 
started under specific plans with the involvement of foreign legal entities and individuals.  
49 Such privatizations were carried out by: sales to individual investors on specified terms; 
auctions or tenders; open sale of shares; or the conclusion of concessions/management 
contracts.50    
 The Kazakhstan privatization experience is mostly characterized by the 
implementation of the coupon mechanism, which was different to the Russian voucher 
scheme. All citizens of Kazakhstan (including children) were to receive coupon books – 
residents of cities were credited with 100 coupons, and rural residents 120 to partially 
compensate for the difference in financial position. 51 The scheme was designed in such a 
way that investment coupons were registered for their owners and were not subject to 
transfer or sale as unlike the case with the voucher privatization scheme in Russia. 
Coupons could only be invested in privatization investment funds52 (PIFs), which would 
issue their shares in exchange for coupons. PIFs, in turn, would purchase shares in SOEs at 
coupon auctions. As part of mass privatization, only privatization investment coupons53 
were used as payment instruments.  
Coupon privatization, the deadline for which had been shifted several times, was 
completed in February 1996. As a result of coupon privatization, investment funds ended 
up owning 10% of state property. At the same time, 66-68% coupons of the population 
were redeemed, i.e., one-third of the population did not use their coupons.54     
 Unfortunately, the lack of time frames for reforming the economy led to 
ineffective solutions. The coupon method of privatization, based on the ideas of social 
justice, was not brought to completion as almost a third of the population did not use its 
                                                 
49 In July 1997, amendments were made to the Law on Foreign Investments of December 27, 1994, which 
removed restrictions on participation in the privatization of foreign investors. 
50 12,875 enterprises were privatized through open auctions, 1,275 commercial tenders, 694 investment 
contests, and 3,104 by other means.  
51 The distribution of coupon books ended at the end of 1993 through the National Bank network. In total, 
more than 15.5 million coupon books were issued to about 90% of the total population. 
52 Only licensed PIFs, of which there were about 170, could participate in auctions. 
53 Not to be confused with housing coupons in small-scale privatization. 
54 Суверенный Казахстан на рубеже тысячелетий, М.С. Ашимбаев (ответственный редактор), 2001. 
(Suverennyy Kazakhstan na rubezhe tysyacheletiy, M.S. Ashimbayev (otvetstvennyy redaktor), 2001.)  
(Sovereign Kazakhstan at the turn of the millennium, edit, by Ashimbaev MC., 2001.) Available at: 
http://bibliotekar.kz/suverennyi-kazahstan-na-rubezhe-tysjache.  
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coupons. Monetary privatization was not entirely focused on stimulating the real economy. 
'As a result, the development of the economy was aimed at exporting raw materials -- this 
type of economic development is entirely reliant on the vagaries of the global commodity 
markets and is therefore very volatile. 55  Despite the drawbacks of the principal 
privatization method used in Kazakhstan, the foundations of the market economy were laid 
by establishing private ownership, creating private owners and shareholders, and by 
providing the basis for the national securities market. 
2.1.3.3. The ‘Uzbek Growth Puzzle’ and features of privatization in Uzbekistan  
 
The main feature of privatization in Uzbekistan is characterized by its gradualist 
content concerning the so-called ‘Uzbek Model’ of transition that was based on five 
fundamental principles: full de-ideologization of the economy; the state is the main 
reformer; the rule of law; robust social protection; and the gradual formation of market 
relations.56  In the most populated country of the region, the prevention of a sharp fall in 
output, a reduction in people’s incomes, and unemployment growth were the main reasons 
for opting for gradual privatization. 57  Considering the special development path of 
Uzbekistan, Spechler mentions that the Uzbek government proclaimed that it would rather 
seek to emulate Japan and South Korea than the liberal Western economies. 58 For instance, 
one of the main principles of Uzbekistan’s transition to a market economy had been that 
‘the state is the main reformer’. This principle also could be seen in the case of Japan. 
According to Johnson, who has researched the ‘Japanese miracle’, “the Japanese state has 
served as a guide for economic development, e.g., through promoting technology transfer, 
planning the development of Japan’s industrial structure and setting incentives to achieve 
the desired changes.” 59 Other scholars have also commented on the particularities of the 
Uzbekistan experience and its similarities to Japanese reforms in the 1950s-70s, South 
Korean reforms in the 1960s-80s, and Chinese and ASEAN member reforms since the 
                                                 
55 Amangeldiev Batirlan Ramazanovich – the leading researcher of the Economic Security Department of the 
Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
http://bibliotekar.kz/suverennyi-kazahstan-na-rubezhe-tysjache/privatizacija-v-kazahstane.html  
56 Islam Karimov, “Uzbekistan: 16 years of Independent Development”, Information Agency “Jahon”, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uzbekistan, 2-3. 
57 Ulugbek Olimov and Yadgar Fayzullaev, “Assessing Development Strategies to Achieve the MDGs in the 
Republic of Uzbekistan”, United Nations Department for Social and Economic Affairs (2011): 4. 
58 Martin C. Spechler, “Hunting for the Central Asian Tiger”, Comparative Economic Studies 42, no. 3 
(2000): 101-120. 
59 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: the Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975. 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982). 
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1990s.60  Uzbekistan’s growth performance during 1992-2001 was the best among those of 
the former Soviet republics.61 This fact is also recognized by the United Nations country 
study Assessment Report, according to which “by 2001 Uzbekistan’s GDP was 3% above 
the 1989 level, making the country’s growth performance the best of the former Soviet 
Republics.” 62  
The Uzbek path to economic development has attracted the attention of many 
scholars and institutions for more than two decades. All of these studies recognized that 
tightly controlled, gradually reformed, Uzbekistan was the best performer among former 
Soviet republics. 63 This was obvious, especially in the first decade of transition. In his 
paper entitled ‘The Uzbek Growth Puzzle’ Jeronim Zettelmeyer 64  wondered why 
authoritarian and non-reformist Uzbekistan was doing better than other former Soviet 
Union countries, contrary to the expectations of major financial institutions. 65  One of the 
most prominent scholars on Central Asian transition – namely, Professor Richard Pomfret 
– has also recognized Uzbekistan’s GDP performance as being the best among other 
former Soviet countries, although he noted that the outcome in the second decade of 
transition has been less positive. 66  Professor Terry McKinley has stated that “[y]et by any 
standard barometers of economic performance – as well as by comparison with other low-
income countries – Uzbekistan has been relatively successful over two decades of 
transition and development, though its achievements appear to remain a frustrating puzzle 
to many orthodox economists.” 67  As an example, Professor Popov cites the following 
figures: “[i]n 2013, Uzbekistan exported about 100 thousand cars, almost as much as 
Russia, whose GDP is 25 times larger” than Uzbek GDP.  68  This relatively successful 
                                                 
60 See in details: Vladimir Popov and Anis Chowdhury. “What Uzbekistan Tells Us about Industrial Policy 
That We Did Not Know?” (2015), where the following scholars and their research are mentioned: Dollar, 
1992; Easterly, 1999; Polterovich, Popov, 2004; Rodrik, 2008; Bhala, 2012. 
61David M. Kotz and Thompson Hall, “The “Uzbek growth puzzle” and the Washing ton Consensus”, In A 
Session on ‘Issues in Economic Transition’ sponsored by the Union for Radical Political Economics at the 
Allied Social Science Associations Convention. 2004.   
62 Ulugbek Olimov and Yadgar Fayzullaev, “Assessing Development Strategies to Achieve the MDGs in the 
Republic of Uzbekistan” United Nations Department for Social and Economic Affairs (2011): 4-5 
63 Richard Pomfret, “Lessons from Economies in Transition from Central Planning”, Australian Economic 
Review 36, no. 2 (2003): 3. 
64 Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Uzbek Growth Puzzle. No. 98-133, International Monetary Fund, 1998. 
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economic performance is even more impressive given that Uzbekistan is not a major oil 
and gas exporter (as is the case with Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan) 
and given that it is one of two double-landlocked countries in the world. 69   
Two decades after the EBRD Transition Report 2013 ‘Stuck in Transition?’ 
identified a reverse ‘puzzle’ – namely, the Kyrgyz ‘Puzzle’ – in that while Kyrgyzstan is 
applying almost all recommendations of the leading financial institutions its transition and 
economic growth seemed to have stalled. According to Islamov, “analyses of more than 20 
years experiences of transition countries in Central Asia led us to the main conclusion that 
less radical and more gradual reforms resulted in better  economic growth. In this respect, 
the achievements of Uzbekistan are not a “puzzle”, but the logical result of its efforts to 
introduce gradually, step-by-step, market reforms combined with state-led industrial 
export-oriented policy, that was first successfully used in Post-World War II Japan.”70  
The gradual character of the Uzbekistan transition model directly reflected the 
speed of privatization reforms that were performed in four stages. The first stage (1992-
1993) covered the state housing fund, small and medium enterprises of trade, service, light 
and food industries, by which 52,268 owners arose. 71  The second stage (1994-1996) 
mostly focused on wide-scale privatization, based on which 2 million shareholders of 
privatized enterprises, 3 million owners of private household plots, 85,000 owners of 
individual and small enterprises, and 14,000 real estate owners arose. 72 The third stage of 
privatization, which began in 1998, mostly focused on the privatization of industrial giants, 
such as oil, energy, chemical, metallurgical, and machine-building industries, with the 
extensive involvement of foreign investment. 73 The fourth stage, which began from 2000 
and remains ongoing, is characterized with the privatization of state assets through zero 
redemption cost; 74 the intense attraction of FDI in the privatization process; and and better 
management of state shares.75       
                                                 
69 Vladimir Popov, “An Economic Miracle in the Post-Soviet Space: How Uzbekistan Managed to Achieve 
What No Other Post-Soviet State Has”, MPRA Paper 48723 (2014).  
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経営ネットワーク研究センター年報= The Annals of Research Center for Economic and Business 
Networks 5 (2016): 85-87. 
71 See details in the official website of the State Committee responsible for privatization in Uzbekistan 
https://gkk.uz/en/ 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid 
74Zero redemption cost is the term used in the “Resolution by the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
dated July 20, 2007 No PP-672., According to this document this term means free transfer of state property 
to new owners under suitable investment commitments. http://www.uzbekembassy.org/e/priva tisation/. 
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Another feature of privatization – unlike the voucher scheme (that was used in 
Russia) and the coupon mechanism (that was used in Kazakhstan) – was based on the 
securitization of state-owned enterprises. A further feature of Uzbek privatization involved 
the usage of zero redemption cost method, which, as stated earlier, involves the free 
transfer of state property to the new owner under appropriate investment obligations, such 
as the obligation to invest in new technologies, foreign currency; 76  creation of 
employment positions in designated regions and so on.77  
The mass reorganization of state enterprises to joint-stock companies reached its 
peak after the adoption of Presidential Decree ‘On Priorities for the Further Development 
of the Denationalization and Privatization Process in Uzbekistan’78This decree specified 
the group of stakeholders in the open joint stock companies formed by privatization. These 
were the state, employers, foreign partners, and other investors.    
Despite all of their achievements, Uzbekistan and other CIS countries are still 
facing severe challenges in developing their market institutions and strengthening market-
based relations. According to the latest EBRD country assessment, although Uzbekistan 
continues to demonstrate strong growth, monopolization of power within the executive 
branch, state dominance of the economy, and the failure to establish a functionally 
independent judiciary, have all hindered Uzbekistan’s transition process. Such a 
phenomenon is particularly evident in the financial market, including the securities market, 
its infrastructure, and regulation. Following the review of two decades of the transition 
experience of Uzbekistan, Professor Pomfret also highlights the severe financial repression 
and domination of the financial sector by state-owned banks. 79  Another scholar 
specializing in the transition of post-Soviet countries – namely, Vladimir Popov –has 
predicting probable economic decrease and necessity for further reforms, recommends 
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Republic of Uzbekistan, Vedomosti of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan) 
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(London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
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increasing the rate of accumulation by ten percentage points through the mobilization of 
domestic savings and attracting capital from abroad to avoid a decrease in growth.80   
As is the case with other CIS countries, processes in Uzbekistan created private 
property institution, shareholders, and joint stock companies that have raised the necessity 
for an organized securities market, which began through the development of the securities 
market infrastructure and the proper legal basis for such market.   
As shown in the brief analysis of the privatization experience of CIS countries, 
primarily Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, despite their neoliberal approach, transition 
reforms will not bring expected results, if there is insufficient institutional and legal 
infrastructure. It is as if a camper were to attempt to burn a fire just with a spark without 
possessing kindling, firewood or any other proper fuel. In this regard, the securities market 
infrastructure will serve as a source for transferring the spark of privatization reforms to 
the fire of the current market relations and maintain its stability and growth that would 
enlighten and further heat the path to development. Therefore, the present author attempts 
in the below section to analyze the necessity of the securities market and its regulation, and 
the features of the institutional and legal framework of the securities market in the CIS.   
2.2. The necessity of SM and its legal regulation in CIS countries 
2.2.1. Necessity and functions of the securities market 
The securities market is an indispensable tool of economic development and plays a 
key role in today’s global financial economy, where transactions are carried out 
electronically and across international borders. 81 It is especially crucial for CIS countries 
the significant parts of which comprise landlocked countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). 82 Securities market supplies 
the economy with the mechanism that helps issuers to accumulate financial resources of 
investors; and investors to multiply their savings by investing funds in securities without 
transportation, logistics, and border issues. On the other hand, the securities market 
provides an effective balance mechanism with the banking industry; contributes to the 
strengthening of competition in the financial market; reduces costs of business financing; 
                                                 
80 Vladimir Popov, “Can Uzbekistan’s Economy Retain its High Growth Rate?” Scenarios of Economic 
Development in 2015, 30 (2014). 
81 J. C. Coffee, J. Seligman and H. A. Sale, Securities Regulation, (Harvard: Foundation Press, 2007), 82 
82 Uzbekistan is one of two double-landlocked countries of the world; the other is  Liechtenstein (surrounded 
by Austria and Switzerland). Details at: https://www.thoughtco.com/landlocked-countries-1435421.  
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supports the improvement of capital allocation and distribution; facilitates price formation;  
and provides a further monitoring system for the economy.83  
The necessity of the securities market would be more apparent by considering its 
primary functions. The securities market has some tasks that can be conditionally divided 
into two groups: general market functions that are inherent in each market, and specific 
functions that distinguish the securities market from other markets. General market 
functions include commercial, price, information, and regulatory functions. The general 
market function allows participants of the securities market to generate revenue from their 
operations in a given market. The price function of the market provides the system and the 
process of price formation, their constant movement. The information function produces 
and brings to its participants market information about financial instruments, subjects, and 
permitted content of their relations. And lastly, the regulatory function of the market which 
creates rules of trade and participation in it, sets the procedure for resolving disputes 
between the parties, sets priorities, and controls the management of the market.  
The specific functions of the securities market include insurance, redistribution, 
infrastructural, and investment functions: the insurance function assists the reduction of 
price and financial risks in transactions with financial instruments; the redistribution 
function provides reallocation of funds between branches and spheres of the economy, 
directing capital to important sectors and industries; the infrastructural function performs 
the creation of trade networks;84 and, lastly, the investment function provides alternative 
sources of investing to banks, brokers, dealer companies, and investment funds.85       
In the transition countries of the CIS, the full potential of the securities market is 
rarely used due to the fact that not all of the various functions of the securities market have 
developed at all. Consequently, the securities market cannot be considered as an alternative 
source of business financing to the banking sector. There is also a serious lack of the 
fulfillment of the securities market’s investment, capital allocation and distribution, price 
formation, information, and regulatory functions. Conversely, the banking sector fulfills 
these functions by occupying this vacuum. The actual conditions under which the 
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securities market functions perform, and their main causes in CIS countries will be the 
subject of the next subsection. 
2.2.2. The necessity of SM regulation in CIS countries 
 
This subsection considers the issue of why proper regulation is crucial for the 
further development of securities markets in CIS countries. According to the existing 
consensus86 a sound legal framework, property rights, shareholder protection, enforcement 
of contracts, and the rule of law are capable of attracting relatively higher investment 
levels and therefore have larger financial markets. Furthermore, regulation is necessary in 
ensuring company transparency that, in turn, is essential for investor protection and to 
inspire the confidence of market participants, especially investors, on the activity and 
behavior of managers and controlling shareholders. According to Professor Bernard Black, 
a country whose laws fail on this issue cannot develop an active securities market.87    
The necessity of regulation for the securities market is key since imbalances and 
crises in the financial sphere can become a dominant destabilizing factor for the economy 
of any country. The disruptive effects of the recent financial crisis patently demonstrate the 
necessity of appropriate regulation in the securities market for strengthening investors’ 
protection, ensuring competition, and guaranteeing fairness in market relations not only at 
the national level but also within regional and global contexts. Thus, one of the main aims 
of securities market development reforms in CIS countries should be to take appropriate 
lessons from existing cases and not to repeat mistakes.  
One of such lessons could be the most recent financial crisis, the roots of which go 
to the US financial and particularly the mortgage markets, and the consequences of which 
affected almost every country of the world. According to ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report’ which was prepared by a special National Commission of the US, “scant 
regulation” was one of the main reasons that led to the full-blown crisis in 2008.88 Another 
point in the Commission’s conclusion was that the financial crisis was avoidable, and it 
                                                 
86 Douglas W. Arner, Financial Stability,Economic Growth, and the Role of Law . (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 14. 
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was the result of human action and inaction: “failures in financial regulation and 
supervision proved devastating to the stability of the nation’s financial markets.”89  
Therefore, regulation is necessary for securities markets, especially for emerging 
ones, for protecting investors against losses, for ensuring freedom and fairness of market 
relations, and for stimulating growth and development. Perhaps the most convincing 
argument proving the need for regulation of the securities market is the presence of 
developed regulatory structures of the securities market in so-called free-market countries 
that only theoretically heed Adam Smith’s notion of the corrective ‘invisible hand’. 
According to a prominent scholar in political economy – Ha-Joon Chang – there is no so-
called ‘free market’ – every market has some rules. 90   
 The regulation of securities market relations is much more necessary in transition 
economies, 91 such as CIS countries, where nascent securities market infrastructure cannot 
fulfill its regulatory and other functions; market participants are not professional, and a 
shadow, than the legal or conventional, market is developed. These specific features of 
transition economies make it necessary for there to be a proper regulatory framework for 
CIS securities markets particularly aimed at giving effect to the stabilizing, protecting, and 
stimulating functions of the securities market. 
 After clarifying the necessity and importance of regulation for securities market 
relations, the next issue to be considered in the following section is the nature of the 
institutional and regulatory framework of the securities market in CIS countries.   
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2.3. An institutional and legal framework of CIS countries’ securities market 
 
2.3.1.Development of institutional and legal bases of the Russian securities market  
 
2.3.1.1. Overview of Russian securities market infrastructure 
  
Russia possesses the largest securities market and the most developed market 
infrastructure not only across the CIS but also across the entire post-soviet and satellite 
region. One of the main reasons for this is based on the model of the financial market 
applied in Russia. According to Golovnin, who conducted comprehensive research on the 
securities market infrastructure development in EAEC countries, Russia applied the Anglo-
Saxon financial model, which is oriented towards the securities market, whereas 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other CIS countries adopted the continental European model 
that is focused upon the banking system. 92  However, this is only a structural 
characterization, given that the existing banking system of Russia as it has developed since 
the collapse of the USSR, with the high degree of state involvement in it, does not entirely 
fit within the conventional Anglo-Saxon model.93 That is the reason why other scholars 
characterize the Russian securities market as a mixed, polycentric, model, whereby 
commercial banks, the stock exchange, and other financial institutions participate 
simultaneously yet with a disparity of influence. The roots of such divergence are to be 
found in the transition history and privatization methods of the Russian experience, briefly 
discussed in the previous subsection. 
The Russian securities market infrastructure is relatively developed in comparison 
to the other post-Soviet countries both in terms of financial instruments and institutions. 
Compared to other CIS countries, in the Russian securities market a maximum variety of 
financial instruments are traded, 94  including shares, federal loan bonds, regional and 
corporate bonds, sovereign and corporate Eurobonds, depositary receipts, investment 
shares, mortgage participation certificates, and exchange investment funds.  95  In 2016 
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variety of new bonds was launched which boosted market liquidity. In particular, the most 
short-term bonds, known as overnight bonds, issued 49 times in a year for a total of 1.4 
trillion rubles (RUB). Another new type of bond – namely, Russian law-governed foreign 
currency bonds – appeared on the market as an alternative to borrowing from global 
markets. In 2016, three issuers offered foreign currency bonds worth a total of USD 1.4 
billion. 96 Moreover, the futures market of the Moscow stock exchange organizes trading 
with: futures contracts for indices (MICEX index, RTS index, RVI volatility index); 
futures on Russian and foreign shares, Eurobond Russia-30, currency pairs, interest rates; 
futures for oil and sugar; option contracts for some of these futures. No other CIS country 
can boast of trading in such variety of financial instruments, as Russia does.  
Despite such established trading in a wide range of financial instruments, “the real 
investment potential of the stock market still fell short of the countries’ need for financial 
resources”, 97 low public and investor confidence being the reason behind the departure of 
private investors from the securities market that consequently lead to the dominance of 
state and quasi-state institutional investors, including the Pension Fund, Sberbank, VTB, 
and other development institutions. This can explain the prominence of government 
securities in the Russian securities market, which represent the most advanced market 
means of public debt. However, such investments of budgetary funds are not entirely 
acceptable means from the viewpoint of market economy principles.  
Stock exchanges play an essential role in the securities market infrastructure as they 
provide the primary platform for trading with securities at the national, regional, and global 
levels. In Russia, the Moscow Stock Exchange serves as such a central platform. It is 
included in the list of the largest exchanges of the world (the second for bonds, the third 
for the number of derivatives contracts, the twenty-fourth in terms of the volume of share 
trading). 98  The main feature of the Moscow Stock Exchange is its multifunctional and 
consolidated character that is not present in other CIS countries, including Uzbekistan. 
Firstly, the Moscow Exchange Group manages the only multifunctional stock exchange in 
Russia for trading stocks, bonds, derivatives, currency, money market instruments and 
commodities. Secondly, its function is not limited only to the organization of securities 
trading. It also includes the central depository (namely, the National Settlement 
                                                 
96 Moscow Stock Exchange, Equity and Bond Market Report 2016. http://2016.report-
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Depository), as well as the clearing center (namely, the Bank National Clearing Center), 
which performs the functions of the central counterparty in the markets, which allows the 
Moscow Exchange to provide customers with a full cycle of trading and post-trading 
services.  
2.3.1.2. Securities market regulatory structure in Russia  
 
The organizational structure of securities markets is one of their main institutional 
attributes. Hence why the effective functioning of the securities market is impossible 
without state regulation and supervision. In the last three decades, the Russian securities 
market organizational structure underwent several stages. The reforms on structuring the 
regulatory architecture of the securities market during this period can be broadly divided 
into three phases. In the first phase of changes (1993-2004) the Securities and Exchange 
Commission was established under the President of the Russian Federation (1993). 99 In 
1996 this Commission became the Federal Commission for the Securities Market of the 
Russian Federation (FCSM), 100  and further legislation that defined its legal status and 
authority was adopted.101   
In the second phase, which covered the period from 2004 to 2012, several structural 
reforms directed toward strengthening the legal status and powers of the regulator were 
carried out. In 2004 the FCSM was abolished and another authority – the Federal Service 
for Financial Markets – was established which took over the functions of control and 
supervision of the abolished FCSM and of other bodies. 102 Further reforms were connected 
with the position of the regulator within government. The regulator`s name and status were 
changed several times since 1993; de jure the regulator was under the President of the 
Russian Federation. However, from 2004 it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Prime 
                                                 
99 Order No. 163-rp of March 9, 1993 President of the Russian Federation ‘On Securities and Exchange 
Commission under the President of the Russian Federation’.  
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Minister. 103  In 2011 the Russian Federal Insurance Supervision Service annexed the 
Federal Service for Financial Markets.104   
The third phase of reforms was more crucial than the previous phases due to its 
form and content. It was connected with the idea of creating a mega-regulator in the 
financial sector as a part of reforms aimed at making Moscow an international financial 
center. The creation of a mega-regulator in Russia began to be actively debated in 2012 
when the UK, whose capital is a principal global commercial center, shifted from the 
single regulator 105  to a twin peaks approach. 106  According to the vice-president of the 
Russian Bank Association, Yuriy Kormosh, the idea of creating a mega-regulator in Russia 
was first proposed by the British company Cadogan Financial107 in 1999.108   However, 
today the discussion on the creation of a mega-regulator in Russia is settled, given that 
since September 1, 2013 the Federal Financial Markets Service has been abolished and its 
powers transferred to the Bank of Russia.109 
Moreover, by March 3, 2014, the Financial Markets Service of the Bank of Russia 
was abolished about two years earlier than planned. The authority to regulate, control and 
supervise the financial markets, previously carried out by the Financial Markets Service 
was transferred to subdivisions of the Bank of Russia. Consequently, the Bank of Russia 
has become the state regulator in the securities market in Russia.  
The Ministry of Finance possesses some residual limited powers to determine the 
procedure for the issuing of federal government securities, and is responsible for 
registering government, municipal and regional bonds, and bonds issued by insurance 
companies. Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia is authorized to take measures to 
protect investor rights, and to oversee merger and acquisition deals concerning JSCs.  
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The Russian securities market regulatory structure is relatively developed in the 
sense of self-regulatory organizations activity. Currently, there are seven major self-
regulatory organizations in the Russian securities market.110 They actively participate in 
establishing rules and standards; protecting members’ interests; improving law 
enforcement practice, and raising public awareness.    
2.3.1.3.Origin and development of SM legal basis in Russia 
 
The specifics of Russian securities market regulation are directly connected with 
the country’s method of market economy transition and privatization reforms briefly 
discussed above. The shock therapy method of privatization and of creating a securities 
market overnight111 did not leave space for the elaboration and adoption of appropriate 
legal bases for those relations. Consequently, the emerging securities market had had 
to survive unaided by the fundamental laws concerning the securities market, JSCs, 
and the stock exchange. Instead, “market participants were forced to use outdated, Soviet-
time Civil and Penal Codes and other laws” and some by- law acts that regulated dynamic 
securities market relations. 112   According to the Chairman of the Russian Investor 
Protection Association, Dmitriy Vasiliev, the delay of the early legal reforms concerning 
the Russian securities market during 1991-1998 impacted on the character of the market 
and “allowed easy creation of so-called ‘financial pyramids.’”113 Gaps in legal regulation 
also caused the emergence of an oligarchs’ class; an increase in corporate raiders practice; 
and other violations of shareholders’ rights.   
 The law on the securities market was adopted in as late as 1996, after five years of 
intensive privatization reforms; after the almost complete distribution of state property 
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among the Communist Party elite (nomenklatura) and officials to the “new Russians.” 114 
One could compare it to the situation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where the adoption of 
the first special laws (not by-laws) was as early as in the early 90s.115 Of course, one could 
reasonably argue that the adoption of laws alone when accompanied by weak institutions 
and poor enforcement practice does not change the situation much. Giving due attention to 
this viewpoint, it should be mentioned that the existence of exclusive legislation in the 
early stages of market relations suggests the presence of some concern about the fairness 
of relations, an attempt of ensuring investor protection, and of efforts on reducing systemic 
risk.  
Despite the decent quality and level of and enforcement, 116 currently Russia 
possesses most special laws that are necessary for modern securities market relations 
including, among others: the Federal Law on the Securities Market; 117 the Federal Law on 
Joint Stock Companies; 118 the Federal Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of 
Investors in the Securities Market; 119 the Federal Law on Banks and Banking Activity; 120 
the Federal Law on the Central Depository; 121 the Federal Law on Investment Activities in 
the Russian Federation in the Form of Capital Investments; 122  the Federal Law on the 
Specifics of the Issue and Circulation of State and Municipal Securities; 123  the Federal 
Law on Clearing and Clearing Activities; 124 the Federal Law on Organized Trading; 125 the 
Federal Law on Investment Partnership; 126  and the Federal Law on Central Bank of 
Russian Federation (Bank of Russia). 127  In addition to these laws, regulation is also 
effected by bylaw acts on the part of the government, the President, and the central 
regulator – namely, the Central Bank of Russia. 
                                                 
114 Federal Law on the Securities Market, No. 39-FZ of April 22, 1996. 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/securities/russiasm.pdf (NB., available in English).  
115 A detailed analysis of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan securities market legislation is presented in the next 
subsections.  
116 A relatively recent assessment of Russian securities market regulation may be found in the IMF report on 
the Russian observance of IOSCO objectives and principles of securities regulation. Cf., IMF, Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes – IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 
Washington D.C., July 2016. 
117 No. 39-FZ of April 22, 1996, last amendment from June 18, 2017, 
http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/1117932/  
118 No. 208-FZ of December 26, 1995 
119 No. 46-FZ of February 18, 1999 
120 No. 395-1 of December 02, 1990 
121 No. 414-FZ of December 7, 2011 
122 No. 39-F3 of February 25, 1999 
123 No. 136-FZ of July 29, 1998 
124 No. 7-FZ of February 7, 2011  
125 No. 325-F3 of November 21, 2011  
126 No. 335-FZ of November 28, 2011. 
127 No.86-FZ of July 10, 2002.  
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Among the legislation mentioned above, the Law on the Securities Market plays an 
important role in securities market regulation due to its rich content and coverage of the 
whole range of securities market relations, including securities issuance, their circulation, 
regulation, and participant responsibility/liability matters. Russian securities law is 
relatively modest compared to that of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. For instance, in the 
relevant legislation, the main issues – such as the legal regime of the security, the 
conception of the securities market; the activity of the accounting system entities, etc.  – 
have not been completely resolved. According to Gabov, judicial practice in cases arising 
from disputes in the securities market – for example, discussions of owners with registrars 
and issuers – suggests that a market with such regulation does not give participants a 
fundamental thing: namely, the certainty and inviolability of their rights.128    
After the financial crisis of 2008 the government took seriously the need to improve 
its securities market legislation. Thus, with the aim of improving the regulation and 
development of the financial market for the medium- and long-term, the government 
approved the ‘Strategy for the Development of the Financial Market of the Russian 
Federation for the Period to 2020’ 129 and presented the ‘Plan of Measures for Creating an 
International Financial Center in the Russian Federation’.130  
2.3.2. Development of institutional and legal bases of Kazakhstan securities market   
 2.3.2.1. Overview of Kazakhstan securities market infrastructure 
 
The Kazakhstan securities market belongs to the most developed financial markets 
in the Central Asian region and one of the leading markets in the CIS. Along with the 
general features of CIS countries’ securities markets (discussed in previous sections), there 
are some notable specifics concerning the formation of the Kazakhstan securities market 
infrastructure. Firstly, unlike other CIS countries, Kazakhstan has been attempting to 
diversify the supply side of its securities market. For instance, in 2012 Kazakhstan was the 
                                                 
128 Габов, Андрей Владимирович, Проблемы гражданско-правового регулирования отношений на 
рынке ценных бумаг, диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора юридических наук, Москва, 
2010. (Andrey Vladimirovich Gabov, “Problems of civil-law regulation of relations in the securities market, 
dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Sciences”, (Moscow, 2010)). Scientific Library of 
Dissertations and Abstracts disserCat http://www.dissercat.com/content/problemy-grazhdansko-pravovogo-
regulirovaniya-otnoshenii-na-rynke-tsennykh-bumag#ixzz4lRko9ObK  
129 The Strategy of Development of the Financial Market of the Russian Federation until 2020. Approved by  
Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 2043- r dated December 29, 2008, 
http://www.fcsm.ru/ru/press/russia2020/ strategy2020/. 
130 Approved by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation no. 911- r dated July 11, 2009, 
http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/connect/ 
economylib4/mer/resources/2fdaf580409d9e7a82e2eb2c73e16b99/911_p.doc 
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first in the post-Soviet region to launch Islamic bonds (Sukuk Al-Murabaha).131 Sixty-two 
percent of this issue went to Malaysian investors and the remaining thirty-eight percent 
went to the securities market of Kazakhstan. 
Moreover, Kazakhstan issued 10- and 30-year Eurobonds for USD 4 billion.132 
Even though the reason for issuing these bonds was to cover the deficit of the state 
budget,133 it was a serious step towards the global securities market.  Consequently, such 
financial instruments have become a serious alternative to traditional bank lending due to 
their level of credit risk, interest rates, and terms.      
Secondly, the involvement of the banking industry in the securities market relations 
of Kazakhstan is more active than in Russia. The fact that Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, 
which is the leading platform for securities trading, was founded by National Bank and 
another twenty-three leading commercial banks of Kazakhstan is illustrative of the 
substantial role of the banking industry in the formation of the securities market 
infrastructure. Bank participation is far-reaching and covers all relations of the market, 
including issuing a wide range of securities, acting as an investor, and rendering market 
intermediary services.134    
Thirdly, unlike Russia and other CIS countries, in Kazakhstan non-banking 
professional investment institutions are relatively developed. For instance, pension funds 
have an active role as investors, shareholders, and intermediaries in the securities market. 
135  
Fourthly, unlike Uzbekistan, and like Russia, the Kazakhstan stock exchange acts 
as a universal financial market, there is systematically organized trading in fields including 
the foreign currency market, the government securities market, the equity market and 
corporate bonds, the repo operations market, and in the derivatives market.136   
                                                 
131 Bonds were issued to the amount of 240 million Malaysian ringgit (11.378 billion tenge) with an annual 
interest premium of 5.50%, and a five-year maturity (August 2017). 
132Sabina Amangeldi, “Kazakhstan placed $2.5bn Eurobonds in two tranches of 10 and 30 years”, Halyk 
Finance, October 7, 2014, http://www.halykfinance.kz/en/s ite/index/research/news:90984  
133 “Kazakhstan Places Two Eurobond Issues to the Amount of USD 2.5 BN”, Kazakhstan Stock Exchange, 
October 15, 2014, http://www.kase.kz/en/news/show/1232335 
134 S. Dontsov, Kazakhstan’s Securities market and Its Main Institutional Investors. Rynok tsennykh bumag. 
no.18, (2003). 
135 Alexander Libman and Evgeny Vinokurov, Holding-Together Regionalism: Twenty Years of Post-Soviet 
Integration (Springer, 2012), 132. 
136 See the website of Kazakhstan Stock Exchange for further details: http://www.kase.kz 
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And fifthly, in 2016 Kazakhstan 137  launched the International Financial Center 
(IFC) in Astana, which is based on English law principles and on the standards of the 
world’s leading financial centers, and which is designed as a prototype of the Dubai IFC.  
The IFC138 supplements the existing securities market infrastructure with a new institution, 
namely, a Special Court that is outside the ordinary judicial system of Kazakhstan. It was 
proposed to improve the dispute resolution system of the securities market, which is one of 
the critical points of investor confidence in the market, to increase the scale of investment, 
and to ensure the integration of the Kazakhstan securities market with international 
markets.   
2.3.2.2. Securities market regulatory structure in Kazakhstan  
 
The securities market organizational structure in Kazakhstan has also faced several 
reforms until the establishment of the current mega-regulator system under the regulation 
of the National Bank of Kazakhstan. In the first stage of changes (1991-1994) as has been 
the case with the other countries compared, the Ministry of Finance was responsible for the 
regulation of the emerging securities market.  
The development of market relations, increasing the quantity and quality of 
financial instruments and market participants, as well as the necessity of implementing 
international standards on securities market regulation, severely reformed the regulatory 
structure of the industry. As a result of these reforms in 1995, the National Commission on 
Securities was established as an independent body, which was the authorized body for 
securities market regulation in Kazakhstan until 2000.  
  In terms of the specifics concerning the participants in the Kazakhstan securities 
market, banks are the most dominant both in relation to stock issuance and circulation, and 
in influencing the future development of the regulatory regime. Thus, for the next five 
years the securities market regulator sat within the structure of the National Bank as a 
separate department.  
From 2004 to 2011 the regulatory and supervisory functions were performed by the 
Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Regulation and Supervision of the Financial 
Market and Financial Organizations (FSA) – an independent entity that reported directly to 
the President. During 2011–2013, the Committee for the Control and Supervision of the 
                                                 
137 Officially, the Astana IFC was launched in 2016, but started fully operating from 2018 after the 
conversion of the main pavilion of the EXPO. 
138 Decree of the President of Kazakhstan ‘On the Establishment of the International Financial Center 
‘Astana’’, May 19, 2015, No. 24. 
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Financial Market and Financial Organizations (FSC) – then a subdivision of the National 
Bank – performed the supervisory and regulatory functions in the securities market of 
Kazakhstan. 
In January 2014, by Presidential decree, the FSC was abolished and its departments 
were subsequently absorbed by the National Bank, which is accountable to the President, 
who, among other things, appoints its Chair (with the consent of Parliament) and his/her 
deputies. The President also approves the National Bank’s structure, overall size of its 
staff, and its salary system. The law does not specify the conditions under which the 
National Bank Chairman and his/her deputies may be removed from office.  
2.3.2.3. Origin and development of SM legal basis in Kazakhstan  
 
As mentioned above, Kazakhstan started to build a legal framework of its emerging 
securities market in parallel with its economic and institutional bases. Thus, the first 
Kazakhstan securities legislation appeared on 11 June 1991 ,139 namely, the Law of the 
Kazakh SSR On Circulation of Securities and Stock Exchange – a critical law for 
securities market regulation that determined initial norms on the status of both financial 
instruments and regulators. This act mainly focused on facilitating trade in securities, and it 
did not institute any effective control or sanctioning mechanisms. Due to the lack of proper 
control over the securities market it is unsurprising that several major financial scandals 
soon emerged. 140  What is more, the Ministry of Finance had to issue a temporary 
instruction on licensing professional activities in the securities market following nine 
months from the adoption of this legislation. By this instruction, the Ministry of Finance 
authorized 1,460 individuals and 98 legal entities from 1992 to 1994.   
 In 1997 a new phase of property redistribution was launched that was characterized 
by the use of important schemes, such as legalized blurring of government shares, 
converting debts into securities, selling receivables, trust schemes, buying bills, and 
manipulating dividends on preferred shares. Also, the active participation of the state and 
escalating investor protection issues concerning the redistribution of the largest 
Kazakhstani companies resulted in strengthening the legal bases of investor protection. For 
instance, by the end of 1997, the Kazakh securities market had an expanded legislative 
                                                 
139 See: Maidan K. Suleimenov and Farkhad S. Karagoussov, “The Legal Basis for the Securities Market in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan”, Review of Central and East European Law, 1998. Nos.5/6, 451-468, 
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=32240989&mode=p 
140 Rilka Dragneva (ed). Investor Protection in the CIS: Legal Reform and Voluntary Harmonization . Vol. 
57. (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007), 159. 
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base based on the provisions of the Civil Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which 
provided a set of measures to protect the interests of investors. The lega l basis of the 
securities market was the Law on the Securities Market of March 5, 1997, and some 
regulations issued under the above law by the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
and the National Commission on Securities. For instance, the Law on Registration of 
Transactions with Securities in the Republic of Kazakhstan o f 5 March 1997; the Law on 
Investment Funds in the Republic of Kazakhstan of March 6, 1997; and the Law on 
Pensions in the Republic of Kazakhstan of June 20, 1997. 
Presently, the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Securities Market of July 
2, 2003 determines the basics of securities market regulation.141 It was adopted a month 
after the Law on Joint Stock Companies was approved on 13 May 2003, which represents 
the beginning of a more qualitative approach to regulation. The Securities Law regulates 
social relations arising in the process of issuing, placing, circulating and redeeming equity 
securities and other financial instruments.  The specifics of the creatio n and activities of 
securities market entities, determine the procedure for regulation, control and supervision 
of the securities market in order to ensure the safe, open and effective functioning of the 
securities market, protection of the rights of investors and holders of securities, fair 
competition of participants in the securities market. The last reforms on the improvement 
of securities market regulation suggest a strong willingness on the part of government to 
boost the market and investment through financial instruments and the securities market. 
For instance, the state initiative to establish a Regional Financial Center in Almaty aimed 
at the development of the securities market, its integration with international capital 
markets, attracting investments into the economy of Kazakhstan through securities market 
and through the access of foreign issuers into the particular trading floor of the financial 
center, all encourage the improvement of the situation. 142  However, some scholars are 
skeptical as they consider the reality of attracting international portfolio investment 
through the Regional Financial Center of Almaty as discourage medium-sized domestic 
enterprises for involving access into the securities market. Instead, they propose that the 
most effective financing and the best government support for the market is the fostering of 
a competitive environment with equal conditions. Honest competition leads to more 
                                                 
141 Adopted in July 2, 2003 No.461-II, with the amendments from February 27, 2017, 
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1041258#pos=190; -223  
142 For further details on the Regional Financial Centre of Almaty (RFCA), see the official internet resource 
of the National Bank of Kazakhstan: http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=768&switch=english  
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efficient sector development. 143  Giving due attention to the government initiative, the 
present author also supports the approach of fostering a competitive environment in the 
financial market.144   
2.3.3. Development of institutional and legal bases of the Uzbekistan securities market   
2.3.3.1. Overview of Uzbekistan securities market infrastructure  
 
Generally, the specifics of the securities market infrastructure of CIS countries 
reviewed are also present in Uzbekistan’s securities market institutions. However, several 
features should be taken into account in proposing recommendations on the improvement 
of the current situation of the market. Firstly, financial instruments in Uzbekistan’s equity 
and state securities markets are relatively developed rather than its corporate bonds and 
derivatives markets. The dominance of the equity market mainly derives from the 
privatization method adopted, based on which state enterprises were restructured as JSCs. 
Compared to the Kazakhstan and Russian securities market, there is almost no derivatives 
market in Uzbekistan. The reasons for the underdevelopment of the derivatives market in 
Uzbekistan is connected both with the systemic and structural drawbacks of the national 
securities market, and the features of the derivative itself. 
Secondly, the leading platform for securities trading – namely, the Tashkent Stock 
exchange (TSE) – is not the multifunctional financial institution as is the case with those of 
Russia or Kazakhstan. The TSE organizes trading only with shares, state and corporate 
bonds, deposit certificates, and derivatives. Trading with commodities, and foreign 
currency held by Tashkent Commodity Exchange, 145  and Uzbekistan state Currency 
Exchange146 respectively. For Uzbekistan, the consolidated exchange is characterized in 
the initial stage of development when in 1991 a stock department was formed within the 
Tashkent Exchange as the first securities market institution. 147   In the opinion of the 
present author, the high level of specialization of different exchanges is a sign of a 
                                                 
143 Z. M. Omarkhanova, L. R. Esbergenova, Z. A. Makisheva, and G. K. Kishibekova. “Modernization of 
Securities Market in Kazakhstan”, International Electronic Journal of Mathematics Education  11, no. 7 
(2016), 2056. 
144 A competitive environment in the present research means the acceleration of the securities market’s 
activity and its resource allocation and distribution functions; and the building of a competitive atmosphere 
that will allow securities markets to compete with the banking industry for the p rovision of finance. 
 
145 See details at: http://uzex.uz/en  
146 See details at http://uzrvb.uz/en  
147 Бутиков И. Отечественный рынок ценных бумаг: хроника событий, Октябрь, 2016. (I. Butikov, The 
Domestic Securities Market: A Chronicle of Events, (October, 2016) http://biznes-daily.uz/ru/gazeta-
birja/42715-otchstvnniy-rinok-snnix-bumag-xronika-sobitiy 
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developed exchange system in the country. From this viewpoint, Uzbekistan’s experience 
on establishment of separate trading platforms with different types of product (stocks, 
commodity, foreign currency, agricultural, etc.) could be a good example concerning the 
organization and regulation of exchange activity in the CIS region.            
Thirdly, the state regulator for the securities market is not combined with the 
banking regulator, as is the case in Russia from 2013, 148 and Kazakhstan from 2014,149 
where the central bank is responsible for the regulation of the entire financial system, 
including the banking industry, capital markets, insurance, and the securities market. The 
state regulator’s status was the object of separate research in which the present author had 
been involved, which included a comparative analysis of the state regulatory regimes of 
the securities markets of Russia, Uzbekistan, and Japan. The conclusions of that research 
indicated that it would be appropriate to implement in Uzbekistan a unified model of state 
securities market regulator under the authority of its Central Bank.150        
And fourthly, Uzbekistan’s securities market has a relatively modest index of 
trading stocks in foreign currency (FC trade/FTC), which shows the openness of the 
market to foreign investors and access of national companies to global financial markets.  
The underdevelopment of the FCT market, while not an excellent feature, was actually one 
of the main reasons that Uzbekistan’s loss was minimized during the last major crisis – 
namely, the global financial crisis of 2008. However, in general, this is a critical factor for 
fostering foreign investment flows into the national securities market, and opening access 
for domestic companies in global financial markets.151  
2.3.3.2. Securities market regulatory structure in Uzbekistan 
 
The experience of Uzbekistan in establishing its state securities market regulator 
has been under way since 1991 when the country began gradual reforms towards building 
a market economy. These reforms could be divided into three stages.  In the first stage, 
attention was mainly paid to creating the legal and institutional bas is for securities market 
regulation through the adoption of legislation and the establishment of appropriate market 
                                                 
148 For further details, see the official website of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation: 
https://www.cbr.ru/Eng  
149 For further details, see the official internet resource of the National Bank of Kazakhstan: 
http://www.nationalbank.kz/?docid=3000&switch=english  
150 For further details, see Otabek Sadievich Narziev, “Independence and Structure of State Securities Market 
Regulator in Uzbekistan”, Annual Report on Research and Education 2014, Nagoya University, March 2015, 
pp. 45-87.  
151 For further details, see the Tashkent Stock Exchange website: https://uzse.uz/isu_infos/FCT 
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institutions. In 1991 the legal basis of exchanges activity was provided 152  by the 
Exchanges Council as a coordinating body for exchange activit ies. The Council was 
formed from the chairpersons of the exchanges operating in Uzbekistan. 
In the second stage, the gradual reforms mostly focused on increasing the quality of 
the regulatory structure. For instance, the Presidential Decree on Additional Measures to 
Develop Securities Market, adopted on September 7, 1995, 153  introduced a series of 
fundamental standards directed at the state regulation of the securities market.  According 
to that Decree, the State Securities and Exchange Commission (SSEC) was formed under 
the Ministry of Finance of Uzbekistan. Its purposes included the implementation of state 
policy on the development, deepening and broadening of the securities market, the removal 
of existing barriers to its further development, as well as the protection of investor and 
shareholder rights and interests.  
The SSEC had to very closely cooperate with the State Committee of Uzbekistan 
for State Property Management (SPC) – i.e., the authorized body for the privatization 
process. The reason for this cooperation was securitization, which was the primary method 
of privatization. The Presidential Decree on the Formation of the Center for Coordination 
and Control over the Securities Market under the State Property Committee of Uzbekistan 
of March 26, 1996, 154 strengthened the legal framework for such cooperation. According 
to the Decree, the aim of establishing the Center for Coordination and Control of Securities 
Market under the SPC (CSM), instead of abolished SSEC under the Ministry of Finance, 
was to improve the functioning and state regulation of the securities market, to coordinate 
the activities of its members, and to ensure the protection of investor rights and interests. 
Moreover, this act determined the legal status of the CSM as the authorized state body 
regulating the securities market. The Resolution (Charter) of the CSM was approved by the 
Government’s Resolution on Organization of the Center for Coordination and Control over 
the Securities Market under the State Property Committee of Uzbekistan of March 30, 
                                                 
152  Указ о координации биржевой деятельности в республике Узбекистан, [Ukaz o Koordinatsii 
Birzhevoy Deyatel'nosti v Respublike Uzbekistan], 2 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki 
Uzbekistan 88 (1992). (i.e., ‘Decree on Coordination of Exchange Activities in Uzbekistan’, Bulletin of the 
Supreme Council of Uzbekistan , vol. 2, 88 (1992)) 
153 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta Respubliki Uzbekistan, 1995 g., No. 10-11, st.225. Nastoyashchiy Ukaz 
utratil silu soglasno p.2 Ukaza Prezidenta Respubliki Uzbekistan ot  24.10.2008 g. za No. UP-4045, (i.e., The 
Vedomosti of the Supreme Council of Uzbekistan, 1995,Vol.10-11, Article 225. This Decree repealed 
according to clause 2 of the Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated October 24, 2008, 
No. UP-4045.) 
154 Sobraniye postanovleniy Pravitel'stva Respubliki Uzbekistan, 1996 g., No. 3, st. 11, (i.e., Assembly on 
Resolutions of the Government of Uzbekistan , 1996, vol. 3, 11). 
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1996.155 Based on this Resolution governmental bodies and securities market participants 
defined one of the main objectives of the CSM was to oversee the implementation of 
securities legislation. 
In the third stage of reforms, which are ongoing, the structure of the securities 
market regulation was improved. These improvements included the further privatization of 
state assets and widening the range of private property as the basis of a market economy, 
the improvement of antimonopoly regulation and the fostering of a real competitive 
environment, the accelerated development of the securities market (especially the 
secondary one), and the improvement of corporate governance. A Presidential Decree o f 
November 13, 2012, created the State Committee of Uzbekistan for Privatization De-
monopolization and Development of Competition by the abrogated SPC and State 
Committee of Uzbekistan for De-monopolization and Development of Competition.156   
However, these reforms toward a unified regulation of state property management, 
the securities market, and antimonopoly regulation gave rise to fundamental problems 
including conflicts of interest. Some of these have been solved, mainly through measures 
on the elimination of conflicts of interest between the SPC, which is the main authorized 
body on managing state shares in joint stock companies, and the CSM, which is under the 
jurisdiction of the SPC. Under a subsequent government Resolution, the new 
organizational structure of the SPC was approved, the Center for Management of State 
Assets under the SPC was created, and the name of the securities market regulator was 
changed to the ‘Center on Coordination and Development of the Securities Market’ 
(CSM).157   
After these latest reforms, the securities regulatory body is still under the  
jurisdiction of the SPC. The difference from the previous structure is that managing state 
assets and regulating securities are currently the responsibility of two separate Centers in 
the formation of the SPC. This theoretically and partly solved the conflicts of interest 
mentioned above. However, due to both Centers being under the jurisdiction of the SPC, 
such problems may recur during their activities that could interfere in the independent 
operation of the securities market regulator.   
 
                                                 
155 Ibid.  
156 Decree on Creation of the New State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan, http://gki.uz/en/about-
spc/day-to-day-activity-/8529-2012-11-14-11-34-46.  
157 Resolution of Cabinet Ministers dated December 14, 2012, No 322 ‘On arrangement of the activity of the 
State Committee of Uzbekistan for State Property Management and State Committee of Uzbekistan for the 
De-monopolization and Development of Competition’ http://gki.uz/en/about-spc/comstructure  
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2.3.3.3.Origin and development of legal basis in Uzbekistan 
 
 The Law on Exchanges and Exchange Activity 158 was amongst the first pieces of 
legislation to determine, clarify, and guarantee the activity of the leading institutions of the 
securities market – i.e., the exchanges in Uzbekistan. As mentioned by one the prominent 
scholars of Uzbekistan specializing in securities market, Igor Butikov, at that time there 
was an urgent necessity for the adoption of this law. In the early 90s, in Uzbekistan, as was 
the case with other republics of the former USSR, the exchange movement had gained 
momentum. By the summer of 1992, there were already 36 different stock e xchanges in 
the republic. The government was alarmed by the fact that the number of exchanges was 
growing at an explosive pace, and since exchanges are in the sphere of circulation, 
economic institutions such as exchanges were necessary to regulate such 
transactions. 
Meanwhile, the country, particularly at that time, needed the production of 
consumer goods, food, etc. – that is it needed the development of its productive base. Since 
up to that point there had been no law on stock exchanges as such, any organization that 
registered itself as an exchange could receive significant revenues, producing nothing but 
the registration of various kinds of contracts. Therefore, in July 1992, the Supreme Council 
of the Republic of Uzbekistan adopted the Law on Exchanges and Exchange Activities, in 
which the status and basic norms for the activity of stock exchanges and stock departments 
of commodity exchanges were first determined. The main requirements for the exchanges 
were as follows: the statutory fund was to be at least 50 million rubles, the founders of 
exchanges could not be state bodies, and the stock exchanges themselves were prohibited 
from establishing and investing money in any business organizations whose activities were 
not connected to the maintenance of exchange trades. As a result, by 1993 there were only 
two exchanges left in the republic: namely, the ‘Tashkent’ Exchange and the ‘Uzbekistan’ 
Exchange i.e., the Republic’s Agro-industrial Exchange. 159  
Another important act of that year was the adoption of the Law on Securities and 
Stock Exchanges, 160  which provided a definition of securities, its main types (shares, 
                                                 
158  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o birzhakh i birzhevoy deyatel'nosti, Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta 
Respubliki Uzbekistan, vol. 10, 1992,  (Law of Uzbekistan on exchanges and exchange activity, Vedomosti 
of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan) http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=24493. 
159 Igor Butikov, Domestic securities market: a chronicle of events, October 2016. For further details, see: 
http://biznes-daily.uz/ru/gazeta-birja/42715-otchstvnniy-rinok-snnix-bumag-xron ika-sobitiy.   
160  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o tsennykh bumagakh i fondovoy birzhe, Vedomosti Verkhovn ogo Soveta 
Respubliki Uzbekistan vol. 11–12, 1994, (i.e., the Law of Uzbekistan on the Securities and Exchange, 
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bonds, treasury bonds, deposit certificates, exchange bills), provided for the regulation of 
their issuance and circulation, established the legal status of stock exchanges and market 
participants, and provided for the supervision of the securities market. This was the first 
law determining the legal basis for regulating the securities market and thus laying the 
foundations for its development in Uzbekistan. The Law on Securities and Stock 
Exchanges was enforced until 2008, when, further to far-reaching reforms of the securities 
legislation, the new Law on Securities Market161 was adopted.  
So, in the first stage of the development of the country's securities market (1990-
1993), necessary legislation was adopted to determine the status of private property, 
including securities, market participants (issuers, investors, trade organizers, and 
intermediaries), and the framework of regulation of the securities market.    
The strengthening of market infrastructure, increasing the number of participants, 
and strengthening state regulation were key features of the second stage of the 
development of regulation for the securities market of Uzbekistan. Thus, in 1994 the first, 
and, currently, the sole, stock exchange – namely, the Tashkent Stock Exchange (of the 
Republic) – was created as an organized market for the circulation of securities. In that 
year 13 broker firms were accredited, and exchange trade circulation was 30 million USSs. 
Unsurprisingly, without an authorized regulatory body of the securities market, it was 
difficult to regulate and coordinate the whole securities market, hence why establishing the 
Center for Coordination and Control of Securities Market 162  under the State Property 
Management Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan on March 26, 1996, represents the 
beginning of a new stage in the development of securities regulation in Uzbekistan.  
During the second stage of privatization, several new JSCs appeared almost daily. 
On April 25, 1996, the Law on Joint Stock Companies and the Protection of Shareholder 
Rights163 was adopted.164 This law was the first to create the legal framework for corporate 
governance in Uzbekistan. The same day a further piece of key legislation concerning  
                                                                                                                                                   
Vedomosti of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Uzbekistan) 
http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=112172. 
161  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o rynke tsennykh bumag, Sobraniye zakonodatel'stva Respubliki 
Uzbekistan, vol. 39, 2009, (i.e., the Law of Uzbekistan on the Securities Market, Collection of Laws of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan) http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=1374867. 
162 See the official website of the Center for Coordination and Development of the Securities Market: 
http://csm.gov.uz/en 
163  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh i zashchite prav aktsionerov, Vedomosti 
Oliy Mazhlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan, vol. 5–6, 1996, (i.e., Law of Uzbekistan on Joint-stock Companies and 
the Protection of Shareholders' Rights, Vedomosti of Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan ) 
http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=14667. 
164 During the preparation of the current paper, this legislation was adopted in new edition and entered into  
force on May 7, 2014. For further details, see:  http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=2382409 
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securities regulation was adopted – namely, the Law on the Mechanism of Operation of 
Securities Markets. 165  This legislation was relevant because it covered all aspects of 
securities market relations and their regulation. Notably, the law provided: for the 
clarification of the concept of the securities market and investment institutions, the 
operation and regulation of the securities market, the disclosure of information rules, and 
for the clarification of the responsibilities of securities market participants. At that time 
one of the foremost institutions of the securities market – namely, the depository system – 
was complicated, and the depositories have insufficient links to each other. The Law on 
Depository Activities at Securities Markets of August 29, 1998, 166  reorganized the 
depository system into a two-tier order: the State Central Securities Depository and 
second-level depositories.  
After laying down the necessary legislation and the securities market infrastructure, 
subsequent reforms in securities regulation aimed at strengthening international relations 
and the protection of investors’ rights in the securities market. Based on this reform on 
January 12, 1998, Uzbekistan’s authorized regulatory body for the securities market joined 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).167 Taking into account 
the active participation of foreign investors in the securities market, on August 30, 2001, 
the Law on the Protection of Investors’ Rights at Securities Markets was adopted.168 That 
year exchange turnover stood at 8.0 billion UZSs, including less than USD 1 million in the 
foreign currency platform. 169  In September 2001 the Tashkent Exchange joined the 
International Association of Exchanges of CIS countries.170 As a result of these reforms, 
the EBRD’s Securities Markets Legislation Assessment in 2004 indicated that 
Uzbekistan’s legislation was in ‘medium compliance’ with IOSCO principles.171   
Such relatively high international appraisal and other existing issues provided the 
impetus for further reforms aimed at improving the securities legislation and regulation. 
                                                 
165  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o mekhanizme funktsionirovaniya rynka tsennykh bumag, Vedomosti Oliy 
Mazhlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan, vol. 1, 2003, (i.e., Law of Uzbekistan on the Mechanism of the Operation of 
the Securities Markets, Vedomosti of Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan) 
http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=14626. 
166  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o deyatel'nosti depozitariyev na rynke tsennykh bumag, Vedomosti Oliy 
Mazhlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan , vol. 1, 2003, (Law of Uzbekistan on depository activities at securities 
market, Vedomosti of Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan) http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=12207. 
167 http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=647839&query=IOSCO 
168  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o zashchite prav investorov na rynke tsennykh bumag, Vedomosti Oliy 
Mazhlisa Respubliki Uzbekistan , vol. 9–10, 2001, (i.e., Law of Uzbekistan on Investor Protection in the 
Securities Market, Vedomosti of Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan) http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=6270. 
169 http://www.uzse.uz/new/about/about_us.asp 
170 Ibid. 
171 Commercial Laws of Uzbekistan: An Assessment by the EBRD, 2002, 4–5 
 50 
Various special teams in the Cabinet of Ministers, Ministry of Finance, Central Bank, and 
the Centre for Coordination and Control of Securities Market were created to study the 
reasons and to explore solutions for existing problems in the field. Based on the intensive 
work and joint efforts of academics, practitioners, and experts, a draft Securities Market 
Development Program for 2006-2007 was prepared which very soon was approved by way 
of Presidential Resolution on Measures on Further Securities Market Development dated 
27 September 2006, No. PP-475.172 The preparation and adoption of this program marked 
a new stage in the event of securities market legislation and regulation. 
The second part of the Securities Market Development Program focused on 
accelerating the development and expansion of the secondary securities market, and had 
the most significant tasks among the other elements of the Program.173 The first of these 
tasks was the elaboration of a law on the securities market by the fourth quarter of 2006. 
The draft of the bill was prepared and was passed by the Legislative Chamber ( i.e., the 
lower house of parliament) on February 13, 2008. 174 The Law on the Securities Market175 
came into force on July 23, 2008, following approval by the Senate (i.e., the upper house 
of parliament) on June 27, 2008, and signature by the President on July 22, 2008. 
In general, the adoption of the Law on the Securities Market has brought the 
country closer to the implementation of the recommendations of the Group of Thirty (G30) 
concerning both the dematerialization of securities and the concentration of accounting for 
securities in a single center. In this way, another significant step was taken to integrate the 
domestic securities market into global capital markets. According to this legislation, shares 
should be issued in a non-cash form – namely, in the form of entries in deposit accounts. 
The legislation further established the rule that the depositary accounting for stocks and 
corporate bonds is carried out only by depositaries. Depositary accounting of securities by 
the Central Depository is considered as the maintenance of the owners’ list.   
                                                 
172 Postanovleniye o merakh po dal'neyshemu razvitiyu rynka tsennykh bumag, Sobraniye zakonodatel'stva 
Respubliki Uzbekistan, 2006, (i.e., Decree on Measures for the Further Development of the Securities 
Market, Collection of Laws of the Republic of Uzbekistan) 
http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=1061597. 
173 The other parts of the program include: the further development of the primary securities market due to 
the complete divestiture of businesses and the creation of new joint -stock companies; the improvement of 
corporate governance in joint stock companies; the formation of the modern securities market infrastructure 
and strengthening its material-technical base; and the improvement of the organization of training and skills 
development for the securities market.   
174 The intensiveness of this complicated task could be understood when considering the fact that the 
Program was approved on September 27, 2006.  
175  Zakon Respubliki Uzbekistan o rynke tsennykh bumag, Sobraniye zakonodatel'stva Respubliki 
Uzbekistan, vol. 29–30, 2008, (i.e., Law of Uzbekistan on the Securities Market, Collection of Laws of the 
Republic of Uzbekistan) http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?lact_id=1374867. 
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With the adoption of the Law on the Securities Market four existing laws were 
unified, namely: the Law on Exchanges and Exchange Activity; the Law on Securities and 
Stock Exchanges; the Law on the Mechanism of Operation of Securities Markets; and the 
Law on Depository Activities at Securities Markets. It was not just a simple merger of the 
four acts. It consisted of double-checking all norms of actual acts to prevent duplication 
and normative conflicts; it provided improvements for regulators and convenience for 
participants through a single primary source, and sought to address existing problems and 
to the norms in rapidly growing relations consistent. 
Substantively, the new law introduced some innovations, which promoted better 
regulation of the securities market. For instance, the restrictions on combining different 
forms of professional activity in the securities market were abolished.  The disclosure 
information system for small business entities was liberalized. All kinds of shares were 
changed into electronic form. The securities register system was improved, a centralized 
digital database was created, and the Central Depository of Securities was nominated as a 
Central Register. A new type of professional activity in the securities market – transfer-
agency – was introduced, and the system of central regulators was improved to better 
implement consistent state regulatory policy in the securities market. Principally, the 
legislation determined that the authorized state body for the provision of the securities 
market should regulate all security issuance, distribution, and circulation independently, 
except state securities, the regulation of which would be conducted together with the 
Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. 
In May 2014 the Law on Joint Stock Companies and Protection of Shareholder 
Rights was adopted in a new edition. The aim of this revised legislation was to increase the 
legal protection of shareholders, especially minority shareholders, to enhance the role and 
importance of management and control bodies of joint stock companies, to further develop 
the corporate governance system, and to ensure information transparency of JSC activities 
for shareholders and potential investors. A year later, in 2015, the Law on the Securities 
Market was adopted in a revised/amended form to simplify the procedures related to the 
issuance of securities, including new financial instruments. This legislation also introduced 
the conclusion of transactions with securities through the widespread introduction of 
modern electronic technologies, as well as the revision of the requirements for professional 
activities in the securities market, including clarification of liability for violation of market 
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legislation.176 The law enhanced the range of securities market objects and subjects. For 
instance, Article 3 of the revised legislation is supplemented by such concepts as 
‘depositary receipts’, ‘infrastructure bonds’, ‘clearing’, ‘market maker’, and ‘netting’.  
The securities law from 2015 presented several regulatory initiatives, for instance, 
according to the law, securities-trading organizers should establish a guarantee fund for the 
compensation of possible losses to investors (cf., Article 23). The depositary activity is 
abolished as a separate professional activity (cf., Article 24), and its functions transferred 
to the investment intermediary (cf., Article 26). Furthermore, under this legislation, 
Uzbekistan National Bank is given the exclusive right to make cash payments on the 
transactions made in the organized markets (cf., Article 33), and the Central Depositary is 
empowered to assign securities with international codes (e.g., ISIN / CFI) (cf., Article 39). 
What is more, this legislation also represented a shift towards taxation of incomes 
from securities transactions. According to Article 16, it is the seller (except issuers) who 
must pay to the state a fee of 0.01% of the transaction value. However, the income/profit of 
the seller, including non-residents of Uzbekistan, under the transaction, is not subject to 
corporate income tax or personal income tax. The new law establishes that the market 
maker177 is exempted from payment of fees and other debts to the Stock Exchange, Central 
Depository, and to the Uzbekistan National Bank where transactions are made in the stock 
exchange to maintain the level of prices, supply, and demand of securities (cf., Article 39).  
 Significant changes in the types of professional activities in the securities market, 
(namely, under Article 24 of the Law on the Securities Market), such activities are carried 
out as: an investment intermediary; the investment adviser; investment fund; trust manager 
of investment assets; transfer agent; and/or organizer of over-the-counter securities trading. 
The depositary and the clearing institution as independent types of activities are abolished, 
while according to Article 26 of the revised legislation, the investment intermediary is 
required to keep a record of the securities and monetary funds of each customer, and to 
carry out transactions with securities by the contract concluded with the client.  
                                                 
176 President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on June 3, 2015, No.ZRUU-387 signed the Law of the Republic 
of Uzbekistan. 
177 Market maker is one of the professional participants of the securities market, whose task is to 
continuously ensure supply and demand on the trading floor for shares, for which company specifically 
assigns them.   
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2.4. Development level and problems of SM in CIS countries 
2.4.1. Development level of CIS countries’ SM   
 
Currently, the securities markets of CIS members are facing a range of institutional 
and legal problems that hinder their further development and integration with regional and 
global markets. According to the review of the transition experience of Russia, 
Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan in previous sections of the present thesis, reform failure in 
CIS countries had much to do with institutional and legal factors. Also, despite almost 
three decades of changes, these factors remain the key issues for the implementation of 
market economy principles in CIS countries.  
Today’s general problem for all CIS countries’ securities markets is the absence of 
a mechanism to ensure the complete realization of the potential of securities markets at the 
level of the national, regional, and global economy. Particularly, currently, the securities 
markets of CIS countries cannot be considered as providing a real competitive alternative 
source of business financing, an alternative system of mobilizing savings and allocations, 
an effective method of ensuring corporate governance and transparency of companies, and 
a potential way to attract foreign investors. 
Statistics and the overview of securities market activity in the countries under 
review helps one to better understand the current situation. In the specific literature178 
market capitalization over GDP, 179 trade volumes, and some listed companies are used as 
leading indicators of securities market development.  
Securities market capitalization is usually described as a percentile value /portion of 
GDP and shows the securities market size relative to the size of the entire economy. 
However, high securities market capitalization rates do not necessarily mean that the 
securities market is dynamic, especially in oligopolistic markets such as those of CIS 
countries. Securities market capitalization in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are quite 
moderate compared to developed markets figures. 180  For instance, in 2015 market 
                                                 
178 See for example: Stefka Slavova, Law and Finance in Transition Economies, London School of 
Economics, Financial Markets Group, 1999. 
179 Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares that are 
outstanding (including their several classes) for listed domestic companies. Investment funds, unit trusts, and 
companies whose only business goal is to hold shares of other listed companies are excluded. The data relate 
to end of year values. 
180 For instance, in 2015 in Japan market capitalization was 112% (with around 4.895 trillion USD); 180 in 
USA 139% (25.068 trillion USD); in Germany 51.01% (1.716 trillion USD); in UK180 65% (1.868 trillion 
USD). See details at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=GB-US-DE; 
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capitalization of listed domestic companies in Russia stood at 29 % (c. 622 billion USD) of 
its GDP, and in Kazakhstan it stood at 19% (c. 40 billion USD).181  In Uzbekistan World 
Bank analysis shows 4.1% in 2006 (c. 715 million USD).182 According to the latest figures 
found in the ADB research paper from 2013 that relates to Uzbekistan securities market 
capitalization information for 2007-2011, the average rate of market capitalization in 
Uzbekistan stood at about 10 % of its GDP (cf., Table 2).  
Table 2. Securities market capitalization in % of GDP  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Russia n/a 116 24 70 66 42 43 37 22 29 
Kazakhstan 54 39 23 50 41 23 12 11 11 19 
Uzbekistan 4 8.8 10.4 7.30 9.4 9.7 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Source: The figures for Russia and Kazakhstan are based on World Bank Database (Market Capitalization of 
Listed Companies, % of GDP 2006—2015).  
The figures for Uzbekistan for 2006 are based on World Bank Database; for 2007 - 2011 is based on the 
ADB Country Assessment of Uzbekistan, 2013.183   
 
Another leading indicator for assessing securities market activity is the trade 
volume versus GDP (Table 3). It shows the value of shares traded is the total number of 
shares traded, multiplied by their respective matching prices. In 2015 securities market 
trade volume in Russia was 8.5 % of its GDP; in Kazakhstan 1.4%, and in Uzbekistan 
according to the latest available data from 2011 the trade volume of stocks comprised just 
0.1% (about USD 118.7 million (c. SUM 213.1 billion)) of its GDP.184   
To conclude, there is still some space in the economy of CIS countries for trading 
with securities. In the largest economy of the region, securities trading does not reach even 
10%, in others, this index represents around 1% of GDP, which suggests significant 
underdevelopment of the securities industry as a business activity. At the same time, it 
provides a focal point for further development reforms and for fostering investment 
activity through this area of the market economy. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=GB-US-DE  
181 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=RU-KZ; 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=RU -KZ  
182 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.CD?locations=UZ; 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS?locations=UZ  
183 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/173358/43359-012-tacr-05.pdf (cf., pages 61, 
63, and 7.)  
184 Regional: Financial Sector Development in Central and West Asia, Country Assessment Uzbekistan , 
ADB, 2013. 
 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-document/173358/43359-012-tacr-05.pdf (at 7). 
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Table 3. Securities market trade volume in % of GDP  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Russia  46  31  68  65  29  18  13  14 8.5 
Kazakhstan  8,5  2,9  3,7  1,3  0,6  0,7  0,3  0,5 1.4 
Uzbekistan 0.4 0.3 0.02 0.09 0.1 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 
Source: The figures for Russia and Kazakhstan are based on the World Bank Database (Stocks 
traded, total value (% of GDP) 2007-2015);  
 The figures for Uzbekistan in 2007-2011 are based on the World Bank Database. NB., for 2012-
2015 the figures are based on this author’s calculations in turn based on data found at: uzse.uz; stat.uz; and 
cbu.uz. 
 
The next important indicator as to the potential of the supply side of the securities 
market is the number of listed companies (Table 4.),185 including foreign companies, which 
are exclusively listed, and which have shares listed on an exchange. A higher number 
means that more companies use equity financing in their business. This indicator does not 
include market professionals, such as investment funds, unit trusts, and companies whose 
only business goal is to hold shares of other listed companies, such as holding companies 
and investment companies, regardless of their legal status.  
According to the available data, among the countries examined in the present 
thesis, the highest index is that of the Russian market with an average of 250 listed 
companies. Despite the lowest level of securities market turnover and rate of market 
capitalization, there are almost 200 listed companies in Uzbekistan’s securities market. A 
considerable amount of JSC stocks are not listed in the stock exchange, and these are 
traded in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. For instance, in 2008 there were only 19 listed 
companies out of 1800 JSCs; 20 companies out of 1781 JSCs in 2009; in 2011 100 listed 
companies out of 1309 JSCs; in 2014 only 138 companies were listed out of 1090 JSCs. 
Lastly, concerning Kazakhstan, market analysis suggests a modest ranking concerning 
listed companies, with around 85 companies, despite the relatively active market turnover, 
which suggests a relatively high level of ownership concentration. 
Table 5. Listed companies  
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Russia  328  314  279  345  327  276  276  266 251 242 
Kazakhstan  90 74 69 60 63 74  80 77 78 85 
Uzbekistan 114 19  20  152 100  130 138 138  261 191 
Source: The figures for Russia and Kazakhstan are based on the World Bank Database (Listed domestic 
companies, total 2007-2016). 
                                                 
185 NB., a company with several classes of shares is counted once. Only companies admitted to listing on the 
exchange are included.   
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The figures for Uzbekistan are derived from various sources: namely, for 2007 and 2008 the figures are 
based on the World Bank Database; for 2010-2012 they are from Almanac Uzbekistan, 2013;  186 and the 
figures for the rest are taken from uzse.uz.  
 
The listed companies’ indicator highlights the oligopolistic character of the 
securities markets and the ownership concentration level of the economy for the countries 
under review. Furthermore, it also reveals the unrealized potential of securities markets 
that once realized through legal and institutional reforms could serve for the increase of 
investments into the economy and for the development of the country. However, at 
present, the securities markets of the CIS countries under review is in a state of 
underdevelopment, as the figures presented in the foregoing so abundantly suggest; they 
have yet to attract, and become the locomotive of, significant investments into the 
economy. The next task of the present thesis is to consider the significant 
underperformance of the securities markets of the CIS countries under review, to try to 
establish its causes, and to explore appropriate solutions.   
2.4.2. SMD Problems in CIS countries  
 
In previous sections, there were brief analyses of the origins and development of 
the securities markets in the three CIS countries under review, and there were attempts to 
outline the current level of their performance. According to the statistics mentioned in the 
foregoing, CIS securities markets exhibit modest levels of development. There are several 
factors that directly and indirectly influence the development of securities markets at the 
national, regional, and global level. These include economic, political, social, cultural, 
institutional, and legal factors. This research primarily focuses on the institutional and 
regulatory problems due to their nature and influence on the further development of 
securities markets in CIS countries. As shown in the earlier analysis and the discussion on 
the different transition ‘puzzles’ of CIS countries, the institutional and legal context is 
essential for building an efficient securities market. Respectively, to better understand the 
problems of securities market development (SMD) in CIS countries, these were 
categorized into two groups: namely, structural and regulatory.  
Structural pertain to systemic and institutional issues that could be taken into 
account during the design of reforms. Particularly in this research, the following 
institutional problems are tackled: the oligopolistic nature of the market, the lack of 
                                                 
186http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/hlm/prgm/cph/experts/uzbekistan/01_general_info/Almanach_Uzb
ekistana_2013_RUS.pdf. (at 198)  
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competition in the financial services sector, and the significant role of the state both in 
regulation and business. 
The oligopolistic nature of the market refers to the structure of the economy as a 
whole, and to the company ownership structure, in particular. In the structure of 
economics, it means dependence of the economy on few sectors, and the absence of, or 
insufficient, diversification of market economy sectors. This feature could be seen in every 
studied country, for instance, in Russia, securities markets are mainly dependent on oil and 
energy sector companies,187 in Kazakhstan oil companies and banks,188 and in Uzbekistan 
banks and natural resource-related companies.189 Oligopoly at the company level means a 
high concentration of shares within a limited number of shareholders. High concentration 
of shares and a limited number of shareholders cause the appearance of scarcity in the 
securities, which negatively affects the demand and supply balance of the market. Also, 
this kind of ownership structure of the company undermines the protection of minority 
shareholders’ rights, and hinders access of new investors to the market.     
Another structural feature of the securities markets of the CIS countries under 
review, which is indirectly connected with the oligopolistic nature of the market, is the 
lack of real competition in the financial services industry. In this regard, three types of 
competition are discussed below, namely: competition between the banking industry and 
securities market, primarily in accumulating funds and business financing, competition 
within the securities market, and competition between conventional forms financing (bank 
and securities market) and quasi- legal form of funding of (shadow lending and borrowing 
mechanisms).  
The competition between the bank and the securities market is the most significant 
for the present research, hence why this issue is analyzed in more detail in chapter four. 
The present section is limited to relying on some basic statistics to hint at the scale of the 
problem. In CIS countries a substantial part of the accumulated and distributed financial 
resources is accounted for the banking industry, in comparison with the securities market. 
For instance, in Uzbekistan, as of April 1, 2017, total volume of bank loans directed to the 
                                                 
187 See detailed analytics at the official webpage of Moscow Exchange http://2016.report -
moex.com/en/review/markets/equity-and-bond-market 
188 See detailed analytics at the Official website of the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange 
http://www.kase.kz/files/publications/2017/31_01_2017_Kursiv.pdf 
189 For instance, in 2016 banks share was 50.6 percent (151.8 billion Uzbek sums) of exchange turnover.  For 
further details, see the official website of the Tashkent Stock Exchange. https://uzse.uz/boards/183 
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real sector of the economy was in excess of 57.3 trillion UZS,190 while in 2016 the amount 
of Tashkent stock exchange transactions had only been 299.8 billion UZS.191 In Russia, the 
volume of bank credits in 2016 was 17 trillion rubles, in contrast, the securities market 
turnover was 9.2 trillion rubles. 192  In Kazakhstan the volume of bank credits to the 
economy KZT 12.9 trillion in 2016,193 while transaction volume with shares in the same 
year was KZT around 3.9 trillion.194 There are several factors behind high divergence in 
the roles of the banking and the securities markets in business financing, including the 
financial structure, legal system, and the regulatory framework. However, the regulatory 
framework factor seems to be the most influential in terms of cause and potential for 
solutions.  
Today in CIS countries real competition is necessary not only between the banking 
sector and the securities market but also within securities market institutions as 
competition is scarce. For instance, in Uzbekistan, despite the existence of three organized 
trading platforms, around 98 percent of the whole trading volume belongs to the Tashkent 
Stock Exchange. The other trading systems, namely, the Inter-Bank trading system (MTS) 
and the Electronic OTC trading system (‘Elsis-Savdo’) are limited to minor shares.195 The 
Tashkent Stock Exchange is the leading securities trading platform and the only corporate 
securities exchange.196 Also in Russia, there is a similar situation as the Moscow Stock 
Exchange became a leading platform for trading with securities after the merging of two 
major Russian exchange groups – namely, the MICEX Group (founded in 1992) and the 
RTS Group (founded in 1995) – in 2011.197 The Kazakhstan Stock Exchange is the leading 
                                                 
190 From the official report of Central Bank of Uzbekistan: http://cbu.uz/ru/press-tsentr/statisticheskie-
dannye/88320/ (NB., in Russian).  
191 See website of internet newspaper Uzbekistan Today at: http://www.ut.uz/en/business/the-republican-
stock-exchange-turnover-reached-the-all-time-high/ 
192 For further details, see: NAUFOR (Russian National Association of Securities Market Participants), 
“Russian Securities market: 2016 Events and Facts.” (2016), 6, 14.  
https://www.naufor.ru/download/pdf/factbook/en/RFR2016_eng.doc 
193 Report of the National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2016, 5. 
http://www.nationalbank.kz/cont/Annual%20report_16.pdf.  
194 For further details, see: KASE, “Volume of trades on KASE increased by 60.3 % to KZT151.5 tn ($467.7 
bn) in 2017”, http://kase.kz/en/news/show/1359935/.  
195 The competition within the securities market institutions was the object of past research in which the 
current author had been involved. In the previous research devoted on the legal regulation of stock exchanges 
activity in Uzbekistan we found that one of the main problems hindering stock exchanges activity in 
Uzbekistan was the lack of competition among stock exchanges. For further details, see: Otabek Narziev, 
“Legal Regulation Problems of Stock Exchanges Activity in Uzbekistan” (PhD diss., Tashkent State Law 
University 2009) (NB., in Uzbek).   
196 See details in Uzbekistan Country Commercial Guide: https://www.export.gov/article?id=Uzbekistan-6-
Financial-Sector  
197Official website of Moscow Exchange Group: http://www.moex.com/en/   
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trading platform in Kazakhstan. 198  Weak competition among stock exchanges in CIS 
countries is one of the main factors of the underdevelopment of the securities market in 
these jurisdictions.199    
And lastly, the third issue connected with competition in fund accumulation and 
business financing is the so-called ‘street funding’. In transition countries such as those of 
the CIS, there is a significant share of the shadow economy that is directly reflected in the 
financial services market. Particularly, alongside with bank credits and the securities 
market, there is another casual source, the so-called ‘borrowing from the street’ practice. It 
means borrowing from individuals, usually in a foreign currency and under higher interest 
rates than the securities market and even banks. From the outside, it looks like normal 
private lend-borrowing relations, but its nature and scale of this phenomenon is beyond the 
content of an ordinary consumer loan and it already covers a significant part of 
entrepreneurs. Among the countries under review, this phenomenon is most developed in 
Uzbekistan. Unfortunately, there are no official data or statistics on this issue, 200  but 
merely observing business activity in Uzbekistan and the existence of a double and triple 
accounting system201 in major part of business entities prove the role of such ‘quasi- legal’ 
loans in the financial services industry of the country. One of the reasons that such ‘quasi-
legal’ loan practices are thriving is connected to problems concerning foreign currency 
exchange; until recently,202 entrepreneurs, especially small- and medium-sized businesses 
(SMBs), had difficulty in taking credit from banks in foreign currency; and there was a 
significant difference 203  between official, real, and exchange rates of foreign currency 
exchange. For business entities that usually import goods, it was easier and cheaper to 
                                                 
198 For further details, see the website of the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange: http://www.kase.kz/en/ 
199 For further details, see: “Capital Markets in Eurasia: Two Decades of Reform”, OECD report, June 2012, 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/CapitalMarketsinEurasia.pdf  
200 In the scale of recent liberalization reforms in Uzbekistan, for last two years there has been an increase in 
official reports that enlighten some issues of shadow business.  For instance, according to the video translated 
by the Uzbekistan 24 TV channel, the representatives of the State Security Committee intercepted foreign 
currency smugglers, who had attempted to bring USD 5.3 million out of Kazakhstan. (September 3, 2018) 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/649483048588031/permalink/962526937283639/ .  
201 The double and triple accounting system in Uzbekistan was connected with three different foreign 
currency exchange rates: the official, which is established by central bank; the real, which is the ‘black 
market’ rate; and the rate that was determined by currency exchange. Enterprises that buy foreign currency 
from black market had to ‘legalize\ these transactions through currency exchange in a higher market price.   
202 See: Decree of the President of Uzbekistan “On Priority Measures on Liberalization of Currency Policy” 
No. UP-5177, September 2, 2017. 
http://lex.uz/pages/getpage.aspx?guid=87&lact_id=3326423&query=%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8
E%D1%82%D0%B0 
203 For instance, as of September 2017, the official rate of USD was around 4000 UZS, its black market rate 
was in excess of 8000 UZS. There was also foreign currency exchange rate, which was more expensive than 
official and black market rates.  
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borrow money from the ‘street’. The fact of the existence of a shadow lending and 
borrowing system in CIS countries confirms that both the banking system and the 
securities market cannot meet the financial necessities of business, which, consequently, 
forces entrepreneurs to seek funds beyond the banking and securities market industry. This 
hugely impacts the regulatory framework both in terms of the causes and possible solutions 
to this problem. If SMD reforms directed to legalize this kind of ‘quasi- legal’ practice and 
convert this to banking and securities market activity, it can be useful both to the state, and 
to business. State benefits from such reform at least by increasing investor confidence in 
the financial system, the inflow of investments, and additional taxes. The legalization of 
shadow mechanisms of business financing gives legal guarantees to businesses, relatively 
affordable funds, and a chance for growth.  
Also, the last structural feature of the securities markets of the CIS countries under 
review, to be covered in this research, is the significant role of the state as regulator and as 
a key participant. 204 The level of state participation in securities market relations provides 
fertile ground for the assessment of the quality of implementation of market principles in 
the country. Today in CIS countries the state actively participates in securities market 
relations through its SOEs and banks that issue, own and manage various securities, and 
render intermediary services. Most importantly, the state sets the rules, regulates market 
relations through the authorized body, and is responsible for the fairness of dispute 
resolution. All CIS countries exhibit strict state regulation of the market through state 
regulators rather than through self-regulatory organizations. 205 A high degree of direct and 
indirect state participation in securities market relations in CIS countries is a sign of 
administrative principles prevailing over market principles despite the almost three 
decades of market transition reforms. In Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, the state 
actively participates in the market through SOEs and banks. For instance, in Uzbekistan, 
around 70 percent of securities market turnover belongs to banks and their financial 
instruments, while approximately 60 percent 206  of the banking industry belongs to the 
state. 207  20 percent (regarding the remaining 30 percent) of securities market turnover 
                                                 
204 Cf., chapter five of this research for a more detailed analysis of this issue. 
205 See details in: EBRD, “Securities Markets Assessment and Legal Indicator Survey”, 2007.  
206 In January 2017, the banking sector’s capitalization was about USD 3.2 billion and the value of total bank 
assets in the whole country was equivalent to USD 27.1 billion. Included in this amount are the assets of the 
two largest state-owned banks, which together hold about USD 17 billion. See details in Uzbekistan Country 
Commercial Guide, https://www.export.gov/article?id=Uzbekistan-6-Financial-Sector  
207 There are 27 commercial banks, including 3 state-owned banks; 11 partly state-owned joint-stock banks; 5 
banks with foreign capital; and 8 private banks. See the Uzbekistan Country Commercial Guide, 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Uzbekistan-6-Financial-Sector. 
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belongs to SOEs or companies with state assets. Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and 
securities issues are usually performed on administrative decisions, 208 instead of on market 
demand and supply principles. The stock exchange mainly hosts equity and secondary 
market transactions with shares of SOEs. In most cases, government agencies decide who 
can buy and sell shares and at what prices, and it is often impossible to locate accurate 
financial reports for traded companies.209  The situation in Russia 210  and Kazakhstan is 
very similar.211    
Concerning structural problems, a lack of competition (between the banking 
industry and the securities market; as well as within securities market institutions) and the 
role of state (both in private and public relations) are key issues on which this research 
focuses, and the theoretical basis of these two issues will be analyzed in the next two 
chapters. The oligopolistic feature of CIS countries securities market will be taken into 
account during the exploration of solutions as a framework, due to its systemic character. 
The primary aim of this research is the exploration of appropriate solutions to the structural 
problems through legal and regulatory reforms. For achieving this task, below follows a 
brief exposition of the regulatory issues of securities market development in CIS countries 
in the example of Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. 
The regulatory problems of securities market development in CIS countries are 
mostly connected with the drafting, adoption, and implementation of mandatory rules that 
are directed to the regulation of relations in this area. The content, form, and methods of 
enforcement of the law are the main issues of this cluster of problems. Unfortunately, it is 
outside the scope of this research to cover all the regulatory aspects of securities market 
development in CIS countries. Hence why the review is limited to the range of subjects 
who can issue securities, market access issues, and the range of securities that could be 
released by subjects.  
                                                 
208 It could be justified in case of JSCs, where the state holds the controlling share. But usually such decisions 
will be at the level of Cabinet Minister or Presidential Decree that is compulsory for all market participants. 
For instance, in October 10, 2017 based on the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 268, one of the 
JSC with 75% states share (namely, the ‘Quartz’JSC) announced an IPO. For further details, see at the 
official website of Uzbekistan SEC: https://csm.gov.uz/ru/o-tsentre/novosti/59-news-obyavleniya/news-
novosti-fondovogo-rynka/484-ao-kvarts-provodit-ipo   
209 For further details, see the Uzbekistan Country Commercial Guide: 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Uzbekistan-6-Financial-Sector 
210 See: Russian Federation Financial System Stability Assessment, IMF Country Report No.16/231, July 
2016, 11, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr16231.pdf 
211 For further details, see: Financial system stability assessment of Kazakhstan, IMF country Report 14/258, 
July 2014, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14258.pdf 
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As for the securities issuer subjects, among the compared countries only in 
Uzbekistan, its scope is limited to JSCs and state bodies. In Russia and in Kazakhstan, the 
range of entities that has the right to issue securities is much broader and includes JSCs, 
LLC, partnerships, pension funds, and other objects. Today in Uzbekistan 80 percent of 
existing companies were established in the form of LLC. The number of JSCs is 
decreasing annually, 212 and most of them are state-owned or with significant state shares, 
and less than one-third of existing JSCs are listed in the Tashkent Stock Exchange. To 
further develop the potential of securities markets in business financing, company law 
reform should be carried out to expand the range of companies that has the right to issue 
securities and involve funds from the securities market. There are several LLCs that are 
much bigger than JSCs. Even state participated companies are founded in the form of LLC.  
Complicated disclosure information mechanisms and various inspection system of JSCs 
makes this form of company unpopular/unfavorable to business representatives. 
Restrictions on the issuance of securities only by JSCs make the market passive and limits 
access to its financial resources. 
The next issue on increasing the share of the securities market in business financing 
is connected with the access to the market by investors. Currently, Russia and Kazakhstan 
completed several reforms on opening their securities market to investors and have created 
opportunities for purchasing their securities on global markets. Unfortunately, in the case 
of Uzbekistan there is still a lack of reforms in both the national and global market context. 
For the domestic market until September 2017 because of the foreign currency exchange 
problems, the share of foreign investors was less than 10 percent of total trade volume. 213 
As for entering global markets, until now Uzbekistan has never seriously considered this 
issue.  
Another issue connected to boosting the business financing potential of the 
securities market is improving the legal basis for diversifying the types of securities 
circulated in the market. In this regard, the Kazakhstan experience in launching Islamic 
bonds – Sukuk – could be one way of introducing a new product for the market. It would 
be better to create the legal bases for the particular financial instrument, which could be 
issued by small and medium-sized enterprises with simplified procedures on issuance, 
circulation, and reporting.    
                                                 
212 For instance, according to the report of Uzbekistan SEC as of April 1, 2017, the number of JSCs in the 
Republic was 630, which is 29 fewer than at the end of 2016, https://csm.gov.uz/ru/o -tsentre/novosti/73-
rezultaty-deyatelnosti-tsentra/433-itogi-i-kvartala-2017-goda 
213 For further details, see the website of Tashkent Stock Exchange: https://uzse.uz/analytics  
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Summary 
 
In the foregoing it has been attempted to outline the genesis, evolution, and 
development of the securities market in the CIS region, and to draw up key regional and 
some country-based specifics of the CIS embryonic securities market infrastructure and of 
its legal and regulatory framework. It was concluded that there were particular political, 
economic, and social bases for the emergence of the securities market and its infrastructure 
in these post-Soviet jurisdictions. Notably, the collapse of USSR, the formation of CIS, the 
choice of the market economy as the primary means of development, privatization, and the 
appearance of shares and JSCs all provided fertile ground for the genesis of basic securities 
market institutions in post-Soviet territories. Despite the almost three decades of existence, 
these markets have yet to rid themselves of certain anomalies including their oligopolistic 
character, state and bank dominance, scarcity of professional institutions, opacity and 
modest corporate governance, and lack of investor confidence. This, and other consequent 
issues will be the subject of the next part of this research. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF SECURITIES MARKET 
REGULATION  
 
The analysis in the previous chapter has revealed several problems and factors that 
hinder the proper development of securities markets in CIS countries, especially in 
Uzbekistan. At the local and regional level, such problems may appear unprecedented, but 
at a broader level most of them had already occurred in some form. There are certain 
theoretical and practical aspects of approaching such challenges. This chapter attempts to 
outline the theoretical basis of securities market regulation, to describe some actual 
problems, and to propose some improvements.  
This chapter serves as the core of our study that stands containing the ideas and 
conclusions of the research. It provides conceptual and ideological remedies for 
application at the local level through analyzing existing theories on securities market 
regulation at a global scale, and through considering chronic  issues that plague the modern 
securities market. The structure of chapter three is as follows: first, there is discussion on 
the necessity and importance of securities market regulation theory with the aim of 
determining the actual need for legal regulation. Then an overview follows on the basic 
theories that directly relate to securities market regulation. And, lastly, there is a review of 
the main problems of modern securities markets accompanied by proposals aimed at 
addressing those problems.  
3.1. Importance of theory in securities market regulation 
 
In the previous chapter, some light was shed on the necessity of securities market 
regulation in the case of CIS countries. In this section, there is an attempt to focus on the 
importance and role of SMR theory in the organization and development of active 
securities markets. According to a relatively extensive study on regulation and growth, 
which analyzed business regulation across 135 countries, “government regulation of 
business is an important determinant of growth”, “the impact of improving regulations is 
large”, and “countries should put priority on reforming their business regulations when 
designing growth policies”.214  
The consensus is that regulation is crucial to achieving and maintaining an efficient 
and fair securities market nationally, regionally, and globally. The securities market needs 
                                                 
214 Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, and Rita Maria Ramalho, “Regulation and growth”, Economics 
Letters 92, no. 3 (2006), 4-5.  
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comprehensive regulation because of its institutional (market), contextual (functional 
features, unique relations and so on), and formal features. The need for regulation in the 
securities market is more pressing than commodity and real estate markets, because of 
several specific characters of the securities market. These features mostly relate to 
financial instruments. 215  Every stage of financial instruments starting from their origin 
(issuance and registration), existence (circulation), and their annulment, requires the direct 
involvement of legal institutions, rules, and procedures. In the case of other market 
products, such as commodities, economic factors prevail over legal factors. In general, 
commodities can be produced and put into circulation without the direct involvement of 
legal institutions, rules, and procedures.216 However, in the case of financial instruments 
this is less so due to the unique economic and legal nature of financial instruments and the 
high systemic risk that can be generated through these instruments.  Hence why the design 
and implementation of effective regulation of such markets with unusual objects, subjects, 
and relations should be based on a sound theoretical framework, which will provide an 
ideological basis for regulation and reforms. For proving this statement, it is enough to 
look back and consider the consequences of the ‘deregulation stream’ just in the last two 
decades, with a particular focus on the latest financial/economic crisis and the 
contributions of SMR theory on making sense of it. There are many studies and opinions 
following the crisis. Nobel prize scholar Joseph Stiglitz wrote perhaps the most generally 
accepted view on this matter:   
“…many of most popular micro- and macro-economic theories aided and abetted 
regulators, investors, bankers, and policy makers – they provided the ‘rationale' for their 
policies and actions. They made the bankers believe that, in pursuing individual self-
interest, they were advancing the well-being of society; they made the regulators think that 
in pursuing policies of benign neglect, they were allowing the private sector to flourish, 
from which all would benefit.”217 
Lessons are drawn from the recent financial crisis, and the aim of avoiding such 
catastrophes in the future places considerable challenges before scholars and professionals 
on securities market regulation to reconsider the ideological agenda that underpins it, and 
to provide suitable perspectives based on the realities of current conditions. To such end, a 
                                                 
215 The phrase of financial instruments here refers to all kind of stocks (including equities, bonds, options, 
and futures) that might be the object of transactions in the securities market.  
216 Except for certification and standardization, ecological and other necessary procedures, which are 
common, practice for some products and services.     
217 Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Anatomy of a Murder: Who Killed the American Economy?”, in What Caused 
the Financial Crisis, ed. Jeffrey Friedman (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2011), 144. 
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brief overview of theories that directly affect SMR follows where the main problems are 
highlighted, and a series of proposals are presented for the improvement of SMR. 
3.2. Overview of basic approaches 
 
Securities market relations and issues concerning their regulation, by their nature 
and essence, are interdisciplinary matters that are primarily studied in the fields of 
economics and the law. The development of the securities market, the enhancement of 
financial instruments, the emergence of various market intermediaries and participants, and 
the rising necessity on effectiveness and fairness in securities market relations, require law 
and regulation to be brought closer with economics and the market. In this sense, Cooter 
and other scholars mention that “law needs economics to understand its behavioral 
consequences, and economics needs law to understand the underpinnings of markets”.218  
The scope of theories that treat law and economics issues is quite broad, and a few 
theories concern securities market relations. This brief overview of such theories concerns 
those directly related to securities market regulation – namely, the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH), behavioral economics, the economic dynamics of law, and the social 
business initiative.  
3.2.1. Microeconomic approach: Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 219 is the basic concept of economic 
analysis of law, 220which aims to explain and predict the behavior of market participants to 
ensure efficiency (positive theory),221and to use incentives and political instruments for 
changing their behavior for ensuring justice (normative theory).222 
                                                 
218 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law, and Economics, (Berkeley: Berkeley Law Books, 6th edition,  
2016), 24. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/books/2 
219 In some literature this notion is cited as efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH). See Burton G. 
Malkiel and Eugene F. Fama, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work”, The 
Journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383-417. 
220 The history of economic interpretation of law goes back to the 18th century CE when Adam Smith wrote 
about the economic effect of legislation on merchants and commerce. However, the beginning of the modern 
school of law and economics is often placed in the 1960s. For details, see: Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, 
Law, and Economics, (Berkeley: Berkeley Law Books, 6th edition,  2016), 24, 
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/books/2 
221 The positive approach to the economic analysis of law seeks to understand how the behavior o f people is 
affected by incentives created by the law. This approach uses the analogy of the law as a type of pricing 
machine. The law ‘prices’ various forms of human behavior through the use of fines, penalties, and other 
measures. For details, see: Richard A. Posner, Economic analysis of law (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 
2014). 
222 The normative approach to the economic analysis of law proposes an efficiency criterion for shaping the 
legal system based on wealth maximization. In the legal context, this approach asks how much each would be 
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Nobel Prize economist Eugene Fama who argued that stocks always trade at their 
fair value, making it impossible for investors to purchase undervalued stocks either or sell 
shares for inflated prices, put the EMH forth in the early 1960s.223 Some scholars state that 
the origin of the EMH can also be traced back to the work of Paul A. Samuelson. They 
point out that Fama and Samuelson independently developed the same basic notion of 
market efficiency from two slightly different research agendas.224 
The EMH states that asset prices fully reflect all available information and 
therefore there are no undervalued or overvalued stocks because the amount in the stock 
exchange is the fair value of that particular stock. According to the EMH, it is impossible 
for investors to either purchase undervalued stocks or sell shares for inflated prices. 
Initially asserting the efficiency of US capital markets,225The EMH has occupied a 
significant place in the economics and finance literature since the 1960s226  also, has a 
strong presence in the contemporary culture of securities regulation. 227 Belief in the EMH 
has led Chicago School of Law and Economics scholars, especially those studying 
financial markets, to conclude that markets are self-correcting and therefore in little need 
of regulation.228 However, severe criticisms of the belief in efficient and rational markets 
also exist. 229 According to Lo, even after several decades of research and numerous 
published studies, economists have yet to reach consensus on whether markets – 
particularly financial markets – are, in fact, efficient. 230  Opponents of the EMH also 
question the pure practical rationality of market participants pointing out an existence and 
                                                                                                                                                   
willing to pay to either get rid of or keep specific laws or rules. For details, see: Richard A. Posner, 
“Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory”, The Journal of Legal Studies 8, no. 1 (1979): 103-140.  
223 Later Chicago School of Law and Economics scholars developed this hypothesis. See Richard A. Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown, University of Chicago Law School, 1972), 415.  
224 See Andrew W. Lo, “Efficient Markets Hypothesis”, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 
eds. L. Blume, S. Durlauf, (2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2007), https://ssrn.com/abstract=991509 
225 See Christopher Paul Saari, “The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the 
Regulation of the Securities Industry”, Stanford Law Review (1977): 1031-1076.  
226. In the early 1960s economists Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi working independently from one 
another, published two articles, “The Problem of Social Cost” and “Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Torts” respectively, that revolutionized legal theory and laid the foundation for many of the ideas 
that were developed in the following years. The movement gained further ground with the publication of 
Chicago University professor Richard A. Posner's “Economic Analysis of Law”. This work led to an era of 
economic principles being applied to all aspects of the law, referred to as the “Chicago School of thought”.  
227 See Donald C. Langevoort, “Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency 
Revisited”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 140, no. 3 (1992): 851-920.   
228 For further details, see: Lynn A. Stout, “Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market 
Failure, and Securities Regulation”, Virginia Law Review (1995): 611-712. 
229 For instance, a detailed analysis could be found in professor Langevoort’s papers. For details, see: Donald 
C. Langevoort, “Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited”, University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 140, no. 3 (1992), 851-920; and Donald C. Langevoort, “Taming the Animal 
Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation”, Nw. UL Rev. 97 (2002): 135.  
230 See Andrew W. Lo, “Efficient Markets Hypothesis”, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 
eds. L. Blume, S. Durlauf, (2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2007): https://ssrn.com/abstract=991509 
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sometimes prevailing irrational component in their behavior. As evidence, they cite the 
securities market crash in late 1987 when stock prices seriously deviated from their fair 
values.231  
Another scholar – Chang also questions the credibility of this EMH by stating that: 
“individually rational actions can lead to the collective irrational outcome”,232and supports 
his statement with concrete cases and theoretical arguments. Notably, he mentions a 
compelling story of two Nobel Prize economists – Robert Merton and Myron Scholes – 233 
whose free market concept and practice failed twice, hurting investors and industry. 234 At 
the end of his critic analysis Chang poses the following reasonable question:  
“When the Nobel Prize winners in financial economics, top bankers, high flying fund 
managers, prestigious colleges and the smartest celebrities have shown that they don't 
understand what they are doing, how can we accept economic theories that work only 
because they assume that people are fully rational? The upshot is that we are not smart 
enough to leave the market alone. We need regulation exactly because we are not smart 
enough.”235 
 
The diversity of opposing arguments on EMH makes it burdensome to compile a 
list of all existing criticisms on EMH. Moreover, this would be outside the scope of this 
research. The reason for analyzing some key criticisms of EMH is to show that there is 
room for improvement concerning EMH theory – it should be reconsidered not only from 
microeconomic but also macroeconomic angles. Next there will be a brief overview of one 
of the leading macro approaches that seriously questions the EMH. 
3.2.2. Macroeconomic approach: economic dynamics of law   
The economic dynamics of law is a relatively new theory that offers a new vision 
of law as fundamentally a macro- level enterprise establishing normative commitments and 
a framework for numerous private transactions, rather than as an analogous to a market 
transaction. Professor David Driesen proposes the main ideas of this approach in a 2012 
                                                 
231 See details in Burton G. Malkiel, “Is the Stock Market Efficient?." Science 243, no. 4896 (1989): 1313-
1318. 
232 See details in Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing 
USA, 2012), 170. 
233 In 1997 these two scholars were awarded the Nobel Prize in economics for their “new method to 
determine the value of derivatives”. In 1998 a considerable hedge fund, the Long -Term Capital Management 
(LTCM), went bankrupt following the Russian financial crisis. It was founded in 1994 and the two Nobel 
Prize scholars were on its board of directors. Another failure case is connected to the Platinum Grove Asset 
Management (PGAM) hedge fund, which was founded in 1999 again by these two scholars. In late 2008 th is 
hedge fund also went bust, temporarily freezing investor withdrawal. For further details, see: Ha-Joon Chang, 
23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2012), 170-173. 
234 Ibid.  
235 Ibid, 170.   
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book 236  and in a 2014 paper. 237According to Driesen, the law is not a transaction as 
claimed by Chicago School scholars. Instead, it is a framework of rules by which deals 
occur. Because law aims to influence future behavior, rather than the past, its architects 
must often address surprise, change, and uncertainty. In other words, we must deal with the 
dynamics of an unknowable future. For Driesen most law is neither efficient nor 
inefficient. It merely provides the framework under which market actors seek to achieve 
practical outcomes. Hence, it is often not possible to determine whether a law is efficient. 
Because the statute provides a framework, it should be thought of as more closely 
analogous to macroeconomic policy than to the transactions that microeconomics typically 
focuses on.238 
As Driesen argues, the microeconomic model of government regulation 
misconceives the essence of law. Government regulation produces not an immediate 
transaction, but a set of rules intended to influence future conduct, often for many years. 
Accordingly, regulation provides a framework for private resource allocation, rather than 
allocating the resources itself. This framework performs a macroeconomic role by 
reducing systemic risks that might permanently impair important economic, social, and 
natural systems. As such, government regulation resembles monetary policy, which 
likewise affects, but does not control, resource allocation.239 
According to Driesen the law and economics, which is a microeconomic approach 
by its content, assume that government regulators should aim to make their decisions 
efficient by seeking to associate costs and benefits at the margin. 240  The Economic 
Dynamic approach focuses on the shape of change over time to avoid systemic risk. 
According to Driesen, “we cannot expect the government to make perfectly efficient 
decisions or ensure our future happiness, but we should, at a bare minimum, expect the 
government to ward off catastrophes, leaving much of the fine-tuning to private 
                                                 
236 For further details, see: David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 250. 
237 For further details, see: David M. Driesen, “Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis”, J. Corp. 
L. 40 (2014): 55. 
238 Ibid. 
239 For further details , see: David M. Driesen The Economic Dynamics of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 250. 
240 Speech of Driesen at the Prague Conference on Political Economy (PCPE) in 2012, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rQe9xNpnCco  
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markets”.241 This approach explains how neoclassical law and economics sparked decades 
of deregulation culminating in the 2008 financial collapse.242 
The dynamic economic analysis also proposes a form of institutional, economic 
analysis as a way to aid regulators in analyzing threats and responding efficiently. This 
approach requires regulators to study how relevant actors react to financial incentives, 
taking into account the level of bounded rationality anticipated in each group of regulated 
actors. Such analysis requires, in particular, consideration of countervailing incentives that 
may defeat legal spurs.243  
According to Driesen, efficiency leads to an attempt to quantify, and then convert 
to dollar values, all of an action’s consequences, to formulate ‘optimal’ policies. 
“Unfortunately, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in a strictly quantitative sense becomes 
impossible or incomplete and unreliable when we face important future consequences. 
Instead, law and economics scholars often use neoclassical economic assumptions as a 
proxy for CBA, because they recognize that reasonably reliable CBA of many legal 
decisions addressing complex dynamic problems proves impossible”.244 
The economic dynamics approach also provides a systematic method of analyzing 
the law’s effects. It focuses on avoiding significant systemic risks (like financial crises in 
case of SMR) and implemented through a systematic analysis of law’s economic 
incentives and how people respond to them. Accordingly, this approach could be a broadly 
applicable framework to adequately address neoclassical law and economics failures, such 
as the 2008 financial crisis. 
Another instance of criticism of EMH relates to the relatively new field of study – 
namely, behavioral finance – that focuses on the relations between irrationality and human 
emotions such as fear, panic, hope, envy, confidence, greed, etc., in financial investment 
decision-making. 
 
 
                                                 
241 For further details, see: The Economic Dynamics of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 250. 
242 For further details, see: David M. Driesen, “Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis”, J. Corp. 
L. 40 (2014): 56-57. 
243 For further details, see: David M. Driesen The Economic Dynamics of Law (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 250. 
244 For further details, see: David M. Driesen, “Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis”, J. Corp. 
L. 40 (2014): 59. 
 71 
3.2.3. Behavioral finance: “not only and not always rational…” 
 
Behavioral finance is the branch of behavioral economics that studies the effects of 
psychological, cognitive, emotional, cultural and social factors on the economic decisions 
of market participants. This is a relatively young and promising field of modern finance 
theory with remarkable progress in the last decades.245 Behavioral finance is based on the 
alternative notion that investors are subject to behavioral biases and therefore their 
financial decisions can be less than entirely rational.246  
There are two main issues that behavioral finance mainly focus on: first, the reason 
that market participants make such irrational systematic errors that affect prices and 
returns, creating market inefficiencies contrary to the assumption of EMH; and, second, 
how do other participants take advantage of such mistakes and market inefficiencies. 
The most continuing critiques of the EMH turn around the preferences and 
behavior of market participants. Lo brings relatively detailed analysis of behavioral critics 
of the EMH, 247and argues that investors are often – if not always – irrational, exhibiting 
predictable and financially harmful behavior.248 
It would be better to consider behavioral finance as an alternative solution to the 
challenges of the EMH in explaining certain financial phenomena, rather than to treat it as 
a replacement of classical economic theory. 249  In the case of extreme complexity and 
unpredictability of contemporary securities markets, relying on only EMH and rationalism 
will not reflect market realities. Just the 2008 financial crisis, when “the supposedly 
smartest people did not truly understand what they were doing” 250 would be enough to 
demonstrate the role of behavioral factors in securities market relations. 
                                                 
245 See Felicia Ramona Birău, “The Impact of Behavioral Finance on Securities markets”, Annals of the 
“Constantin Brâncuşi” University of Târgu Jiu, Economy Series 3 (2012): 45-50. 
246 See Alistair Byrne and Mike Brooks, “Behavioral Finance: Theories and Evidence” (2008): 1-26.  
247 For instance, overconfidence (Fischoff and Slovic (1980); Barber and Odean (2001); Gervais and Odean 
(2001)), overreaction (DeBondt and Thaler (1985)), loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Shefrin 
and Statman (1985); Odean, (1998), herding (Huberman and Regev (2001)), psychological accounting 
(Tversky and Kahneman (1981)), miscalibration of probabilities (Lichtenstein, Fischoff and Phillips (1982)), 
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson (1997)), and regret (Bell (1982)). For details, s ee: Andrew W. Lo, “Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis”, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, eds. L. Blume, S. Durlauf, (2nd 
Edition, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2007): https://ssrn.com/abstract=991509, 9-10. 
248 See Andrew W. Lo, “Efficient Markets Hypothesis”, in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, 
eds. L. Blume, S. Durlauf, (2nd Edition, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2007): https://ssrn.com/abstract=991509 
249 See Felicia Ramona  Birău, “Behavioral Finance Paradigm And Its Implications On Investment 
Decisions”, in Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, ECO-TREND. 2011.  
250 See Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 
2012),170-173. 
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Critical studies on economics revealed another important theory that not only 
provides an alternative vision to the issues under review here, but also severely criticizes 
EMH, wealth maximization theory, and other microeconomic approaches, and proposes 
substantial solutions tested in real life over the last four decades, namely, the social 
business approach briefly outlined in the next subsection. 
3.2.4. Social business: “not only and not always wealth maximization aim….”  
Social business is an entirely new, dynamic, and bright notion within the field of 
economics that was defined and developed by Nobel Prize economics scholar Muhammad 
Yunus.251 The concept of social business is based on the following four pillars:252  
Firstly, it is the business that created and designed to address a social problem, 
rather than to earn money, maximize profit or wealth, in contrast to the tenets of 
conventional economic theories. According to professor Yunus traditional economic 
theory is not relevant to the realities of humans; it is misinterpreting human nature 
focusing only on egoism. However, the human being is not a ‘money-making machine’, it 
is multi- faceted, and one of its facts may include its selflessness, which based on the 
principle of “the best way of being happy is to make others happy”.253  
Secondly, it is based on the principle of non- loss and non-dividend business, which 
means that investors from the beginning decide not to take any profit of their investment, 
but only get back their invested amount. Instead, investors look forward to the impact of 
their investment through a real solution of some social problems. The opportunity of one 
hundred percent withdrawing investment by investors makes social businesses different to 
traditional non-profit organizations or other NGO’s, which usually have a limited profit-
making right.   
Thirdly, unlike a non-profit, a social business is not dependent on donations or 
other grants to survive and to operate, because, like any other business, it is self-
sustainable. Profits realized by the company are reinvested in the industry itself (or used to 
                                                 
251 Professor Muhammad Yunus is the recipient of 55 honorary degrees from universities across 20 countries. 
He has received 112 awards from 26 countries including state honors from 10 countries. He is one of only 
seven individuals to have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the United States Presidential Medal of 
Freedom and the United States Congressional Gold Medal. For further information on professor Muhammad 
Yunus, see: http://muhammadyunus.org/index.php/professor-yunus/curriculum-vitae-in-brief 
252 For further details, see: Muhammad Yunus, Building Social Business: The New Kind of Capitalism that 
Serves Humanity’s Most Pressing Needs, (Public Affairs, 2010); Muhammad Yunus, Creating a World 
Without Poverty: Social Business and the Future of Capitalism (Public Affairs, 2009).    
253" See Muhammad Yunus, “Nobel Prize Winner Muhammad Yunus: The Key to Super Happiness” (2013).  
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start other social companies), with the aim of increasing their social impact.254 This feature 
makes social businesses a new form of a commercial venture that lies somewhere between 
for-profit and philanthropy.255 According to Muhammad Yunus in philanthropy or charity 
one dollar has only one life and one chance; in the case of social businesses one dollar can 
be used over and over to solve social problems.256 For Muhammad Yunus, the profit made 
through social business operations is less important than the beneficial effects it has on 
society. This is again connected with the purpose of business activity that should be other 
than merely making a profit as an end in itself. So social businesses could provide an 
alternative model for utilizing capitalism to address social concerns at the local, national, 
regional, and global levels.257 
And, lastly, the social business concept is not a hypothesis any longer. Instead, it is 
effectively implemented and a developing business model for more than three decades in 
many countries across the globe. In 2006 the Nobel Prize was awarded to Professor 
Muhammad Yunus and Grameen Bank which are implementing social business projects 
since 1976.258 Today the Grameen Group is a network of nearly 30 sister organizations in 
around 60 countries, involving 9 million borrowers in Bangladesh and 300 million around 
the world, with a 3 billion USD loan turnover with 98.4 percent return rate.259  
  Some of the future challenges deriving from the development of the social 
business are listed up in the recent research by Agafonow and others, 260 where authors 
raise a reasonable question: is the development of a capital market that targets social 
businesses possible? This research attempts to partly contribute to this issue by considering 
the implementation of the social business model in the securities market relations of CIS 
countries.   
                                                 
254 For instance, expanding the company’s reach, improving the products or services or in different ways 
subsidizing its social mission.  
255 See Alejandro Agafonow and Cam Donaldson, “The Economic Rationale Behind the Social Business 
Model: A Research Agenda”, Social Business 5, no. 1 (2015): 5-16. 
256 See Muhammad Yunus, Building Social Business: The New Kind of Capitalism that Serves Humanity’s 
Most Pressing Needs, (Public Affairs, 2010); Muhammad Yunus, Creating a World Without Poverty: Social 
Business and the Future of Capitalism (Public Affairs, 2009). 
257 See Muhammad Yunus, Bertrand Moingeon, and Laurence Lehmann-Ortega, “Building Social Business 
Models: Lessons from the Grameen experience”, Long Range Planning 43, no. 2-3 (2010): 308-325. 
258 See Nancy Wimmer, Green Energy for a Billion Poor: How Grameen Shakti Created a Winning Model 
for Social Business, MCRE-Verlag, 2012, 226; Muhammad Yunus, Bertrand Moingeon, and Laurence 
Lehmann-Ortega, “Building Social Business Models: Lessons from the Grameen experience”, Long Range 
Planning 43, no. 2-3 (2010): 308-325. 
259 See Muhammad Yunus’s  keynote speech at the Conference ‘The Future of Finance’ at Imperial College 
Business School in London on April 19, 2018,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ccX0pisosB4 (video).  
260 For further details, see: Alejandro Agafonow and Cam Donaldson, “The Economic Rationale Behind the 
Social Business Model: A Research Agenda”, Social Business 5, no. 1 (2015): 5-16. 
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 3.3. Contemporary problems of securities market regulation  
One of the tasks of the current chapter is to analyze the main theoretical problems 
currently at play in securities markets, to consider their primary reasons, and to examine 
their implications for CIS and other countries with transition securities markets.   
Here only those problems that are directly or indirectly pertinent to the above basic 
theories shall be discussed. One of the main problems is connected with the failure of the 
EMH, and the necessity of adjusting it with the realities of today’s securities market. 
3.3.1. The excessive efficiency of securities markets  
The first problem is connected to the notion that securities markets are ‘too 
efficient’.261 Even though this problem is characteristic of developed financial markets, it 
can be easily have implications for emerging or transition countries in the current 
information technology and globalization conditions. At the very least, developing 
countries cannot entirely avoid the harmful consequences of the overly efficient securities 
markets in developed countries, as has been the case with the financial crisis in 2008.   
Chang refers to this problem as having to do with the short-term generation of 
profits by the financial sector through financial ‘innovations’ in the form of various 
complicated financial instruments. According to Chang “these new assets have made the 
overall economy, as well as the financial system itself, much more unstable”. 262 
Consequently, there have formed a massive gap between the financial sector with a short-
term focus and the real sector of the economy, which has long-term goals. For instance, if 
in 1980 the total value of all financial assets was approximately five times the value of US 
GDP, by 2007 this ratio had doubled. In the US, the securities industry increased from 107 
percent of GDP in 1980 to 323 percent of GDP in 2007. 263 In the UK, the financial assets 
ratio to GDP was around 700 percent of GDP in 2007. 264 In equities, much growth came 
                                                 
261" This problem is widely discussed in various papers, especially after the financial crisis of 2008. See for 
instance: Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 
2012), 231-241. See also: Raymond Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development , (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1969); Robert G. King and Ross Levine, “Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be 
Right”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, no. 3 (1993): 717-737; Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi 
Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth . No. w5758. National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.  
262 See Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 
2012), 231-232. 
263 See details in Kevin R. Brine and Mary Poovey, Finance in America: An Unfinished Story, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2017), 361. 
264 See Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 
2012), 237. 
 75 
from an increase in assessment ratios rather than their substantial increase. 265 Due to the 
creation of more and more financial claims for each underlying asset and economic activity 
financial derivatives, which did Warren Buffet call as “financial weapons of mass 
destruction” before the crisis of 2008, grew about eight times faster than world output.266 
In 2016 total debt levels globally came in at a record USD 164 trillion, amounting to 225 
percent of the world economy’s gross domestic product.267 
So, the root of the problem of excessive efficiency of the modern securities markets 
goes to the deviation from the basic securities theory, which is the equivalence of issued 
securities to the amount of existing real assets or economic activity. If under a real asset 
worth USD 1 a USD 10 derivative is generated, there is 100% possibility that the owners 
of USD 9 derivatives will be in loss. During the high speed of securities market relations, 
this possibility of failure may seem low, but it is only an illusion. 
The best, credible, and initially assumed way of organizing securities market 
efficiency did not rely on the ‘artificial increase’ of financial assets, as was the case with 
the ‘invention’ of derivatives, collateralized debt obligations, or credit default swaps, but 
on ensuring the real sector of economy involved financial flows through the accumulation 
and redistribution functions of the securities market. Ideal securities market efficiency 
cannot be achieved based on the lopsided development, i.e., fostering of financial 
instruments without the growth of the real economy; or in the case with the securities 
market, which should reflect the real economy will pose it to high risk of destruction. 
The financial crisis is not a natural disaster, i.e., all measures and their 
consequences did not happen accidentally and by chance. Some scholars have further 
supplied some theoretical background through the notions of ‘self- interest’ and ‘wealth 
maximization’ theories. There were professionals who ‘invented’ complicated and 
complex financial instruments and cared mostly about achieving their self- interest and 
wealth-maximizing aim. There were credit rating agencies whose biased assessment of 
                                                 
265 See details in Robin Greenwood and David Scharfstein, “The Growth of Finance”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 27, no. 2 (2013), 9. 
266 The increase was in just ten years from USD 92 to USD 683 trillion or from 2.4 to 11 times the size of 
global output. See details in José Gabriel Palma, “The Revenge of the Market on the Rentiers: Why Neo -
liberal Reports of the End of History Turned Out To Be Bremature." Cambridge Journal of Economics 33, 
no. 4 (2009), 837      
267 See: Cheang Ming, “Global Debt Is at Historic Highs And Governments Should Start Cutting Levels 
Now,the IMF Says”, CNBC, April 19, 2018:  
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/18/global-debt-is-at-historic-high-and-governments-should-cut-levels-
imf.html 
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financial instruments speeded the circulation. Also, there were ‘illiterate’268and bargain-
seeking consumers; and some regulators could not recognize the actual value of these 
‘financial innovations’ and foresee their harmful consequences. 
The next problem of the modern securities market to be discussed tries to find an 
answer to the question as to why this had happened, and what were the main factors and 
driving force. In the opinion of this author, there are two key answers: the misbalance in 
theoretical supply and the human factor.  
3.3.2. Misbalance in theoretical supply 
The foregoing included a brief discussion as to the importance of theory in 
securities market regulation, and it was concluded that theory is essential for the design 
and implementation of effective regulation. In this subsection, an attempt is made to shed 
light on the deficiency of economic theory that was dominant in the last centuries. There 
are two main issues in economic theory directly relevant to the securities market and its 
regulation: first is the theory focusing on, and by all means to stimulate, self- interest 
approach of market participants, and the second is the hypothesis that encourages wealth 
maximization. There is sufficient literature and debates are on the advantages and 
disadvantages of these theories. This research does not aim to review those debates but, 
rather, to direct the focus on the other side of the issue – the moral side, which did not 
enlightened decades, and lagged behind the self-interest and wealth maximization streams.   
3.3.2.1. Self-interest focused approach is misbalance in interpreting human merits 
Some ideas and experiences about selfless interest are concisely discussed above 
within the scope of social business and behavioral finance theory and practices. Briefly, 
altruistic interest means that human beings, who are the main subjects and taks a central 
position in the market relations, are not only self- interest driven, but may also behave in 
selfless ways, i.e., acting not only for their own ego or their own interest. 
  The economic theories of last century mainly focused only one feature of a human being 
– its self-directness, ignoring and depreciating its moral and social characteristics. As a 
result more and more people in society are brought up as self- interested. Existing theories 
                                                 
268 ‘Illiterate’ here means that ordinary people without special knowledge of finance economics could not and 
cannot understand the whole scheme and terms of those risky financial instruments. This was briefly raised 
earlier in the foregoing, referring to Chang’s book, where he showed that even Nobel Prize scholars in 
economics, top managers, and bankers could not fully understand the realities of such financial instruments. 
See details in Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing 
USA, 2012), 170-173. 
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neither provide firm conclusions about the limits of such self- interest behaviors nor could 
consider its harmful consequences in the personal and public spheres. Moreover, the 
original natural remedy for the deviation of self- interest conduct – namely, the selfless 
instincts – was not accounted for by those theories. Therefore selflessness became 
unsustainable and could not fulfill its original function – to be an antidote for the plague of 
self-centeredness both in the personal and in public spheres. As a result, there have been 
overwhelming financial crises, global fraud and manipulation, and loss of trust, which are 
the core values of both market and social relations. 
In conclusion, however, it must be stated that this self- interest misbalance does not 
necessarily depreciate the essence of self- interest theory and its practice. The present 
author is merely drawing attention to balancing it through considering the limits of self-
interest; and by bringing up possible antidotes, such as selfless directed behavior in 
practice. In case of securities market this will contribute in solving such key problems of 
the modern securities market such as greediness, fraud, demand and price manipulation, 
insider dealing, Ponzi schemes, abuse of investor trust, etc – in short: both market and 
regulatory failures. 
3.3.2.2. Wealth maximization approach is misbalance in interpreting business aim 
The second misbalance in theoretical supply is connected with the misinterpretation 
of wealth maximization as the purpose of the activity of market participants. As one of the 
main concepts of market efficiency theory, wealth maximization provided the ideological 
background for fostering market relations. It seems that there is nothing wrong with it 
because endeavoring wealth maximization is the consequence of natural self- interest 
instinct. However, the problem is in the interpretation of wealth maximization as the 
principal purpose of business. This does not fit with the notion of wealth, which originally 
tends to be as a means for achieving some greater goals rather than being an end in itself. 
In this author’s opinion, wealth in and of itself does not have significant value . The 
relation and demand of subjects on the proper item determine its value. For instance, in the 
case of securities, their value is no more than the value of ordinary paper. However, state 
guarantees, the company’s activity, transparency, and development prospects, along with 
investor demand turns such paper to valuable commodities. 
The misinterpretation of wealth by existing economic theories is also not in line 
with the ideal business goal, which is not only about making money, but also solving 
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problems, and avoiding loss. According to the 2015 Deloitte Millennial Survey 269  75 
percent of millennials overwhelmingly believe that businesses are focused on their profit-
making agenda rather than helping to improve society. 270 According to millennials in the 
21st-century business needs to reset its purpose, and it should focus on people and mission, 
not just products and profits.271 This kind of necessity is becoming even sharper in case of 
the modern securities market.  
Today in the securities market there is massive divergence between two common 
aims of doing business with securities. Speculative aim is prevailing over investment aim 
in the securities market. However, investment focused aim was the original purpose of the 
securities market formation through the accumulation of resources and their redistribution 
within the sectors of the economy. In this long-term goal shareholders’ primary aim is to 
gain from the development of the business and industry. In contrast, participants with 
speculative purposes care little about the long-term growth of the company or industry. 
Instead, their goal is to maximize their profit by all means in short-term price fluctuations 
caused by objective and subjective factors. 
The ideal conduct for market participants is to act towards solving some problems – 
for instance, in the case of the securities market, to invest their funds to sectors of the 
economy where there is scarcity in financial resources. In this process, investors seek 
appropriate profit and bear the relevant risk of loss for their investment. Of course, a 
market participant investing in the securities market can choose a short-term investment, 
mainly focusing on daily price changes of stocks. It is entirely just ifiable in normal 
conditions when a participant has to sell or buy shares on a short-term basis. However, 
when speculation becomes a routine business, and this business becomes dominant in the 
securities market, there is increased risk of a market crash. Consequently, risk and scale of 
harm will be higher and higher.272 This is because the circulation of financial instruments 
is much faster than the financial assets or real sector business. For instance, professor 
Chang makes an interesting comparison: “building factory takes at least months, if not 
years; technological know-how may take decades; but financial assets can be issued and 
                                                 
269 See more about the 2015 Deloitte Millennial Survey: https://www2.deloitte.com/bm/en/pages/about-
deloitte/articles/2015-millennial-survey-press-release.html  
270 Ibid. 
271 See Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited’s (Deloitte Global) fourth annual Millennial Survey, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/bm/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/2015-millennial-survey-press-release.html  
272 History contains enough evidence on this issue. Cf., for instance the securities market crashes in 1930, 
1980, and 2008.   
 79 
circulated in minutes, if not seconds”. According to Chang, “if the financial sector moves 
too fast, it can derail the real economy”.273  
There is appropriate link between overgrowths of speculative practice in modern 
securities markets and wealth maximization, the efficient market hypothesis, and self-
interest approaches. The imbalance in securities market business goals is causing several 
substantial problems that go beyond the financial sphere and a single jurisdiction. It is 
necessary to reconsider wealth maximization theory in order to adequately interpret the 
aim of business, to resolve the mentioned divergence between business aims in the 
securities market, and to return the modern securities market to its initial aim, which is to 
facilitate investment.  
The fostering of moral values already integrated into individuals could be an 
effective way of achieving these tasks. Primarily, in case of scarcity of moral values in 
modern securities markets, this measure will assist in achieving a balance between moral 
and material merits of market participants, which could consequently lead to fair and 
transparent market relations in the securities business.        
3.3.3. Moral value deficit syndrome  
The last problem of the modern securities market discussed in the foregoing has 
been referred to as the moral value deficit syndrome.274 Moral value here means all merits 
intrinsic to a human being that can be put opposite its material values. This research 
considers both the moral values and the material interests as being integral parts of human 
beings. However, due to several factors, these are not always equally developed, and a fair 
balance between them is not always achieved. For instance, there is a considerable gap 
between material and moral values in modern securities market relations, because of 
lopsided explanation by above-mentioned economic theories and their practice in the last 
half-century.  
It is hotly debated in the relevant literature whether the market and morality are 
consistent with each other,275 whether there is a place for morality in the market,276  or, 
                                                 
273 See Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism, (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 
2012), 239-241. 
274 A metaphor coined from the ‘acquired immune deficiency syndrome’ disease.  
275 See for instance: Jeffery D. Smith, “Moral Markets and Moral Managers Revisited”, Journal of Business 
Ethics 61, no. 2 (2005): 129-141; See also: Ian Maitland, “Virtuous Markets: The Market as a School of the 
Virtues”, Business Ethics Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1997): 17-31. 
276 See for instance: Thomas Clay Arnold, “Rethinking Moral Economy” American Political Science 
Review 95, no. 1 (2001): 85-95. 
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alternatively, what may be the moral limits of the market277 etc. Unfortunately, reviewing 
these discussions is outside the scope of the present research. The goal of this subsection is 
to show the role of moral values in modern securities market relations and to use their 
potential in potentially solving the problems discussed earlier.  
Moral values are connected with the market through the participation of human 
beings, who, in this author’s opinion, should be at the center of market relations.278 In other 
words, because moral values are an integral part of human beings, they, by extension, also 
become an essential part of market relations. Moral values are the main feature that 
distinguishes human nature from vending machines. By this statement, the present author 
does not suggest that market participants should be saintlike. Rather, what should be 
pointed out is the need to use the natural integral ‘watchdog’ of human beings – their 
moral values in market relations as a remedy – that is to say, their moral values can restrain 
market participants from such wrongdoings, such as fraud, abuse of trust, insider dealing, 
manipulation and so on. Unfortunately, neither in current securities market theory nor in 
practice are moral values duly regarded. In contrast, because of the above-mentioned 
dominant economic theories, moral values have not been taken into account in market 
relations, which has consequently contributed to the various failures both in market and 
regulation procedure.279   
The recent survey shows a clear, negative shift in millennials’ views on business 
motivations and ethics. Today, only a minority of millennials (albeit a substantial one), 
believe that businesses behave ethically (namely, 48 percent vs. 65 percent in 2017), and 
that business leaders are committed to helping improve society (47 percent vs. 62 percent 
in 2017).280 In this regard, millennials believe that corporations should set out to achieve a 
full balance in social objectives, such as making a positive impact on society and the 
environment; creating innovative ideas, products and services; and seek to achieve job 
creation, career development, and to improve people’s lives. In their collective view, 
                                                 
277 See for instance: Philip Booth, “The Moral Limits to the Market Economy, and the Financial Crash.” IEA 
Discussion Paper No. 30, September 2010, https://iea.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/upldbook521pdf.pdf  
278 In the literature, there are various approaches to this issue. For instance, some scholars place institutions 
in the front line; others corporations and their behavior; and the third group of scholars prioritize regulation, 
etc. In the present author’s opinion, the human is the crucial factor in all of the mentioned aspects; 
respectively in market relations, its position is central. As there is no institution, corporation, and regulation 
without human, it is humans who really may develop or debase relations, including market relations.   
279 See Stan Viorica, “The Actual Collapse and the Importance of Moral Values (Ethics); Some Reflections 
Regarding the Roots of the Current Crisis,” Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 58 (2012): 1057-
1063. 
280 The Deloitte Millennial Survey 2018, “Millennials’ Confidences in Business, Loyalty to Employers 
Deteriorate” https://www2.deloitte.com/bm/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/millennialsurvey.html. 
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businesses are out of step with these priorities. 281  In the opinion of the present author 
concerning the origin of this situation, the dominant theories of the last century have made 
a substantial contribution to the present situation.   
Self- interest and wealth maximization approaches will be the leading cause of the 
problem in securities markets if they are not equipped with moral values. The recent 
financial crisis is a clear example of this. 282 The person who owns 10 dollars has more 
intention to earn more than the person who possesses less money. On the one hand, there is 
nothing wrong with self- interest and wealth maximization – on the contrary, it encourages 
action in all business relations. On the other hand, in the majority of cases the practice of 
profit or wealth maximization shows a deviation from moral values.283  In contrast, the 
existence of strong moral values help to use the wealth and money according to their initial 
purpose – as a mean to solve problems, not as an ultimate goal in and of itself. For 
instance, philosopher Jacob Needleman states that people with strong ethical and religious 
lives have often stayed quite stable after being rich. According to Needleman “they have a 
sense that there’s something more important than wealth. That is why, even when they get 
wealthy, it does not deflect them”284  
The longest research on happiness, which took about 80 years, also revealed that it 
is not wealth that is the source of happiness, but things such as communication, love and 
close relationships that provide real happiness.285 Professor Robert Waldinger, who is the 
fourth director of this research project, stated that: “what I learned from this 75-year study 
is that good human relations are a secret of happiness”.286 It is impossible to reach good 
human relations without strong moral values, whether this is is in social or market 
relations.  
                                                 
281 Ibid. 
282 The core causes of majority financial crisis were fraud, abusing trust, insider dealing, manipulation or 
other forms of ethical and moral failures. See, for instance, Joseph E. Stiglitz, “The Anatomy of a Murder: 
Who Killed the American Economy?” in What Caused the Financial Crisis, ed. Jeffrey Friedman, 
(Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2011) 140-141. See also: Viral V.Acharya and Matthew 
Richardson, “How Securitization Concentrated Risk in the Financial Sector”, in What Caused the Financial 
Crisis, ed.Jeffrey Friedman, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2011).184-185; Daron Acemoglu, 
The Crisis of 2008: Lessons For and From Economics, in What Caused the Financial Crisis, ed. Jeffrey 
Friedman, (Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania, 2011), 255. 
283 Professor Jacob Needleman wrote in this regard the following: “[w]hen money can make you feel humble, 
then I think it’s beneficial. However, if it fattens your ego, which it often does, then look out”. See: Jacob 
Needleman, “Money and the Meaning of Life”,(1991).  
284 See in details: Needleman, Jacob. "Money and the Meaning of Life." (1991). 
285 Robert Waldinger, “What makes a Good Life? Lessons from the Longest Study on Happiness” TEDx 
Beacon Street, November 2015, 
https://www.ted.com/talks/robert_waldinger_what_makes_a_good_life_lessons_from_the_longest_study_on
_happiness?referrer=playlist-the_most_popular_talks_of_all#t-754153  
286 Ibid.  
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Recent research that used data from 73 jurisdictions from 2009 to 2011 examined 
the existence of social capital thresholds in the securities market development and 
macroeconomic performance nexus. The empirical results demonstrate that securities 
market liquidity is significant and positive in influencing GDP and total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth respectively only after the achievement of a certain threshold level of firms’ 
ethical behavior. Until then, the effects of the securities market on both GDP growth and 
TFP growth are found to be negligible. They mention that even though ethics and trust are 
as old as humanity, “we are only at the starting point in the journey to better understand the 
role of ethics and trust, or in a broader sense, social capital, in financial markets”.287 
Therefore, modern securities market relations need a proper ideological supply for the 
activation and development of market participants' moral values, at least up to the level 
that will provide balance with their dominant material values. This issue would be a 
promising field of further research and future studies. 
Summary 
 
In this chapter, it was attempted to provide an outline of the basic theories of 
securities market regulation and some challenges they are facing in contemporary 
conditions. It was found that theories have a significant impact on securities market 
regulation and current theoretical notions focus mostly on self- interest, wealth 
maximization, and microeconomic issues, and do not adequately reflect the market and 
human features. There should be substantive research and consideration towards 
encouraging business (including securities business) to consider alternative aims, market 
participants to espouse alternative values, and the securities market regulation to shift 
towards a more balanced approach.   
 
  
                                                 
287 See details in Adam Ng, Mansor H. Ibrahim, and Abbas Mirakhor, “Ethical Behavior and Trustworthiness 
in the Securities market-Growth Nexus”, Research in International Business and Finance 33 (2015): 44-58. 
  
 83 
CHAPTER 4. SECURITIES MARKET AS AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF 
BUSINESS FINANCING IN CIS COUNTRIES   
 
Chapter two288 highlighted the presence of a vast difference in business financing 
through banks and securities markets in CIS countries, especially in Uzbekistan where 
more than ninety percent of business financing comes from banks, and less than ten 
percent from the securities market. The main aim of this chapter is to analyze the reasons 
behind the high discrepancy in bank and securities market financing of business, and to 
work out solutions on balancing the sources of business financing in transition countries, 
including those of the CIS. To achieve this goal this chapter: provides an analysis of the 
main features of the bank-based and market financial systems, attempts to examine the 
notions of debt and equity financing, and explores the main regulatory differences of 
banking and securities market financing.   
4.1. Bank-based and market based financial systems: does financial structure matter? 
 
 There are several causes of the high divergence between the role of banking and 
securities market in business financing. Financial structures, financial instruments, and the 
regulatory framework are the most influential among them. This subchapter seeks to 
clarify the reasons behind bank dominance in business financing from a financial structure 
viewpoint. 
Overall, financial systems may be divided into bank-based and market-based, 
according to the role of banks or securities markets in accumulating and directing funds to 
sectors of the economy; and the degree to which the state is involved in the allocation of 
credit.289 In general, in bank-based systems, the majority of financial assets and liabilities 
mainly consist of bank deposits, loans, and credits. Contrary in market-based systems, 
securities are the dominant form of financial asset. Bank-based systems mostly rely on 
relationships and collateral, while market-based systems are mainly driven by effective 
investor protection laws, clear disclosure standards, good faith, and investor trust. Market-
based countries generally have better-developed markets for equity finance, 290  whereas 
bank-based systems are characterized by a powerful and dominant banking system.  
                                                 
288 See especially 2.4.2 subsection of the current thesis.  
289 This chapter mostly covers the first criterion – the issue connected to state involvement will be discussed 
in the next section.  
290 See details in Michiel J. Bijlsma and Gijsbert T. J. Zwart, The Changing Landscape of Financial Markets 
in Europe, the United States and Japan . No. 2013/02. Bruegel Working Paper, 2013. 
https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/dp238-changing-landscape-financial-markets-
europe-us-and-japan.pdf  
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A significant part of the literature on bank-based and market-based financing of 
business discusses the link between financial structure and economic growth. 291  The 
findings and results of these studies are diverse. The majority of studies took a balanced 
approach mentioning the importance of both bank-based and market-based systems to 
economic growth,292 while some studies conclude that financial structure per se does not 
matter, it is the overall provision of financial services (banks and financial markets taken 
together) that is important for growth.293Other research emphasizes a country’s level of 
economic and financial development, mentioning that the relationship between financial 
structure and economic growth is more complicated. 294  The latest studies on financial 
structure and growth favor market-based systems.295 Their findings are mostly connected 
to the results of post-crisis research,296 where banks overstretch and misdirect credit in 
economic expansions and share credit in financial recessions more than markets. Other, 
more recent, research concludes that financial structure matters from the systemic risk 
viewpoint. Notably, authors argue that bank-based financing generates systemic risk, while 
market-based financing reduces it. 297  They conclude that countries could increase their 
resilience to systemic risk by reducing the share of bank financing and respectively 
increasing market-based funding.298  
As a conclusion, it must be mentioned that in general what is essential is not 
whether a financial system is bank-based or securities market-based, but, rather, how 
developed and efficient the financial system is, and whether companies have access to 
                                                 
291 See, for instance, Leonardo Gambacorta, Jing Yang, and Kostas Tsatsaronis, “Financial Structure and 
Growth,” (2014); Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik Feyen, and Ross Levine, The Evolving Importance of Banks and 
Securities Markets, World Bank, 2011; Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic 
Growth, World Bank, 1999, 537–58.   
292 See, for instance, John H. Boyd and Bruce D. Smith, “The evolution of debt and equity markets in 
economic development”, Economic Theory 12, no. 3 (1998): 519-560; Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, Stock 
Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, World Bank, 1999, 537–58; Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, “Stock 
Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence”, Journal of Banking & Finance 28, no. 3 (2004): 423-442; 
Leonardo Gambacorta, Jing Yang, and Kostas Tsatsaronis, “Financial Structure and Growth,” (2014).  
293 See for instance: Ross Levine, Bank-based or Market-based Financial Systems: Which is Better? , No. 
w9138. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002; Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, “Stock 
Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth: an Overview”, The World Bank Economic Review 10, 
no. 2 (1996): 223-239. 
294 See details in Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Erik Feyen, and Ross Levine, The Evolving Importance of Banks and 
Securities Markets, World Bank, 2011. 
295 See for instance: Sam Langfield and Marco Pagano, “Bank Bias in Europe: Effects on Systemic Risk and 
Growth”, Economic Policy 31, no. 85 (2016): 51-106. 
296 See Marco Pagano, Sam Langfield, Viral V. Acharya, Arnoud Boot, Markus K. Brunnermeier, Claudia 
Buch, Martin F. Hellwig, and Ieke van den Burg, Is Europe Overbanked?, No. 4. European Systemic Risk 
Board, 2014. 
297 See Joost Bats and Aerdt Houben, “Bank-based versus Market-based Financing: Implications for 
Systemic Risk”, (2017). 
298 Ibid. 
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actual alternative sources for financing their business. Imbalance in business financing, in 
the case of CIS countries bank dominance, causes serious micro- and macro- level 
concerns. At the micro level, the predominance of either form in business financing limits 
company chances to attract finance from alternative sources. At the macro level, as the 
analysis indicates, bank-based financing generates systemic risk. The dependence of a 
country’s economy on either form of financial structure does not refrain working on the 
achievement of the balance between bank-based and securities market-based financing. 
4.2. The notion of debt and equity financing 
 
The debt and equity financing issue is the logical supplement to the bank-based and 
market-based financial structure issue that was briefly analyzed above. In general, bank-
based countries have a dominant debt financing economy, and market-based countries 
have a dominant equity financing. Also, the aim of this subchapter is not to try to change 
this phenomenon, but to better understand the notion and specifics of debt and equity 
financing to identify the implications useful for regulatory remedies in the case of CIS 
countries.   
Overall, any business in any stage of its activity needs to fulfill its short-term or 
long-term financial needs. There are two ways for a company to attract outside funds: 
namely, via debt-based (loan) financing and via equity-based financing. Each method has 
its advantages and disadvantages, and each is a better fit for some situations than others. 
Factors that distinguish these two types of business financing include: fundraising terms, 
process, size, time frame, aim and methods of usage. 
In general, so-called debt and equity financing are two different systems of 
business financing based on different principles. The central tenet of debt financing is 
based on borrowing funds from a lender with the obligation of returning these by the 
prearranged date at a fixed interest rate stipulated from the outset. Primary forms of debt 
financing are lending and sale of bonds. The structure itself does not change the principle 
of the transaction: the lender retains a right to the money lent and may demand it back 
under conditions specified in the borrowing arrangement.  
The important point here to mention is that debt financing is not limited only to the 
banking industry. Debt (bonds) is also an active financial instrument in the securities 
market. So, the main difference in debt and equity financing is not based on institutional 
factors, but in the terms and principles of funding. One more critical issue here is the active 
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participation of banks in securities markets. For instance, in Uzbekistan the average share 
of banks in the securities market is more than 70 percent.299  
The notion of pure equity financing is based on investing goal rather than lending 
for the interest, as in the case of debt financing. Equity financing provides ownership and 
managerial rights to investors. Companies involving this investment without any collateral 
are required to share their profit and disclose appropriate information. Profit or return in 
relation to equity financing is highly risky than in the case of debt financing, where interest 
rate and time of recovery is preliminarily established before lending. In the case of equity 
finance, an investor might not get any revenue if the company did not make any profit. 
However, on the other hand, the level of an investor’s gain is not limited, as in the case 
with debt financing where the interest rate is predetermined and fixed. If the company is 
successful, there will be more dividends, and consequently more investment flow. 
Increasing investment is a decisive factor for the company rather than growing its debt 
balance. In other words, investors tend to look with caution at a company that has more 
debts, and seek to finance the company that has a high flow of investment. The following 
table describes the fundamental differences of debt and equity financing. 
Table 5. Comparison of debt and equity financing 
 Criteria of comparison Debt financing Equity financing 
1.  Ownership status No Yes 
2.  Profit Guaranteed and fixed Not guaranteed and not 
fixed 
3.  Level of profit Low High  
4.  Management possibility No Yes 
5.  Return form Interest  Dividend 
6.  Collateral Generally essential  Not required 
7.  Risk of lost Relatively low Relatively high  
8.  Duration  Limited Unlimited  
 
In the end, some researchers found that firms tend to turn to banks for financing 
mainly due to the fact that banks are good at helping them through times of financial 
distress.300 Another reason is connected with the desire of a company – whether it wants to 
share ownership, profit, management, and information. The research has concluded that, 
“the riskier firms prefer bank loans, the safer ones tap the bond markets, and the ones in 
between prefer to issue both equity and bonds.”301 And the last point is that loan or debt-
                                                 
299 Very similar situations may be witnessed in other CIS countries too.  
300  Patrick Bolton and Xavier Freixas, “Equity, Bonds, and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial 
Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information."  Journal of Political Economy 108, no. 2 (2000): 324-
351. 
301 Ibid. 
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based fundraising is the most common form and relatively easier method of busines s 
financing in developing countries302 and among SMEs.303 This is due to the fact that in 
developing countries banks’ infrastructure, regulatory support, and corporate conduct are 
relatively advanced than the securities market. And not only SMEs, but also larger 
companies not eager to use equity financing due to factors, including the complicated 
procedure of securities issuance, strong corporate governance and disclosure information 
standards, and relatively less state encouragement.       
4.3. Regulation as a tool for striking a balance 
 
Regulatory policy and state support of bank and equity financing have a significant 
impact on the development of the real economy. Research on bank competition in access to 
finance suggests that the institutional and regulatory framework is essential in improving 
the competitive and regulatory environment of business financing. 304 Notably, the authors 
underline the importance of regulations, institutions, and ownership structure for 
policymakers who are interested in easing financing obstacles. 305  Later, other studies 
examined this issue deeper and found that the functioning of factors such as decent 
property rights protection, strong shareholder rights, high quality of corporate information, 
and less government interference in the form of corruption and political interference ha ve a 
high impact on access to finance.306 Usually, in developing countries, including those of 
the CIS, the factors mentioned above that assist financial access are underdeveloped or 
partially developed.307  
One of the examples of regulation impact on the development of the banking sector 
would be large-scale state support of the banking industry, which has created an unfair 
situation in business financing in CIS countries. For instance, in Uzbekistan, direct 
                                                 
302 See details in Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic. Financing of Firms in 
Developing Countries: Lessons from Research . The World Bank, 2012, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2039204  
303 See, for instance, Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic. Financing of 
Firms in Developing Countries: Lessons from Research . The World Bank, 2012; Thorsten Beck, Asli 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, “Bank Competition and Access to Finance: International 
Evidence”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking  (2004): 627-648; Thorsten Beck and Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, 
“Small and Medium-size Enterprises: Access to Finance as a Growth Constraint”, Journal of Banking & 
Finance 30, no. 11 (2006): 2931-2943; Neil Lee, Hiba Sameen, and Marc Cowling, “Access to Finance for 
Innovative SMEs since the Financial Crisis”, Research policy 44, no. 2 (2015): 370-380; Babajide Fowowe, 
“Access to Finance and Firm Performance: Evidence from African Countries”, Review of Development 
Finance 7, no. 1 (2017): 6-17. 
304Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, “Bank Competition and Access to 
Finance: International Evidence”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking  (2004): 627-648. 
305 Ibid. 
306 Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic. Financing of Firms in Developing 
Countries: Lessons from Research. The World Bank, 2012. 
307 ‘Partial development’ here means dominance of banking or securities market financing. 
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government intervention through specialized institutions, subsidized financing programs, 
and tax incentives have tended to preserve the role of the banking sector as a channel for 
planned financing.308 On the contrary, the nascent securities market that was deprived of 
such care on the part of government was almost abandoned. By this, this author is far from 
stating that government should always support all forms of market institutions. This author 
does not favor excessive administrative regulation of market relations. Rather, what is 
argued is for there to be a balance concerning the attention and care that banking and the 
securities market, regarding business financing, receive from the state. Balancing here is 
necessary for ensuring regulatory neutrality, and it does not mean reducing bank 
privileges, but providing at least the same level of state support to the securities market, 
and for its development. As bank participation (as issuer, shareholder, and intermediary) in 
the securities market is more than seventy percent, the banking industry is likely to lose 
very little if anything from this reform. Instead, it is likely to indirectly enjoy any 
privileges given to the securities market.   
Uneven levels of protection of consumers’ interests of financial services and 
investors characterize CIS countries. For instance, one of the institutional measures of 
investor rights protection – guarantee (compensation) funds – in all CIS countries mainly 
focuses on payment of insurance compensation in the case of financial insolvency of a 
bank. However, none of the countries have established guarantee (compensation) funds to 
cover the losses of investors in case of illegal actions or bankruptcy of participants of the 
securities market. The securities legislation of all of the three countries compared in the 
present thesis provides rule of guarantee or insurance fund based on which securities 
market intermediaries (traders and brokers) should create their own insurance deposit fund 
for covering their liability. In Russian and Kazakhstan law, the rules on the foundation of 
such funds seem milder,309 as opposed to Uzbekistan law, where market intermediaries 
should form a guarantee fund to compensate the investor for losses. 310 This is a useful 
mechanism that provides some guarantees of investor rights. However, this is an individual 
and limited system, and cannot be compared to the nationwide measures such as those 
concerning a guarantee fund for bank deposits, or some other centralized institution.  
                                                 
308 See ADB, “Country Partnership Strategy: Uzbekistan 2012–2016”, Sector Assessment (Summary): 
Finance, 2, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/linked-documents/cps-uzb-2012-2016-ssa-05.pdf. 
309 See: Law on Securities Market of Russian Federation (amended as of April 23, 2018),  Article 51.9, 
http://docs.cntd.ru/document/9018809; and Law on Securities Market of Kazakhstan (amended as of 
February 27, 2017), article 90-1.2.  
310 See Law on Securities Market of Uzbekistan, June 3, 2015. Article 23, http://lex.uz/docs/2662541. 
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In Russia and Kazakhstan, there are established institutions of the financial 
ombudsman that are authorized to protect the rights of investors, and of consumers of 
financial services. However, their effect did not cover all aspects of the financial market 
and is limited mainly to banking. Uzbekistan also founded several country- level 
institutions for the protection of investor rights, 311  however, as is the case with its 
neighbors, these foundations mainly focused on the banking industry and its clients. 
One more issue that requires a balance between banking and the securities market 
is connected to the mechanism of creditor/investor rights protection. In general, all CIS 
countries legislation introduced creditor/investor protection rules both for banking and 
securities market relations. However, there is high divergence between the status and legal 
interpretation of credit and investment, and, respectively, between creditor and investor, in 
comparatively in the legislation of the countries under review. The tendency is towards the 
view that law better protects bank credits and creditor rights than shares and shareholder 
rights. Different regulatory approaches and special preferential packages to bank credits 
and creditors raise concerns regarding the competitiveness of debt and equity financing in 
CIS countries.   
The present author is far from stating that government is intentionally 
discriminating between debt and equity financing – the existence of competition between 
the banking industry and the securities market is beneficial both for state and companies. 
The existence of separate state initiatives on fostering the securities market (albeit, not 
equal with bank-supporting measures) is undisputable evidence on this point. The reason 
for the difference in the level of support and outcomes is mainly based on bank 
concentration and state ownership issues. Concerning the countries reviewed here, bank 
concentration is relatively high. For instance, in Russia and Kazakhstan, the five largest 
banks own more than 50 percent of assets.312 In the case of Uzbekistan, this figure is more 
than 70 percent. 313  According to Beck and others, in low-income countries bank 
concentration increases financing obstacles, with a stronger effect for small and medium 
                                                 
311 For instance, in August of 2017 the State Fund for Support of Business Development was established to 
provide resources to commercial banks, including through attracted foreign credit lines, for subsequent 
lending to small businesses. In October 2017 the Guarantee Fund for SME development was established the 
majority of shareholders of which are twenty banks.  
312 For further details, see: Финансовые рынки Евразии: устройство, динамика, будущее / под ред. проф. 
Я. М. Миркина. — М. : Магистр, 2017. — 384 с. (Financial Markets of Eurasia: Structure, Dynamics, 
Future, ed. Prof. Ya. M. Mirkina. - M.: Master, 2017, 384).  
313 For further details, see: Central Bank of Uzbekistan, Report on the Activity of Commercial Banks, June 1, 
2018, http://cbu.uz/uzc/statistics/bankstats/2018/06/127781/.  
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compared to large firms.314 In countries with high government interference in the banking 
system and a higher share of government-owned banks, the effect of bank concentration 
has deteriorated. 315  The overall results of the research suggest the importance of 
institutional and regulatory policies for the relation between banking market structure and 
firms’ access to finance at any level of economic development.316 
State ownership is also one of the key reasons for differentiated policy in banking 
and securities market financing. This is based on the statement that the state supports banks 
and bank financing, as the majority share in the banking industry belongs to the state. 
Recent research also suggests that in most developing countries firms with state 
participation had better access to bank financing due to implicit or explicit guarantees from 
the governments and due to other government interventions. 317 In all of the countries under 
review in this thesis, state banks possess over half of the assets, capital, and loan portfolio 
of the banking sector. In the case of Uzbekistan this figure exceeds 80 percent. 318 At this 
point, it is not argued that state ownership may necessarily influence the different 
regulatory policies between banking and securities market financing. Because in the 
countries examined here the state holds almost the same level of share in SOEs too,319 
however banks enjoy considerable state support, subsidies, guarantees, and privileges 
rather than other SOEs. This weakens any argument that government supports banks 
because of the ownership issue. Equally, however, by this the author does not deny the 
nature and various effects of state ownership concentration in this matter. This matter 
requires a more detailed analysis of the character of state ownership, which we would like 
to fulfill in the next chapter.   
Summary 
 
In this chapter, it was attempted to offer an analysis of the reasons behind the 
disparity of share of business financing regarding banks and the securities market in CIS 
                                                 
314 See Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, “Bank Competition and Access to 
Finance: International Evidence”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking  (2004): 627-648. 
315 Ibid. 
316 Ibid. 
317 See: Yao Wang, “What are the Biggest Obstacles to Growth of SMEs in Developing Countries?–An 
Empirical Evidence from an Enterprise Survey”, Borsa Istanbul Review 16, no. 3 (2016): 167-176.  
318 By June 1, 2018, the total state share in Uzbekistan banks stood at 82 percent. See official statistics of the 
Central Bank of Uzbekistan: http://cbu.uz/uzc/statistics/bankstats/2018/06/127781/.  
319 For instance, there were 659 JSCs registered in Uzbekistan by January 1, 2017, of which 73.4 % with state 
shares. See: “The Concept of Development Secondary Securities market  in 2017-2018 in  Uzbekistan” 
developed by the Center for Research on Privatization, Development Problems Corporate Governance, and 
the Securit ies Market  under the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan to promote privatization and 
competition. https://research-center.uz/info/concept/ 
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countries. For this purpose, central financial structure systems, which is bank based and 
market-based were reviewed as a means of identifying solutions through the analysis of the 
notion of debt and equity financing, and, lastly, the regulatory framework both as a reason 
and solution of the problem was considered. 
 The findings indicate that financial structure matters in the origin and development 
of either industry (bank or securities market), but dependence on one economic structure 
does not restrict the development of the other. Therefore, no matter which type of financial 
system dominates in a country’s financial system, the regulatory framework should 
provide sufficient room and create the climate for real and fair competition among banks 
and securities markets. In the case of CIS countries, bank financing is relatively developed, 
so there should be a supportive regulatory framework for fostering equity financing to 
achieve fair competition between these two financial institutions. Concerning the financial 
instruments, we found that there are principal differences of debt and equity financing, and 
they should be taken into account while balancing the share of bank and securities market 
financing. And, lastly, this chapter aimed to provide an overview of the regulatory 
framework that, on the one hand, is a contributing reason behind the problem discussed, 
and on the other, could be the appropriate solution to it.  
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CHAPTER 5. STATE ROLE AND SECURITIES MARKET DEVELOPMENT IN 
CIS COUNTRIES  
 
The analysis in the previous chapters indicates that in the CIS countries’ securities 
market, the state has a significant role as regulator and as the principal shareholder. In CIS 
countries the state actively participates in securities market relations through its SOEs and 
banks that issue, own and manage various securities, and render intermediary services in 
the securities market. The state sets rules to regulate market relations through authorized 
bodies that are also responsible for the fairness of dispute resolution. Consequently, a high 
level of direct and indirect state participation in securities market relations suggests the 
prevalence of general administrative principles over market principles. In such conditions, 
one of the main tasks of implementing market princ iples in the securities market, and 
respectively improve equity financing, would be to consider the reduction of state share 
and administrative methods. For this, it is necessary to hold extensive and comprehensive 
reforms that are underpinned by sound theory to get proper understanding and direction. In 
this regard, this chapter provides an outline of the theoretical bases of state participation in 
the economy, an overview of the state’s role and the extent of state ownership, an analysis 
of the main SOE problems, and provides perspectives of future SOE reforms in selected 
CIS countries. 
5.1. Outline of theories on state participation in the economy 
 
In general, the modern market economy cannot exist without the state’s economic 
activity. Especially during the last two decades, the state’s presence in business relations as 
a unique subject has only increased. For instance, according to Bremmer, “[g]overnments, 
not private shareholders, already own the world’s largest oil companies, and control three-
quarters of the world’s energy reserves.”320 In the late 70s of the last century SOEs’ share 
in developed countries accounted for about 7% of GDP; in non-socialist developing 
countries almost 12%, and in planned economies around 90%.321 Despite the privatization 
movements in the last three decades, SOEs still have a significant impact in key industries 
                                                 
320 See Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age-The End of the Free Market”, Foreign Aff. 88 (2009): 
40. 
321 See, for instance, Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini, “Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in 
Business, Brazil and Beyond”, Harvard University Press (2013); Max Büge, Matias Egeland, Przemyslaw 
Kowalski, and Monika Sztajerowska. “State-owned Enterprises in the Global Economy: Reason for 
Concern?” Vox: CEPR’s Policy Portal (2013); L. Bernier, ed. 2014. Public Enterprises Today: Missions, 
Performance, and Governance. Learning from Fifteen Cases. Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang S.A. 
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of the economy, market capitalization, investment, and employment, especially in the post-
Soviet countries. In such conditions, state presence in the economy is a crucial issue that 
generates fruitful discussion and much controversy. 
  The recent history of the main discussion on the state’s involvement in market 
relations goes to the classics of economic theory (A. Smith, D. Ricardo et al.) according to 
which the market economy should develop by self-regulation, that is, without the 
involvement of any external forces, including the state. 322 The classical model assumes 
minimal intervention in the economy and is based on the notion of Adam Smith whereby 
the state is the ‘night watchman’ of a market economy. Following this concept, business 
produces and consumes, and the state is engaged in the protection of property rights, 
ensures the observance of market principles, and strongly reacts to the deviation of rules, 
up to the use of force (law, court, army, police and so on). However, the crisis of the 
capitalist economy and securities market crash in 1929-1933 marked the end of the free 
enterprise ‘era’, and reflected the inability of the market system to develop itself without 
state involvement.  
The Keynesian model was presented as a remedy for the economic crisis. It 
assumes active and, as far as possible, maximum government intervention in the economy 
to minimize cyclical fluctuations, unemployment, inflation and  loss of resources and 
products of all market participants. In his ‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money’, Keynes questioned the assumption that self-regulation is automatic in a 
market economy, and justified the need for government intervention in economic 
processes.323 This theory received a practical application in the US economy (in the 50s) 
and brought specific, definite results in economic activity. Later, Keynes ’s theory of state 
regulation formed the basis of the economic policy of almost all developed capitalist 
countries. 
In the 1970s-80s, when excessive state intervention in the economy was considered 
responsible for slowing down the development of social production, neoclassical economic 
ideas have again become relevant and remain so to this day. According to this doctrine 
freeing up markets and the reduction in direct state intervention make economies more 
flexible and creative. They inspired liberalization and privatization in many developed and 
                                                 
322 Adam Smith, Essays on philosophical subjects, (London: T. Cadell Jun. and W. Davies, 1795). 
323 See details in John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money , (Springer, 
2018).  
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developing countries, and even political revolution in many socialist countries. 324 
According to Chang, “despite the continuous widening of their scope, neoliberal reform 
programs have failed to produce expected results”. Neoliberalism failed in generating 
faster growth, instead of increased income inequality and economic instability.325 By the 
end of the 20-century neoclassical theory was no longer dominant. Recent research 
suggests that globalization has increased government sectors around the world. 326  The 
latest tendency in the attitude of the world’s largest economies to a maximum usage of 
state leverages in economic relations may change the further direction of theories on the 
state’s role in the marketplace.327   
5.2. Overview of the state’s role in CIS countries 
 
Almost three decades earlier, the state in all CIS countries had an absolute role, 
both in terms of market regulation and economic activity. Around 80 years CIS countries 
experienced a centrally planned economy and administrative command ruling in their 
economic, social, and political life. During the command and regulatory system, the state 
was the principal buyer of products, the central monopolist, and the exclusive distributor of 
resources, financial means, equipment, and human resources. Enterprises sought different 
ways of access to these resources, and very often the situation developed in such a way that 
some received enough resources, sometimes in excess, and others were deprived of them. 
In the absence of competition, enterprises with resources were not interested in their 
rational use, and enterprises deprived of the necessary means could not intensively develop 
their production.   
It seemed that the market economy could change that situation, but despite the 
almost three decades of reforms, most CIS countries consider liberalization and 
privatization reforms very cautiously. As a result, today most CIS countries have dominant 
(i.e., more than fifty percent of) state shares in their economy, and a tight market regulation 
system. For instance, in Russia by the end of 2015, the share of SOEs in the country’s 
                                                 
324 See Ha-Joon Chang, Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of the State , (Zed Books, 2003), 
37.  
325 Ibid, 2. 
326 For further details, see: Stephanie Meinhard and Niklas Potrafke, “Globalization–Welfare State Nexus 
Reconsidered", Review of International Economics 20, no. 2 (2012): 271-287. 
327 For instance, recent US initiatives on de-facto restricting access to its economy, triggering a US-China 
trade war, and preferring a protectionist over a globalist approach may also lead to a change of state theory.  
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GDP was almost seventy percent, 328  in Kazakhstan sixty percent, 329and in Uzbekistan, 
according to official statistics,330 around twenty percent.331 Also, in all countries examined 
here banks dominate in the financial sector, and the state share in bank ownership is 
around eighty percent. This has great significance for the further development of the 
securities market in these countries, where banks play a considerable role in market 
relations as securities issuers, shareholders, and intermediaries.   
 As for the reasons of high state involvement in the economy, several factors could 
be listed, including historical, geographical, legal/juridical, political, and economic. 
Historical elements relate to the heritage of the centrally planned economy that was in 
operation for more than a century. The geographical aspect is explained through natural 
resource abundance in the countries examined. Usually at the initial stage of development 
the management and extraction of natural resources is the responsibility of public entities 
rather than private ones. Another main factor by which the dominance of state regulation 
and state presence in the economy in CIS countries is explained is through legal origin 
theories. For instance, several scholars in their numerous studies found that civil law 
countries were associated with a greater state ownership and regulation than common law 
countries. 332  Political and economic factors mainly relate to the weak regulatory 
framework and the transitional stage of the economy that is usual for countries with 
identical or similar characteristics. In other words, in the transition period, there will be 
more demand for the state’s paternalistic, welfare, and social roles. However, the limits of 
the transition period and the content of state participation on it may differ based on a 
country’s features. To get a picture of such features, an attempt to outline the level of state 
ownership in the case of Uzbekistan, Russia, and Kazakhstan is offered below.    
 
                                                 
328 See details in: Государственное участие в российской экономике: госкомпании, закупки, 
приватизация, Бюллетень о развитии конкуренции, март 2016, c.4. (State Participation in the Russian 
Economy: State Companies, Purchases, Privatization, Competition Development Bulletin , March 2016, 4). 
http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/8449.pdf.  
329 Вячеслав Щекунских, Госкомпании безнадежно неэффективны для государства, June 23, 2017, 
(Vyacheslav Shchekunsky, State-owned Companies are Hopelessly Ineffective for the State), 
https://www.kursiv.kz/news/vlast1/goskompanii-beznadezno-neeffektivny-dla-gosudarstva/ . 
330 Detailed analysis of GDP structure by sectors and state share of them raises some doubts on the reality of 
these official statistics. Below we briefly present those analyses.  
331 See Official Report of the Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan about Macroeconomic Indicators for 2017, 
5, https://stat.uz/uploads/docs/vvp-uzb.pdf.  
332 See for instance recent research on this issue: Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei 
Shleifer, “Law and Finance after a Decade of Research”, in  Handbook of the Economics of Finance, vol. 2, 
425-491 (Elsevier, 2013). 
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5.2.1. State ownership level in Uzbekistan 
 
The state ownership level issue is one of the puzzles that occur in studying the issue 
of SOEs in Uzbekistan. This puzzle is mainly caused by inconsistent data and statistics, 
including from official sources, on the level of state ownership. The analyses show that 
socially-oriented market economy and gradual privatization reforms have had a significant 
influence on SOE reform in Uzbekistan. According to official statistics the share of state 
ownership in the GDP structure of the country decreased from 41 percent in 1995 to 19 
percent in 2017 (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Structure of Uzbekistan GDP by ownership form  
 
Source: State Statistic Committee of Uzbekistan.333 
 
The above figures are based on the Report of the Uzbekistan Statistics Committee, 
but attempts to scrutinize the figures by checking other sources, including official sources, 
give rise to serious doubts on the reality and reliability of these figures. An attempts 
follows in the below to interrogate the statistic data in order to understand the real share of 
state ownership in the GDP of Uzbekistan. First, an examination of the GDP structure 
(figure 3) suggests that in 2016 almost half of the GDP relates to the services sector, nearly 
one-third to industry, and about 18 percent to agriculture.  
Figure 3. Changing dynamics of GDP structure of Uzbekistan
 
                                                 
333 For details see: https://stat.uz/uz/statinfo/milliy-hisoblar/tahlillar-milliy-hisoblar/432-analiticheskie-
materialy-uz/2023-makroiqtisodiy-ko-rsatkichlari-tahlili; https://stat.uz/uploads/docs/vvp-uzb.pdf. 
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Source: State Statistic Committee of Uzbekistan.334  
 
 The next step of investigation is to look inside the services sector and analyze its 
structure. The following chart (figure 4) demonstrates the main industries within the 
services sector of Uzbekistan, where transport services lead with around 40 percent of the 
share, trade covers more than one-third of the services sector, almost one fifth goes to 
finance, and about 10 percent belongs to the communication services. Moreover, were one 
to dig deeper into specific service sectors, it would appear that the state has a significant 
share in each of them. For instance, in the transport sector, airways and railways facilities 
are entirely owned and managed by SOEs, in the banking sector, almost 80 percent of 
services and assets belong to the state (figure 5), and in the trade sector, more than 65 
percent of export accounts for SOEs or government-related entities (figure 6).  
 
Figure 4. Services structure of Uzbekistan GDP (2017)
 
Source: State Statistic Committee of Uzbekistan.335 
 
Figure 5. State ownership in commercial banks of Uzbekistan
 
Source: Central Bank of Uzbekistan, Information on the leading indicators of commercial banks 
activity as of June 1, 2018.336  
 
 
                                                 
334 See: https://stat.uz/uz/statinfo/milliy-hisoblar/tahlillar-milliy-hisoblar/432-analit icheskie-materialy-
uz/2023-makroiqtisodiy-ko-rsatkichlari-tahlili; https://stat.uz/uploads/docs/vvp-uzb.pdf. 
335 See: https://stat.uz/uploads/docs/Xizmatlar-uz-12-2017.pdf  
336 See: http://cbu.uz/uzc/statistics/bankstats/2018/06/127781/ 
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Figure 6. State share in Uzbekistan export (2016)
 
Note: Export volume in 2016 was USD 7.11 billion.  
Source: https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/uzb/ 
 
Going further on with seeking to verify the figures on the state share in 
Uzbekistan’s GDP, it is necessary to analyze the structure of the industry sector. The 
following chart shows that Uzbekistan’s industry sector is quite diversified (Figure 7), 
however, in all sectors of industry SOEs have a significant share. For instance, in the 
mining sector one of the largest companies is Navoiy Mining and Metallurgical 
Combinat,337 which is the primary producer and exporter of uranium and precious metals, 
including gold. There are other giant companies in the mining sector including Bekobod 
Metallurgical Combinat and Angren Metallurgical Combinat in which the state owns a 
significant share. In the ownership structure of textile, chemicals, automobile, electricity, 
and gas sectors, a similar situation is witnessed.  
Figure 7. Industry structure of Uzbekistan GDP 
 
Source: State Statistic Committee of Uzbekistan.338 
 
Next, an attempt to identify state ownership in the number of companies could also 
shed further light on the question of state involvement. By January 1, 2017, there are 
                                                 
337 See the official website: https://www.ngmk.uz/en/about/about.. 
338 See: https://stat.uz/uploads/docs/vvp-uzb.pdf 
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213,089 acting companies (excluding farmers) in Uzbekistan, 1.1% of which are unitary 
enterprises totally owned by the state (i.e., the state holds 100% of their shares). The main 
organizational- legal form of operating companies is that of Limited Liability Company 
(LLC) – namely, 57% of companies (Figure 8). There are only 2,302 large companies, 
which cover around 1.1 percent of the total quantity of acting businesses.339  
 
Figure 8. Classification of companies in Uzbekistan by their legal-
organizational form (by Jan.1st of 2017) 
 
Source: State Statistics Committee of Uzbekistan340 
 
The following table presents the summarizing picture of ownership structure in the 
companies, which are mainly JSCs, acting in the industry sector (table 6). From the table it 
is clear that the state share in these JSCs, including SOEs shares, exceeds 80 percent.   
 
Table 6. State share in JSCs of Uzbekistan, by January 1, 2017 
Structure of stock by nominal price USD billion Number of JSCs Share in %  
State share in JSCs 2.78 158 73.01 
SOEs share in JSCs 0.43 326 11.34 
Total 3.21 484 84.35 
Private sector share 0.6 175 15.65 
Source:  ‘Concept of Development Secondary Securities market in Uzbekistan in 2017-2018’341 
 
By quantity, JSCs comprise only 0.3 percent of all existing companies (figure 8), 
but by financial status – they are much larger than LLCs. According to legislation the 
                                                 
339 Unfortunately, it was not possible to find any reliable information about the quality, i.e., turnover of 
companies, which could be useful for clarifying state share.       
340 See: https://stat.uz/uz/432-analiticheskie-materialy-uz/2032-korxonalar-va-tashkilot larning-demografiyasi  
341 The text of the Concept was developed by the Center for Research on Privatization, Development 
Problems, Corporate Governance and the Securities Market under the State Committee of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan to promote privatization and competition. See: https://research-center.uz/info/concept/ 
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minimal amount of charter capital of JSCs should be no less than USD 400,000, 342 while in 
the case of LLC this amount is 40 times of minimum wage, 343 which will be around USD 
920.344    
The following chart demonstrates a change of the quantity of SOEs in the last five 
years (figure 9), where there has been an increase both in the quantity of JSCs and LLCs 
until 2015, and a significant decrease in the previous two years.        
 
Figure 9. Change of SOEs’ quantity of Uzbekistan in the last five years 
 
Source: State Committee of Uzbekistan for Assistance Privatized  Enterprises and Development of 
Competition.345 
 
Also, lastly, the agriculture sector, which, according to official statistics, covers 
around one-fifth of the country’s GDP (figure 3). Despite several reforms and attempts to 
diversify ownership in the sector, the state remains the principal owner. According to the 
Constitution of Uzbekistan, the land amounts to national wealth, and, consequently, it is 
outside the scope of privatization. 346  The Law on Privatization and Denationalization 
(1991) also prohibits the privatization of land and related resources. 347 Farmers produce 
                                                 
342 Article 17 of the Law on Joint Stock Companies and the Protection of Shareholders Rights, May 7, 2014, 
http://lex.uz/docs/2382411#2383643  
343 Article 14 of the Law on Companies with Limited and Additional Liability, December 6, 2001, 
http://lex.uz/docs/18793#19022  
344 Currently, the minimum wage is UZS 184,300 and the exchange rate is about UZS 8,000 to USD 1.  
345 For 2013 data, see: https://gkk.uz/ru/deyatelnost/rezultaty-deyatelnosti/press-relizy-o-rezultatakh-
deyatelnosti-komiteta/93-itogi-2012-goda; for 2014: https://gkk.uz/ru/deyatelnost/rezultaty-
deyatelnosti/press-relizy-o-rezultatakh-deyatelnosti-komiteta/96-itogi-2013-goda; for 2015: 
https://gkk.uz/ru/deyatelnost/rezultaty-deyatelnosti/press-relizy-o-rezultatakh-deyatelnosti-komiteta/1331-
press-reliz-o-rezultatakh-deyatelnosti-goskomkonkurentsii-respubliki-uzbekistan-za-2014-god; and for 2018: 
https://gkk.uz/ru/deyatelnost/rezultaty-deyatelnosti/press-relizy-o-rezultatakh-deyatelnosti-komiteta/3190-
rezultaty-deyatelnosti-goskomkonkurentsii-respubliki-uzbekistan-za-2017-god..  
346 “The land, its minerals, fauna, and flora, as well as other natural resources shall constitute the national 
wealth, and shall be rationally used and protected by the state” (cf., Article 55), (English text available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/uz/uz007en.pdf).  
347 See Article 4 of this legislation, http://lex.uz/docs/127000 (in Russian).  
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agricultural products in the leased land, which at any time and for any reason may be taken 
over by local and central authorities.348 In most cases, farmers do not have actual choice in 
terms of crop, marketing, pricing, and selling of their crops. Usually, local authorities 
administratively order what kind of product/crop should be sown, and at what price it 
should be sold. In most cases, authorities do not take responsibility for selling the product 
that was grown by administrative pressure, without any marketing analysis. Consequently, 
farmers waste time and funds – that in most cases were borrowed from state-owned 
commercial banks –, and lose confidence.349 In sum, in the agricultural sector, there is 
absolute state ownership over the land, which is the primary means for the organization of 
business in that sector, and there is actual state control over farmers’ activities. 
The scrutiny and interrogation of the figures mentioned above concerning state 
ownership in the GDP of Uzbekistan suggests the presence of inconsistencies between 
official data and other sets of data and statistics. For instance, the recent Resolution of the 
President of Uzbekistan ‘on Measures to Improve the System of State Assets Management, 
states that: “[s]tate-owned enterprises and other legal entities with the predominant share 
of state in the capital fund play [a] significant role in the national economy, occupying key 
positions in priority sectors, primarily in the fuel and energy, agro- industrial, mining, 
engineering, transport, chemical industry, [and in] telecommunications.”350 
There are some enlightening conclusions in the EBRD, US Government reports, 
and in the ADB concept paper. According to the latest EBRD country assessment, “the 
state continues to play a dominant role in the economy. Progress under the recently 
renewed privatization programme has been minimal”.351 The US Government Report of 
2018 also mentioned SOE dominance in a range of sectors including in “energy (power 
generation and transmission, and oil and gas refining, transportation and distribution), 
metallurgy, mining (non-ferrous metals and uranium), telecommunications (fixed 
telephony and data transmission), agriculture (cotton processing), machinery (the 
automotive industry, locomotive and aircraft production and repair), and transportation 
                                                 
348 For instance, see a recent documentary film about depriving a farmer of their land in the Bukhara region 
of Uzbekistan, https://www.facebook.com/kunuznews/videos/328601307697880/.      
349 A recent documentary film explores these issues that farmers face: 
https://www.facebook.com/UzbekTVofficial/videos/282061672401929/ . See also a documentary film about 
farmers who had grown pepper based on administrative decisions and were subsequently facing issues with 
its sale: https://www.facebook.com/kunuznews/videos/312268516043486/.  
350 See the Resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Measures to Improve the System of 
State Assets Management of May 12, 2018, No.PP-3720, http://lex.uz/docs/3734161  
351 EBRD, Country Assessments Uzbekistan, http://2013.tr-ebrd.com/en/country-
assessments/3/uzbekistan#corporate 
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(airlines, railways, municipal public transportation)”352 A recent ADB concept paper also 
mentioned that “SOEs dominate all the important segments of the economy, and thus leave 
little space for the private sector.”353  However, as mentioned above, the recent reforms 
suggest that the current situation in Uzbekistan will no longer remain as it is. The extent, 
intensity, and content of the intended reforms may help mitigate SOE problems not only 
within Uzbekistan, but could also lead to the reconsideration of the issue of SOEs by the 
other countries within the CIS region. 
5.2.2.The share of SOEs in Russia  
 
The public sector also plays a significant role in the Russian economy. The share of 
SOEs’ revenue in terms of the total revenue of the largest companies has grown steadily in 
recent years. According to the recent report of the Russian Federal Antimonopoly Service 
(FAS), the state’s presence in the Russian economy is proliferating. Thus, the contribution 
of SOEs to GDP grew to 70% in 2015 from 35% in 2005, and the number of state and 
municipal unitary enterprises has tripled in the last three years. 354 According to the data for 
2011, the largest share of the state’s presence was observed in the transport sector (73%), 
banking (49%), oil and gas sector (45%), housing and public utilitie s (35%), mechanical 
engineering (15%), and in the telecommunications sector (14%). 355 The dynamics of the 
sectorial structure of SOEs ranked by Expert RA (i.e., Russia’s oldest credit rating agency) 
according to the annual accounts for 1998, 2005, 2009, and 2014 shows an increase in the 
state’s share in the engineering, oil, and gas, and banking sectors. The presence of the state 
has noticeably decreased however in the chemical and petrochemical industry. The state is 
practically not represented only in the trade, non-ferrous, and ferrous metallurgy sectors.356 
At the same time, the state demonstrates inflexibility, and is very reluctant now to 
part with its property. The FAS report, for example, notes that in 2012 the list of the largest 
                                                 
352 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Uzbekistan: 2017 Investment 
Climate Statements Report, June 29, 2017, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2017/sca/270035.htm,. 
353 ADB Concept Paper, “Proposed Programmatic Approach and Policy Based Loan for Subprogram 1 
Republic of Uzbekistan: Economic Management Improvement Program” Project Number: 51350-001, 
January 2018, 6, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/51350/51350-001-cp-en.pdf  
354 For details, see: Государственное участие в российской экономике: госкомпании, закупки, 
приватизация, Бюллетень о развитии конкуренции, март 2016, c4. (State Participation in the Russian 
Economy: State Companies, Purchases, Privatization, Competition Development Bulletin, March 2016, 4), 
http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/8449.pdf 
355 Ю. Цепляева, Ю. Ельцов, Половину экономики России уже составляет госсектор, 22 октября 2012 
год. (Y. Tseplyaeva, Y. Eltsov, Half of the Russian Economy is Already in the Public Sector. October 22, 
2012), https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2012/11/06/esche_odin_byudzhet   
356 Bulletin on Competition Development, “State Participation in Russian Economy: State -owned 
Companies, Procurement, and Privatization”, Analytic Center under the Government of Russian Federation, 
March 2016, 20, http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/8449.pdf  
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companies subject to privatization was expanded. The state was going to significantly 
reduce its share in them, or even wholly withdraw. However, plans have changed, and now 
the state is not going to part with corporate control. 357  According to Russian Prime 
Minister Dmitriy Medvedov “[s]ince 2013, we have doubled the number of unitary 
enterprises, while different orders provide for their further reduction.” 358  As FAS 
emphasizes, such enterprises are still being created in markets with relatively developed 
competition, where the use of administrative resources and budget financing negates the 
efforts of more active players. It should be mentioned that FAS is more active in reducing 
anticompetitive actions and the dominant position of state companies in Russia compared 
with the same authorities in Uzbekistan. For instance, recently FAS proposed several bills 
on reducing the state share of, and promoting competition in, the market. A separate bill of 
the FAS proposes to prohibit the creation of unitary enterprises in competitive markets, 
and from February 1, 2018, to eliminate such an organizational and legal form, which is 
considered a relic of the planned economy system. The enormous growth of state and 
municipal enterprises is the most dangerous trend in terms of the general strengthening of 
state monopoly in the economy, which, according to FAS, over the past three years their 
number has doubled. A unitary enterprise, by entering a competitive market, monopolizes 
it after a certain period, and private business is consequently discriminated. 
Furthermore, the FAS prepared a draft presidential decree approving the national 
plan for the development of competition in 2017–2019, which it submitted to the 
government for adoption.359 The main threat to competition, according to the FAS, comes 
from the state itself, and a presidential decree needs to reduce state participation in the 
economy. The FAS proposes to do this in several ways, and the first is to reduce the 
market share of state and municipal companies. The government should ban SOEs and 
public enterprises from acquiring new assets, both directly and through subsidiaries. Also, 
the state should divest itself of all existing SOEs, and not only of the less important 
ones. According to the draft decree, SOEs ought to be obliged to develop programs for the 
alienation of core assets. The reality is that these bills may not actually change the situation 
                                                 
357 Ibid. 
358 “Why is the Share of the State Growing in the Russian Economy?”, Factograph, October 11, 2017. 
https://www.factograph.info/a/28786989.html   
359 Екатерина Мереминская,  Маргарита Папченкова ,ФАС предлагает Путину указом снизить  
присутствие государства в экономике. Ведомости, 8 февраля, 2017.(Yekaterina Mereminskaya,  
Margarita Papchenkova “FAS predlagayet Putinu ukazom snizit' prisutstviye gosudarstva v ekonomike ”) 
(“FAS Offers Putin Decree to Reduce the Presence of the State in the Economy”) Vedomosti, February 8, 
2017. https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2017/02/08/676610-prisutstvie-gosudarstva-ekonomike  
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much given that the FAS’s authority is limited against large SOEs that are fully exploiting 
their lobbying capacity to influence state policy in this matter. 
Furthermore, there has been a significant increase in state presence in the financial 
services of Russia. For instance, while in 2004 the state share in the banking sector had 
been only 30%, by 2018 it had risen to 70% from 61% at the beginning of 2015.360 
Currently, among the top five Russian banks, there is no private bank, and in the top ten, 
only three, including a branch of a foreign bank. The share of four state-owned banks 
represented in the top 100 largest companies in 2014, accounted for 86% of the revenues 
of all companies in the industry.361 Since August 2017, the three largest private banks have 
come under state control, as the Bank of Russia began to seize them through the newly 
created Fund for the Banking Sector. The nationalization of the banking sector carries 
severe risks for investors, including the inefficiency of bank management caused by 
financing industries on political grounds – an action that is not necessarily always 
economically justified.   
State presence in the economy directly reflects the share of the state in the 
securities market of the country. According to a recent report, the country’s largest SOEs 
are in the top ten most capitalized stock issuer companies. The total share of the ten most 
capitalized issuers practically stopped shrinking from 2011, and in 2017 this figure was 
about 61.5% of total market capitalization (table 7). For instance, the share of Gazprom, 
Rosneft, and Sberbank together covered over 30% of the total capitalization of the market 
in 2017. In the period 2007-2014 Gazprom had been the leader concerning capitalization, 
in 2016 it was Rosneft, and in 2017, it was Sberbank.362  
Table 7. The list of most capitalized Russian issuers (2017) 
 Company issuer Capitalization in billion USD  %  in total capitalization 
1 Sberbank  87.61 14.06 
2 Gazprom 53.35 8.56 
3 Rosneft 53.30 8.55 
4 Lukoil 48.99 7.86 
5 Novatek  35.54 5.70 
6 Noril Nickel 29.51 4.74 
                                                 
360 Analytical Credit Rating Agency “ACRA: State Share in Banking Sector reaches 70%”, February 14, 
2018. https://acra-ratings.ru/about/articles/301  
361 Bulletin on competition development, "State Participation in Russian Economy: State -owned Companies, 
Procurement, and Privatization”, Analytic Center under the Government of Russian Federation, March 2016, 
p.20. http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/8449.pdf   
362 NAUFOR Report, Russian Securities market: 2017, Events and Facts, 2018. 
http://naufor.ru/download/pdf/factbook/ru/RFR2017.pdf  
 105 
7 Surgutneftgaz 20.94 3.36 
8 Gazprom neft 20.17 3.24 
9 Tatneft 18.90 3.03 
10 NLMK 15.35 2.46 
 Total 623.2 61.6 
Source: NAUFOR Report, Russian Stock Market: 2017, Events and Facts, 2018,13 
 
Overall, Russian business attempts to survive in whatever economic space is not 
yet occupied by the state. According to a survey conducted by the Russian Union of 
Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 48% of Russian companies believe that government 
considers business as a ‘wallet’.363 It is officials who entrepreneurs consider to be the main 
enemies of competition. The actions of the authorities are the main reason for the reduction 
of the number of competitors in the critical sectors of the economy that directly reflects the 
securities market indicators of the country. 
5.2.3. SOEs presence in Kazakhstan’s economy 
 
Kazakhstan’s economy is also characterized by the dominance of large SOEs, 
industrial and financial conglomerates, especially in the gas, transport, electricity, postal, 
and mobile telecommunication services sectors. There are about 7,000 registered SOEs, of 
which over a thousand are considered significant, as they employ more than 250 people. 
As of October 2017, about 10.3% of all operating companies in Kazakhstan are either 
state-owned or involve state participation. In recent years, the share of the state in large 
companies has significantly increased rather than decrease. Notably, in October 2017, 
about 46.9% of all large operating enterprises in Kazakhstan are either wholly state-owned 
or with partial state participation. This is the highest indicator of the public sector ’s share 
in large businesses over the past ten years, while the lowest record was in 2007 when the 
state share was 41.7%. 364  The percentage of SOEs in medium-sized enterprises is 
significantly higher (56.5%) than in relation to large companies. Despite this fact, the state 
share in relation to medium-sized enterprises is decreasing. 
                                                 
363" Андрей Полунин, Россия заигралась в монополию:  Доля госкомпаний в ВВП страны выросла до 
70 процентов, 29 сентября 2016  (Andrei Polunin, “Russia Played a Monopoly: The Share of State -Owned 
Companies in the Country’s GDP Grew to 70 percent”, Free Press, September 29, 2016), 
http://svpressa.ru/economy/article/157621/. 
364 “In Kazakhstan, the state’s share in Big Business Reached a Peak in 10 years”, Informburo, October 12, 
2017, https://informburo.kz/novosti/v-kazahstane-dolya-gosudarstva-v-krupnom-biznese-dostigla-
maksimuma-za-poslednie-10-let.html  
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Kazakhstan has set a goal to reduce the state’s share in the economy to 15% by 
2020, which is the most ambitious privatization program since independence. There is 
considerable support for the idea that privatization can lead to a significant increase in 
profitability, company performance, and efficiency. The present privatization program 
seems extremely ambitious as it is proposes to privatize about 800 companies, including 
the ‘top 65’ and some large enterprises.365 
As for state presence in the banking sector, SOEs and various state funds are still 
the main creditors of the banking system of Kazakhstan. Together, they account for about a 
third of the liabilities of banks, for which there are objective reasons, such as a high 
proportion of the state in the economy, especially in the oil and gas sector. At the same 
time, the state also takes indirect financial participation in the rehabilitation of loan 
portfolios through the framework of business support programs, construction, and 
agriculture. In a relatively small and poorly diversified economy, it is difficult for banks to 
get significant and stable financial resources. The state had been actively involved, through 
massive government bailouts, in the banking sector in the crisis years of 2009-2010. At 
present, the state, represented by the government of Kazakhstan and the National Welfare 
Fund, Samruk-Kazyna, has significantly reduced its share of the banking sector. So while 
at the beginning of 2014, the state controlled 19% of the total assets of Kazakhstan banks, 
in 2016 the share of state assets was less than 4%.366 
On the other hand, state presence in Kazakhstan’s securities market is relatively 
significant. For instance, as of January 2017 assets of second-tier banks invested in 
securities amounted to 3,217,295 million tenges (c., USD 8.5 billion). More than 76% of 
this was spent on government securities of Kazakhstan. 367  However, there are recent 
reforms promising further liberalization of the securities market, the reduction of state 
participation in the economy, and the creation of a competitive market. Some of such 
concrete measures are determined in the Joint Action Plan on the Development of the 
Securities market for 2018–2021, which was adopted by the Government and the National 
                                                 
365 OECD, Comprehensive Country overview of Kazakhstan, Part II, Depth analysis and recommendations, 
2017. https://www.oecd.org/dev/MDCR_Kazakhstan_Vol_2_web.pdf  
366 “The state is leaving the banking sector of Kazakhstan; the market is moving into a competitive 
environment. After a series of privatizations of state assets, the banking sector shows stronger financial 
indicators”. See: 
http://ranking.kz/a/infopovody/osudarstvo_pokidaet_bankovskij_sektor_rk_rynok_perehodit_v_konkurentnu
ju_sredu_posle_serii_privatizacij_gosaktivov_bankovskij_sektor_demonstriruet_bolee_silnye_finansovye_p
okazateli?mcode=banks (January 12, 2016) (in Russian).  
367 National Bank of Kazakhstan, “The Current State of the Securities Market of Kazakhstan” as of January 
1, 2017. http://www.nationalbank.kz  
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Bank of Kazakhstan. According to a report of the National Bank, part of the measures 
mentioned above has already been implemented. Particularly, actions on the simplification 
of procedures for issuers to enter the securities market, access to trading for retail 
investors, substantial liberalization of brokers, and the expansion of investment 
opportunities of bank-holding companies have all led to a revival of dealing in securities 
on the Kazakhstan Stock Exchange. 368  Despite these reforms there still are significant 
problems that require immediate and comprehensive solutions. Below follows an attempt 
to address to address the issue of SOEs in CIS countries by reference to the case of 
Uzbekistan. 
5.3. Main SOE problems in case of Uzbekistan 
 
In this part the term ‘SOE problems’ is used in relation to the following two 
meanings: first, in the meaning of the problems that SOEs face; and, second, the problems 
that third parties369 face because of the improper organization of SOEs activity. These two 
meanings of SOEs problems are interrelated and require a comprehensive approach, which, 
unfortunately, is lacking in the current SOE policy reform both in Uzbekistan and its 
regional peers.  
In the present author’s opinion, the current tendency of SOE reforms in Uzbekistan 
considers the SOE problems mostly in relation to the first meaning, i.e., the reform is 
limited to: addressing some SOE issues with little or no attention to the impact of their 
activity, ensuring healthy competition, and to implementing market economy principles as 
a whole. For instance, the recent Resolution of the President of Uzbekistan highlights 
several problems related to SOEs activity in Uzbekistan such as conflict of interest in 
corporate governance, the lack of effective investment management system, fragile 
transparency in corporate governance, and the ineffectiveness of management training 
system of SOEs. 370  In general, the spirit of current SOE reforms focuses on the 
improvement of corporate governance, investment management, and the effectiveness of 
SOEs. While there is little doubt that these reforms may indirectly affect the development 
                                                 
368 National Bank of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Report for 2017.  
http://www.nationalbank.kz/cont/%D0%93%D0%9E-2017_%D1%80.pdf  
369 The term ‘third parties’ here means private enterprises as competitors, taxpayers and investors as 
stakeholders, and the economy as a whole business platform.  
370 Resolution of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Measures to Improve the State Assets 
Management System, No.PP-3720. May 12, 2018. (Постановление Президента Республики Узбекистан, 
"О мерах по совершенствованию системы управления государственными активами", ПП-3720, 12 мая 
2018 года), http://lex.uz/docs/3734161. 
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of competition and the implementation of market principles in the country, from a strategic 
and macroeconomic perspective, these reforms mostly serve to strengthen SOEs and 
increase their role in the economy, instead of to reduce their share, and to promote healthy 
competition and market principles. 371  Eventually, these reforms are likely to result in 
strong and dominant SOEs that will remain disciplined under administrative rules, rather 
than market principles such as sound transparency, healthy competition, and effective 
corporate governance.  
5.3.1. Transparency  
 
Transparency and limited access to information remain the core issues of SOEs in 
the post-Soviet republics, including Uzbekistan. The brief analysis in the previous section 
hints at some aspects of the transparency issue such as the lack of information, the 
inconsistency of data, and the unreliable statistics at the macro and micro level. Reports of 
several international financial institutions also certify this fact. For instance, the recent 
EBRD reports mention that in Uzbekistan “availability and access to business data is still 
poor, with reporting methods often outdated.”372 According to the ADB concept paper “the 
data dissemination system is fragile in Uzbekistan, and will require significant 
strengthening[…].”373    
Transparency of SOEs activity is necessary for providing clear, reliable, and on-
time information on the content and form of state assets, the process of their usage, and the 
main results of state business activity. A well-established and effective disclosure system 
of SOEs action will serve to strengthen and maintain public and investor confidence both 
in SOEs and the whole industry. 
Transparency is mainly maintained through a sound disclosure system that allows 
the public to reach necessary, relevant, and on time information about state assets, their 
management, and efficiency. Usually, there are two kinds of subjects responsible for 
disclosure information: the government, and SOEs themselves. Disclosure by these two 
subjects differs from each other depending on the content, form of information, and 
method of its release. 
                                                 
371 In this sense, it is primarily reminiscent of the recent Chinese approach to SOEs reform.               
372 For details, see: EBRD, “Uzbekistan Country Strategy 2018-2023”, 16. 
373 ADB Concept Paper, “Proposed Programmatic Approach and Policy Based Loan for Subprogram 1 
Republic of Uzbekistan: Economic Management Improvement Program” Project Number: 51350-001, 
January 2018, p.7 https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/51350/51350-001-cp-en.pdf 
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In Uzbekistan the legal basis for access to information is specified by the 
Constitution374and other legal acts 375 that regulate disclosure information and access to 
official reports. Despite the existence of a wide range of legal acts regulating information 
access and disclosure information by the government, significant problems on this issue 
still remain. For instance, according to the latest OECD report the vague definitions of 
‘state secret’ and ‘another secret provided by the law’ was the basis for the restriction of 
access to information in Uzbekistan. 376  The problems of ensuring transparency are not 
limited to issues concerning the underdevelopment, conflict, and duplication of the 
relevant legislation, but also extend to implementation and enforcement issues. The 
mechanism of monitoring the implementation of the right to access information is one such 
issue. According to the OECD report the government “does not perform monitoring over 
the implementation of the right to access information, as seen by the absence of any 
reports, analytical research or general statistical data.”377  
The second issue of transparency and accountability of SOEs is related to 
disclosure information by SOEs themselves. Currently SOEs in Uzbekistan operate in the 
following three legal-organizational forms: JSCs, LLCs, and as state unitary enterprises. 
By October 12, 2018, the Center for Management of State Assets of Uzbekistan had been 
managing state shares in 502 JSCs, 352 LLCs, and 1955 state unitary enterprises.378   
The legal basis concerning SOEs transparency and accountability in Uzbekistan 
mainly relates to the Law on Securities Market of 3 June 2015;379 the Law on Joint-Stock 
                                                 
374 Particularly, Article 29 that declares the right of everyone to “seek, receive and disseminate any 
information, except for information aimed against the existing constitutional system and other restrictions set 
by law”. Also, Article 30 of the Constitution provides that all state authorities, public associa tions, and 
officials of Uzbekistan are required to ensure that citizens be able to get acquainted with documents, 
decisions, and other materials concerning their rights and interests. See the following link for the full text of 
the Constitution of Uzbekistan: http://lex.uz/docs/35869 
375 The most relevant laws are as follows: the Law on Guarantees and Freedom of Access to Information of 
April 24, 1997 (http://lex.uz/docs/2118); the Law on Principles and Guarantees of Freedom of Information of 
December 12, 2002 (http://lex.uz/docs/52268); the Law on Openness of State Authorities and Public 
Institutions Activities of May 5, 2014, (http://lex.uz/docs/2381138); the Law on E-government of December 
9, 2015 (http://lex.uz/ru/docs/2833855#2858663); and the Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of 
Uzbekistan on Measures for Further Improvement of the Uzbekistan Governmental Portal of Data Providing 
on the Internet Network of August 7, 2015. (http://lex.uz/ru/docs/2718602). 
376 See details in OECD, “Anti-Corruption Reforms in Uzbekistan: Round 3 Monitoring of the Istanbul Anti-
Corruption Action Plan”, 2015, 90-95, http://www.oecd.org/corruption/acn/Uzbekistan-Round-3-Monitoring-
Report-ENG.pdf  
377 Ibid., at 95. 
378 See the website of the Center for Management of State Assets under the State Competition Committee of 
Uzbekistan – for JSCs: http://csam.uz/info/CompanyList.aspx?t=AO; for LLCs: 
http://csam.uz/info/CompanyList.aspx?t=OOO; and for State Unitary Enterprises, see: 
http://csam.uz/info/CompanyList.aspx?t=GUP  
379 Particularly Chapter 6, Articles 43-51. See details at 
http://lex.uz/docs/2662539?ONDATE=04.06.2015%2000#2662584   
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Companies and Protection of Shareholders Rights of 26 April 1996;380and the Law on 
Companies with Limited and Additional Liability of December 6, 2001. 381  These laws 
mainly regulate relations connected to JSCs and LLCs, including to state shares, and 
provide the legal basis for transparency and accountability. There are also several by- laws, 
including special acts regulating disclosure information by SOEs (mostly JSCs). For 
instance, the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers on Measures for the Further Enhancement 
of Corporate Management System in Joint-Stock Companies of July 2, 2014, defines the 
types of information that are mandatory for JSCs to publish on their corporate websites.382  
Another effective regulative measure on ensuring corporate transparency, including SOEs, 
is provided by the Presidential Decree on Measures for the Implementation of Modern 
Corporate Governance Methods in Joint-Stock Companies of April 24, 2015. Based on 
this, in December 2015, the Single Portal of Corporate Information (openinfo.uz) 383 was 
launched to publish financial statements and audit reports, information on substantial facts 
in JSCs activities, information about shares, share capital, changes in the corporate 
governance of JSCs, and other useful for shareholders and investors information about 
JSCs.384  By October 16, 2018, on the single portal of corporate information, there are 
disclosed 8967 items of information concerning 756 JSCs, including SOEs. 385 
Unfortunately, a significant part of the rules on corporate transparency and accountability 
focus on JSCs alone, with insufficient attention on LLCs and state unitary enterprises.     
In the case of SOEs set up as LLCs form transparency and accountability issues are 
relatively limited both in legislation and at the level of enforcement. In terms of legislation, 
there is only one piece of legislation, mentioned above, according to which the company 
must disclose information in mass media in specific cases. 386  There are also limited 
opportunities in relation to enforcement. According to the relevant legislation, LLCs do not 
have the right to issue securities, and, consequently, they are not burdened by the 
obligations of securities issuers such as that of mandatory disclosure of information. 
                                                 
380 Particularly articles 107-109. http://lex.uz/docs/6567#9197  
381 The text of this legislation is available at the following link: http://lex.uz/docs/18793   
382 The text of the Decree is available at the following link: http://lex.uz/docs/2420413    
383 At present this portal (www.openinfo.uz)  remains unavailable (last accessed on February 8, 2019). The 
data on JSCs can be accessed on the website of the authorized body of securities market regulation of 
Uzbekistan at the following link: http://openinfo.csm.gov.uz/view.php?tbl=annual_companies      
384 Clause 35 of the Program on measures for the Fundamental Improvement of Corporate Governance 
System, approved by the Presidential Decree on April.24, 2015 No. UP-4720.  
http://lex.uz/docs/2635199#2638254  
385 See details on the website of the authorized body of securities market regulation of Uzbekistan at the 
following link: http://openinfo.csm.gov.uz/view.php?tbl=annual_companies   
386 For instance, according to Article 19, the company must inform creditors and publish information in mass 
media about the decrease of the charter capital decision.  See details  in http://lex.uz/docs/18793#19523   
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Undoubtedly, this relates to the legal nature of LLCs. However, in the case of LLCs with 
state shares, there should be an organized platform for sharing information to the principal 
(state) and the ultimate owner (public).387 Currently the only available to the public sources 
of such information are the websites of such companies,388 the webpage and reports of the 
Center for State Assets Management, 389  and any publications of the state statistical 
committee.390    
As for state unitary enterprises, despite their prevailing current quantity of other 
SOE forms, it has not been possible to locate any particular law or other legal act 
regulating disclosure information by this type of SOE. 391 Were one to consider the main 
legal feature of unitary enterprises, which comprises the fact that they are founded by a 
sole owner (usually by state) and its charter capital is not divided in shares, one may 
recognize the importance of detailed legal regulation of their activity, especially for 
transparency and accountability. 392  Most state unitary enterprises in Uzbekistan are 
established to fulfill the state functions in several areas, but at the same time, according to 
the Civil Code, they are commercial entities, and, consequently, are not treated as public 
entities. Therefore, the requirements of and procedures for transparency and accountability 
under the regulations mentioned above do not, on the face of it, apply to state unitary 
enterprises.   
Overall, current data availability and quality on SOEs in Uzbekistan requires 
additional regulations and improvements. Implementing international standards would be 
an effective way of making such improvement. In this regard, it would be useful for 
Uzbekistan to adhere to the OECD Guidelines on accountability and transparency for state 
                                                 
387 In most cases, even the state does not possess the real, reliable, and current information about the scale, 
management, and effectiveness of state assets. This is a reality also encountered concerning the regional 
peers of Uzbekistan.  
388 For instance, at the website of one of the largest SOEs, formed as an LLC in the automobile industry of 
Uzbekistan, SamAuto, we could not find any related information about state ownership levels, the process, or 
the results of state assets management, http://www.samauto.uz/ru/about/history/ 
389 The website of the Center for State Assets Management contains relatively extensive info rmation. At least 
there is information concerning quantity, related industry, region, and amount of charter capital. 
Unfortunately, there is no information on state share, http://csam.uz/info/CompanyList.aspx?t=OOO. 
390 Above the features and reliability of data taken from the website of the State Statistics Committee have 
been briefly described, https://stat.uz/en/   
391 Uzbekistan National Law Resources Database on the website www.lex.uz, currently includes in excess of 
34,000 legal acts, yet does not contain any particular legal act on State Unitary Enterprises, except the 
general provisions of unitary enterprises provided in the first part of the Civil Code of Uzbekistan. 
392 See Article 70 of the Civil Code of Uzbekistan, http://lex.uz/docs/111181. See also the Commentary to 
Articles 70-72 of the Civil Code of Uzbekistan, 2011, 202-211. 
https://www.osce.org/ru/uzbekistan/74874?download=true    
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ownership, which provide appropriate disclosure and transparency practices, and coherent 
disclosure policy for companies with state shares. 393    
5.3.2. Competitive neutrality  
 
Competitive neutrality is the term that is often used in the SOE-related studies to 
explain the different treatment of companies based on ownership criteria.  394 Central to this 
term is the misbalance in the regulation and conduct of SOEs and POEs that provides a 
considerable advantage to SOEs, and causes the growth of anticompetitive conditions and 
practice. Direct and indirect preferential treatment of SOEs creates an uneven playing field 
in the market, whereby SOEs may become a monopoly and abuse their dominant position.  
Competitive neutrality is usually examined through an analysis of several factors, 
which include regulatory neutrality, financial and debt neutrality, imbalanced privileges, 
below cost sales, preferential ban and so on. Unequal treatment of POEs and SOEs by the 
state is a characteristic feature of most transition countries, including Uzbekistan. In the 
case of Uzbekistan, competitive neutrality is mainly influential in financing and subsidies, 
regulatory neutrality, privileges, and preferential bans.  
Due to issues with transparency, including those covered above, it has not been 
possible to find any publicly available information from official sources to provide a 
general picture of competitive neutrality in Uzbekistan. 395 There are some conclusions in 
the reports and publications of international financial institutions. For instance, according 
to a recent EBRD report, gaps in competitiveness and the significant presence and 
preferential treatment of SOEs in Uzbekistan have constrained the development of the 
private sector. 396   This report is critical not only because it shows the situation of 
competitive neutrality in Uzbekistan, but also because it determines enhancing 
                                                 
393 OECD, Accountability, and Transparency: A Guide for State Ownership, 2010. 
http://www.korupce.cz/assets/protikorupcni-strategie-vlady/na-leta-2013-2014/1a---Guide-OECD-for-state-
ownership.pdf  
394 A Capobianco and H. Christiansen, “Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges 
and Policy Options”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 1, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2011. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9xfg jdhg6-en  
395 Except for some sporadic and fragmented information that does not however provide a general picture of 
competitive neutrality in Uzbekistan.  There are limited sources that highlight some aspects of competitive 
neutrality. For instance, in the Speech of the Deputy Director of State Committee on Development of 
Competition, Mr. Yunusov mentions that exclusive rights and individual privileges to separate companies are 
limiting the development of the competition in the market. November 1, 2017.  
https://gkk.uz/ru/novosti/vystupleniya-i-zayavleniya-rukovodstva-gkk/2878-davlat-ra-obat-mitasi-raisi-
rinbosari-d-yunusovning-ma-ruzasi. The special portal devoted to competition (www.raqobat.uz) is 
unavailable (last accessed on February 8, 2019)..   
396 The strategy devoted to competitiveness has been termed “enhancing competitiveness by strengthening 
the private sector’s role in the economy”. See details in EBRD, Uzbekistan Country Strategy 2018-2023, 
approved on 19 September 2018, 8    
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competitiveness as one of three strategic priorities of EBRD in Uzbekistan for the period 
2018-2023.397  
There is also an extensive analysis regarding financial and debt neutrality. An IMF 
country report states that in 2017 loans on preferential terms extended to SOEs accounted 
for more than half of all loans (Figure 10).398 An IMF analysis of the structure of bank 
funding also shows that domestic banks in Uzbekistan are highly dependent on 
government financing (Figure 11).  
Figure 10. Structure of loans in Uzbekistan (2017) 
 
Source: IMF Country Report No.18/117, May 9, 2018. p.33 
 
Figure 11. Structure of funding in Uzbekistan (2017)
 
Source: IMF Country Report No.18/117, May 9, 2018. p.33 
  
There are also serious concerns about ensuring regulatory neutrality in the 
treatment of SOEs and POEs. The term regulatory neutrality here mainly means impartial 
                                                 
397 Ibid. 
398 For details, see: IMF Country Report No. 18/117, May 9, 2018. p.33 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/05/11/Republic -of-Uzbekistan-2018-Article-IV-
Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-45873   
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regulation at substantial and procedural levels. In the significant level of regulatory 
neutrality at a glance it seems that there is no direct discrimination of companies based on 
their ownership factor. At least, the necessary legal acts regulating business relations 
(namely, the Civil Code, the legislation on companies, on competition, and so on) treat 
both SOEs and POEs under the same principles. However, in some by-law acts 399 
individual companies (mostly SOEs) may enjoy various advantages (financing, tax 
exemptions, exclusive export/import right and so on) that may assist these companies to 
become dominant, and to lead the market towards monopoly or oligopoly, rather than 
competition.400 The case of ‘General Motors of Uzbekistan’, which has been a monopoly 
for more than two decades, is the quintessential example of such one-sided direct state 
support of an SOE that eventually led to ineffectiveness, a rise in expenses, and the 
collapse of competition in the automobile industry of Uzbekistan.401 Recently, even the 
head of the state commented on the fact that despite it having been provided a wide range 
of privileges, the ‘General Motors of Uzbekistan’ could not even meet expectations both in 
terms of localization of production and in terms of employment issues.402 In this sense, the 
state needs to take severe measures on enhancing competition and preventing any kind of 
barriers to ensuring competition.403     
The second part of regulatory neutrality relates to ensuring impartiality in 
enforcement practice – this is not less essential than the substantive aspects of regulatory 
neutrality. It is much more complicated than the adoption of laws or other legal acts. In 
relation to this aspect of regulatory neutrality, every subject and institution involved in law 
enforcement needs to be treated and improved. The following excerpt from a US 
Department of Commerce Report helps to understand the role of enforcement practice in 
regulatory neutrality: 
“Many foreign investors prefer international arbitration in cases of investment disputes 
with local SOEs because court processes in local courts are not always transparent and 
non-discriminatory due to pressure from the government. Judgments against state-owned 
enterprises are particularly difficult to enforce. Nearly all U.S. businesses operating in 
                                                 
399 In CIS countries by-law acts stronger than laws and their number prevails over the laws several times. 
400 For instance, the Presidential Decree on Additional Measures to Stimulate the Expansion of the 
Production of Domestic Non-food Consumer Goods”, January 28, 2009. http://lex.uz/docs/1433996.  
401 See Presidential Decree on the foundation of ‘General Motors Uzbekistan’ – an Enterprise with Foreign 
Investments, PP-800, dated February 21, 2008. The extract of the document is available here 
http://lex.uz/docs/1318292. 
402 The President of Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, had mentioned this issue during his visit to Andijan 
region on May 19, 2018. An official report is available at the following link: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EaycFLZf8e0.  
403 Some of the recent reforms and initiatives in relation to this issue are presented in section 2.4 of this 
article.  
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Uzbekistan do so in partnership with state-owned enterprises or firms, which are often 
affiliated with the political elite”.404 
 
The same US Department of Commerce report also mentions the issue of tax 
neutrality in Uzbekistan, where most SOEs enjoy several advantages, including different 
tax holidays, and better access to markets, easier access to finance, and various 
government subsidies.405 
At a glance, it would seem that competitive neutrality is purely the government’s 
responsibility and fault. However, a comprehensive approach to this issue shows that every 
subject, even a foreign investor, who is thought of as introducing and implementing 
international business standards, could be equally responsible for ensuring a competitive 
environment. The case of British American Tobacco (BAT), the world’s second-largest 
tobacco company,406provides one such example. 407  The results of the analysis of BAT 
documents during litigation in the US revealed that the company had engaged in anti-
competitive practices contrary to its code of conduct and established international business 
standards. BAT had acquired the former state-owned tobacco company and created its 
private monopoly in Uzbekistan.408 One may reasonably argue that one case alone cannot 
sufficiently portray the situation concerning privatization, SOEs, and competitive 
neutrality issues in Uzbekistan. The present author would agree. But were one to consider 
the fact that the amount of investment by BAT is estimated to be one third of all foreign 
direct investment received by Uzbekistan between 1992 and the end of 2000,409 this case 
merits consideration, and appropriate lessons should be withdrawn. 
Despite the concerns about SOE competitive neutrality outlined above, currently, 
there are several projects, including with the involvement of international financial 
institutions, which allow for a degree of optimism on the improvement of the present 
situation. The ADB project adopted in January 2018 would be a great example in this 
sense, which seeks to improve access to bank finance and facilitate competitive financing 
                                                 
404 See US Department of Commerce, Uzbekistan Country Commercial Guide, 2017. 
https://www.export.gov/article?id=Uzbekistan-7-State-Owned-Enterprises.   
405 Ibid.   
406 https://www.statista.com/statistics/259204/leading-10-tobacco-companies-worldwide-based-on-net-sales/  
407 See details in Anna B. Gilmore, Martin McKee, and Jeff Collin, “The Invisible Hand: How British 
American Tobacco precluded competition in Uzbekistan”, Tobacco Control 16, no. 4 (2007): 239-247.  
408 Ibid. 
409 See Anna B. Gilmore, Martin McKee, “Tobacco and Transition: An Overview of Industry Investments, 
Impact, and Influence in the Former Soviet Union. Tobacco Control 13, (2004):136–142. 
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of the private sector.410 Such initiatives are a sign of rising confidence of the international 
community in recent government efforts towards implementation of market economy 
principles.  
Improvement of competition law and its enforcement practice can help to address 
competitive neutrality concerns, and stimulate more competitive conditions both in 
Uzbekistan and other CIS countries. An OECD report recommends taking measures in line 
with competitive neutrality, and emphasizes the necessity of transparency rules, specific 
competitive neutrality policies, and the role of competition authorities in ensuring a level 
playing field between SOEs and POEs. 411  Also, privatization and corporatization of 
government business lead reducing state share in the economy, which increases 
competitive atmosphere and consequently raises company efficiency. 
5.3.3. SOE Efficiency  
 
SOE efficiency is another hot issue that is usually discussed in most SOE related 
studies. The notion of SOE efficiency generally refers to the productivity and profitability 
of SOEs when compared to POEs. In general, a significant part of the existing literature 
found that SOEs are comparatively less efficient than POEs.412 Most scholars agree that 
the inefficiency of SOEs is not necessarily connected to the ownership factor. Inefficiency 
in SOEs is caused by a complex issue, which involves various factors, including 
institutional, organizational, political, and behavioral.413 For instance, some of the recent 
studies found that management culture, legislation, political goals, and competition 
negatively impact on SOEs efficiency much more than does the issue of state ownership.414  
                                                 
410 ADB Concept Paper, “Proposed Programmatic Approach and Policy Based Loan for Subprogram 1 
Republic of Uzbekistan: Economic Management Improvement Program” Project Number: 51350-001, 
January 2018. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/51350/51350-001-cp-en.pdf 
accessed on October 18, 2018.  
411 Antonio Capobianco and Hans Christiansen, “Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises”, 
(2011), 20.  
412 See, for instance, Brigitta Jakob, “Performance in Strategic Sectors: A Comparison of Profitability and 
Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises and Private Corporations”, The Park Place Economist 25, no. 1 
(2017): 8; David G. Victor, David R. Hults, and Mark C. Thurber, eds. Oil and Governance: State-owned 
Enterprises and the World Energy Supply, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); William L. 
Megginson and Jeffry M. Netter. “From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on 
Privatization”, Journal of Economic Literature 39, no. 2 (2001): 321-389; Aidan R. Vining and Anthony E. 
Boardman, “Ownership versus Competition: Efficiency in Public Enterprise."  Public Choice 73, no. 2 
(1992): 205-239.  
413 See, for instance, Ha-Joon Chang, Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of the State , (Zed 
Books, 2003); Kathryn L. Dewenter and Paul H. Malatesta, “State-owned and Privately Owned Firms: An 
Empirical Analysis of Profitability, Leverage, and Labor Intensity”, American Economic Review 91, no. 1 
(2001): 320-334. 
414 See, for instance, David G. Victor, David R. Hults, and Mark C. Thurber, eds. Oil and Governance: State-
owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply , (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
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In general, the cause of SOE inefficiency compared to POEs could be the 
following: 1) the monopoly and dominant status of SOEs;415 2) SOE activity may often 
combine business and political interests and thus cause a conflicts of interest;416 3) SOE 
managers may have fewer incentives to pursue efficiency than in POEs;417 and 4) the weak 
disciplinary system of managers may contribute towards lousy performance. 418  Recent 
comparative research on efficiency concerning SOEs and POEs suggests that SOEs are 
less efficient and have lower profitability compared to POEs due to soft-budget 
constraints419 and lack of autonomy caused by policy burdens. 420 All of these reasons have 
a place to consider in case of CIS countries, including those three within the scope of the 
present thesis.   
In the case of Uzbekistan, recent reforms mostly focus on SOEs efficiency rather 
than transparency and competitive neutrality issues. The scope of current SOE reforms in 
Uzbekistan is not only limited to the government’s efforts – there is considerable support 
from international financial organizations too. The recent projects of EBRD and ADB 
could be an excellent example on this point. According to EBRD most SOEs in Uzbekistan 
lack effective governance and institutional capacity, and this needs to be changed within 
the scope of the latest EBRD Country Strategy for 2018-2023.421 Also, in the latest ADB 
concept paper the prevalence of large and inefficient SOEs is mentioned as one of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
Filippo Belloc, “Innovation in State-owned Enterprises: Reconsidering the Conventional Wisdom”, Journal 
of Economic Issues 48, no. 3 (2014): 821-848. 
415 See for instance, Mary Shirley and Patrick Walsh, Public versus Private Ownership: The CurrentSstate of 
the Debate, World Bank, 2000; Andrei Shleifer, “State versus private ownership”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 12, no. 4 (1998): 133-150. 
416 See, for instance, Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling,  “Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 3, no. 4 (1976): 305-
360; Ha-Joon Chang, Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of the State , (Zed Books, 2003). 
417 See, for instance, Elizabeth M. Freund,  “Fizz, Froth, Flat: The Challenge of Converting China’s SOEs 
into Shareholding Corporations”, Review of Policy Research 18, no. 1 (2001): 96-111; Ravi Ramamurti, “A 
Multilevel Model of Privatization in Emerging Economies”, Academy of Management Review 25, no. 3 
(2000): 525-550. 
418 See, for instance, Ha-Joon Chang, Globalization, Economic Development and the Role of the State , (Zed 
Books, 2003); Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, 
and States, Vol. 25. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970). 
419 The term ‘soft budget constraint’ relates to the financial conditions for the operation of SOE, which 
include the non-obligation to make a profit as conditions for the efficiency of the enterprise, poor control 
over expenditures, and the availability of funds to cover losses. 
420 For further details, see: Brigitta Jakob, “Performance in Strategic Sectors: A Comparison of Profitability 
and Efficiency of State-Owned Enterprises and Private Corporations”, The Park Place Economist 25, no. 1 
(2017): 8. 
421 EBRD, Uzbekistan Country Strategy 2018-2023, 8 , as approved by the Board of Directors on September 
19, 2018. 
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critical deficiencies in management. 422  The efforts of international financial institutions 
suggest increasing trust by the international community in ongoing reforms in Uzbekistan, 
and the urgency of SOE efficiency issues in the country. 
Severe steps for the improvement of SOEs efficiency have been taken at the 
national level too. In 2014 some measures had been taken in Uzbekistan to increase 
efficiency and the implementation of corporate governance systems in JSCs (mainly 
SOEs), including some reorganized companies. New legislation – namely, the Law on 
Joint-Stock Companies and Protection of Rights of Stockholders – 423  has established 
standards for implementation of monitoring of JSC activities, and has adopted the program 
on the improvement of the corporate governance systems, the publication of annual 
financial statements, and in relation to external audit. 424  Also, recently unprecedented 
action was taken by the government towards ensuring the effectiveness of one of largest 
SOEs in the country. According to the Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers, the United 
Investment Healthcare Group LLC (USA) is to be involved as trust manager of the state 
share in the authorized capital of JSC Dori-Darmon (Uzbekistan's largest pharmaceuticals 
company).425 
 Improving SOEs efficiency is a long and complicated process involving a variety 
of measures not only by government, but also by companies themselves, investors, and 
society as a whole. These measures should take into account the unique nature of SOEs, 
their double-aimed features, and their considerable influence on the market for, both, its 
growth or its restraint. Improving the efficiency of SOEs should involve both SOE 
management reforms and the strengthening of elements of competition in the sectors where 
SOEs operate. Ensuring healthy competition could provide the appropriate conditions that 
could in turn give rise to solutions to all the issues and concerns relating to SOEs discussed 
throughout this chapter.   
 
 
                                                 
422 ADB Concept Paper, “Proposed Programmatic Approach and Policy Based Loan for Subprogram 1 
Republic of Uzbekistan: Economic Management Improvement Program”, Project Number: 51350-001, 
January 2018, 6, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents/51350/51350-001-cp-en.pdf  
423 The Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, adopted on May 06, 2014, No.ZRU-370. 
424 Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Measures for Implementation of Modern 
Techniques of Corporate Governance in JSCs of April 24, 2015. 
425 Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of Uzbekistan on Measures to Improve the Efficiency of the JSC Dori-
Darmon and the Financial Stability of the State Unitary Enterprise O'zmedimpeks No.849, October 22, 2018,  
http://lex.uz/docs/4013375  
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5.4.Future perspectives of SOE reforms in CIS countries 
 
 An overview of state participation in the economy of CIS countries from the 
perspectives of their role and influence on ensuring a competitive environment in the 
market has been provided in the foregoing. Taking into account the specific features of the 
countries examined in this thesis, the present author considers that CIS countries cannot 
entirely hand over their huge SOEs arsenal. Theoretically, there is no necessity for the 
privatization of all state assets. If SOEs were to be treated equally to POEs and their 
activity were to not cause restricting competition, SOEs would theoretically have an equal 
right to exist. In such scenario, an optimum way to increase SOE transparency, 
competitiveness, and efficiency, and to also ensure healthy competition in the market 
would be to reform SOE activity based on a comprehensive strategy, which should include 
not only privatization – a common trend in CIS countries and not always effective – but 
also should include extensive measures on fostering an active competitive environment, on 
separating business and political SOE aims, and on enhancing transparency in state assets 
management.  
There are many mechanisms for developing a competitive environment, including 
privatization, deregulation, de-monopolization, the development of small- and medium-
sized enterprises and so on. Whether they are to be relied upon would depend on, among 
other things, the situation in the relevant markets of the country, on the degree of growth of 
the economy as a whole, and on the impact of external and internal factors. In the case of 
CIS countries, it this author’s opinion, the measures on the creation of an active 
competitive environment should include several actions. For instance, the elimination of 
state monopoly in the economy, which requires deep institutional reforms aimed at 
creating more favorable conditions for the development of entrepreneurship and for 
improving the system of state management of the economy. Also, preventing the abuses of 
market-based monopolies by their dominant position in the market. State institutions 
should ensure the development of competition, without which it is impossible to increase 
the competitiveness of the entire economy. Additionally, there should include the 
strengthening of the role of market mechanisms in regulating business activities, the 
removal of administrative obstacles to market entry, and the creation of competitive 
conditions for all economic actors. And, lastly, reforms should provide consumers the 
opportunity to consistently receive high-quality public services for economically 
reasonable prices. 
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 CIS countries should also take measures to ensure that SOEs function on the 
basis of market and not political considerations , which would require the determination 
of the authorized body responsible for exercising state ownership rights, and the 
clarification and separation of ownership from regulatory functions that ensure equal 
conditions even between SOEs and POEs. 
If one is to consider state assets as public wealth, there should be appropriate 
measures aimed at achieving maximum transparency and accountability in all aspects of 
the state assets management process, starting from privatization and ending to dividends. 
This kind of system should allow regular public access to the necessary information 
mentioned in the foregoing through an Internet portal, mass media, periodicals, and 
through accountability in terms of parliamentary control. Hopefully such kind of measures 
not only provides systemic details on the management of state assets but also allows for the 
public to consistently scrutinize and oversee their management, officials and state asset 
managers to be more accountable, and for there to be greater investor confidence in the 
whole system.       
Summary 
 
This chapter has sought to outline the role of SOEs in the economy of CIS 
countries, to outline the theoretical basis of state participation in economics, and to address 
some urgent issues connected with SOE activity in Uzbekistan. Among the findings of this 
thesis is that despite extensive privatization reforms implemented since the 1990s, SOEs 
are still having a significant role in the economy of Uzbekistan and the other CIS countries 
examined in this thesis. In most cases, SOEs enjoy privileges and immunities that are not 
based on their better performance, but due to the fact that they belong to the state or state-
related officials. Such kind of exclusive privileges and immunities ultimately distorts 
market conditions by weakening competition, and by leading to SOEs abusing their 
dominant position in the market. A further finding is that one of the core causes of SOE 
inefficiency is their double-aimed (business and political) feature that should be addressed 
in subsequent reforms. A crucial conclusion of the research behind this thesis is the 
recognition that securities market development reforms can provide practical solutions for 
SOE reforms in CIS countries. Securities market development can assist privatization 
process with offering more public assets to private owners (through various IPOs and 
SPOs), which may also lead to increases in the transparency and accountability of SOEs, 
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through, for instance, mandatory information disclosure and effective corporate 
governance systems).    
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CHAPTER 6. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER SECURITIES MARKET 
DEVELOPMENT IN CIS COUNTRIES 
 
6.1. Main findings and conclusions 
 
The securities market in the CIS countries examined in this thesis, despite the 
apparent progress in some of its areas – such as the formation of collective investment 
institutions, the development of infrastructure, and the improvement of the regulatory 
framework – remains one of the least developed sectors of the financial system. A 
distinctive feature of the securities market in CIS countries, as well as other emerging 
economies, are high levels of concentration: for instance, about 85% of the capitalization 
of the securities market is provided by the ten largest companies mainly representing state-
owned banks and industrial giants. In general, less than 30 percent of existing JSCs are 
included in the official list of Stock Exchanges. As a result, the liquidity of the securities 
market (the ratio of trade turnover to capitalization) is at a low level. Furthermore, the 
capitalization of the securities market amounts to 0.1% of the global capitalization of the 
securities market. Another significant reason for the low liquidity of securities markets is 
the lack of high-quality financial instruments and, accordingly, the lack of investor interest 
in attracting investments through the securities market. 
Also, the securities market of CIS countries today is not efficient enough given that 
it cannot ensure fair pricing, free market access for investors, and the protection of their 
interests. The majority of JSCs created during privatization have not developed a 
consistent dividend policy; many issuers either do not pay at all, or pay meager dividends, 
so the shares lose their attractiveness for ordinary investors and are purchased based on the 
growth of their market value, and not to receive dividends. Therefore, small stock 
transactions have more of a speculative than an investment character. For some JSCs, it is 
tough to establish the ownership structure of a company. The cross-ownership of shares of 
various companies leads to the fact that it is impossible to determine who is the real owner. 
This causes serious caution for potential investors and leads to limited demand for stocks. 
Currently, the primary source of business financing is bank loans that are usually 
given at state-subsidized rates. Banks also involve money from the securities market 
through issuing securities, and investors provide them with money because they are 
reliable borrowers. This seriously affects competition in business financing. The 
competition of banks and the securities market is that banks earn on credit, and it is not 
profitable for them when companies prefer securities market financing to bank credit. 
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Moreover, in order for companies and individual investors to buy securities, they 
withdraw money from bank deposits, which is also unprofitable for banks. The 
interaction of these sectors is that banks go out with their securities into the market and sell 
them. The money that banks make from such transactions is often used towards loans 
with interest rates. This means that instead of directly involving money from the 
securities market, companies end up obtaining funds from banks at a greater expense. On 
the other hand, state subsidies and cheap credit lines under various state programs further 
weaken competition in business financing. The relatively underdeveloped level of 
securities market infrastructure, low public awareness about the opportunities of this 
market, and the lack of a competitive and encouraging legal framework further weakens 
the already limited ability of companies to access necessary funds from the securities 
market. 
6.2. Suitable measures for further SMD in CIS countries 
 
Further securities market development reforms in the CIS countries examined in 
this thesis are necessary for the improvement of business financing and for enhancing 
investment opportunities of national, regional, and global companies and investors. The 
subsequent increase of competitive conditions in business financing should entail an 
improvement in the quality and expansion of the range of financial services provided by 
securities market institutions. Appropriate measures should be taken to create competitive 
financial services and to achieve an efficient securities market in CIS countries. In the 
author’s opinion, the necessary reforms in this sense should aim at increasing the capacity 
of securities markets of CIS countries’, raising public awareness of investment and 
financing opportunities of the securities market, and at improving public confidence.   
 The analysis of the research involved in this thesis suggests that a key issue in the 
securities market of CIS countries concerns the so-called supply-side problem, which 
relates to the lack of subjects and objects mainly caused by regulatory, rather than 
economic, factors. In this sense, it is necessary to introduce in CIS countries proper 
regulatory mechanisms of enhancing the range of investors. The core goal of this measure 
is to create tools that allow attracting and investing financial resources using opportunities 
of securities market infrastructure for not only large enterprises but also SMEs. In the three 
countries examined herein, particularly in Uzbekistan, it is only JSCs that may issue 
securities and attract financial resources from the securities market. However, JSCs only 
comprise less than 1% of all existing companies in Uzbekistan, most of which are set up as 
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LLCs. In such conditions, it seems advisable to design reforms that would allow full access 
to LLCs and other companies to issue securities, to invest in securities, and to be listed in 
the stock exchanges. In other words, CIS countries should eliminate securities market entry 
conditions that are based on criteria concerning a company’s legal-organizational form and 
capital. Instead, the central principle for access to the securities market should be a 
company’s credibility, transparency, and effectiveness. This task may be achieved in 
different ways, depending on the specific features of, and prevailing conditions in, the 
country in question. There are plenty of examples from across the globe that allow such 
companies to participate in the securities market. For instance, by the end of 2016, there 
were over 7,000 companies listed on the SME platforms across over 40 countries. 426 In the 
case of CIS countries, the creation of special trading platforms for SMEs, LLCs, and other 
‘new subjects’ would be a good incentive for the increase of securities market capacity.  
 However, simply enhancing the range of subjects in the securities market cannot 
sufficiently solve the issues surrounding securities market capacity in CIS countries. 
Significant improvements should be pursued in expanding the range of financial 
instruments circulating in the securities market, and in balancing its regulatory framework 
with the legal and regulatory framework of bank instruments. Global practice has already 
also presented clear examples for this initiative. Notably, projects related to the promotion 
of sustainability in energy efficiency, renewable energy, water sustainability, agriculture 
and forestry, waste and pollution, and low-carbon transport could all be excellent examples 
for boosting the securities market of CIS countries. 427  In this sense, the creation of 
individual financial instruments that feature sustainability and cultural factors would be 
another excellent example in the case of CIS countries. In this regard, the implementation 
of unique financial tools in transport, energy, housing, and social infrastructure using the 
model of green bonds, Islamic bonds, and social business practices could be useful for CIS 
countries.  
Another set of measures that equally assist the development of both subjects and 
objects of the securities market relate to creating opportunities for broad range 
securitization of state assets. The analysis in the present thesis suggests that in all three 
                                                 
426 For further details, see: UNCTAD, World Federation of Exchanges, “The Role of Stock Exchanges in 
Fostering Economic Growth and Sustainable Development”, 2017, 12. 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/WFE_UNCTAD_2017_en.pdf  
427 For instance, currently there are 11 stock exchanges globally that have been trading in so-called green 
bonds since 2007. By the end of 2016, the value of the green bond market had exceeded USD 180 billion. 
For further details, see: UNCTAD, World Federation of Exchanges, “The Role of Stock Exchanges in 
Fostering Economic Growth and Sustainable Development”, 2017,17. 
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/WFE_UNCTAD_2017_en.pdf  
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countries studied herein the state has a significant share in the economy, which is directly 
reflected in the securities market where there is a relatively high level of ownership 
concentration. The research behind this thesis also indicates a current tendency in CIS 
countries of an increase of the share and presence of SOEs, and that reforms that were 
mostly devoted to improving SOE efficiency have not been enough for fostering real 
competitive conditions in the market. A wide range of securitization of state assets helps to 
diversify ownership, reduce the dominant position of SOEs, and strengthen the competitive 
environment in the market. 
Public awareness and confidence are further crucial issues that require 
comprehensive and immediate action. Such actions should also aim at lifting another 
serious barrier towards securities market development in CIS countries. Despite the 
existence of securities market institutions for almost three decades, the populations of the 
countries examined remain reluctant to use whatever opportunities the securities market 
presents. That is partly caused by low levels of public awareness and public confidence, 
and by the cultural features of some countries. Consequently, the savings of the general 
public usually go to investment in foreign currency or to short-term deposits of banks. To 
raise public awareness about the opportunities and risks of investing in the financial 
market, the following measures are proposed: the identification of the target audience in 
order to carry out activities aimed at attracting people to the securities market, as well as 
developing guidelines for carrying out operations for each of the target groups; the 
identification of the reasons for the lack of public confidence in financial market 
instruments, and the preparation and implementation of measures aimed at informing the 
general public about its rights and about opportunities in the securities markets for 
investing personal savings.  
The implementation of these proposals should lead to a change in the investment 
behavior of the general public, and to attracting the savings of the general public to the 
financial market. 
6.3. Design of the reforms in the example of Uzbekistan 
 
In this part of the thesis, more detailed measures are proposed on securities 
market development in the case of Uzbekistan. In the last two years Uzbekistan is 
witnessing extensive reforms in every area, including market development. The Strategy of 
Actions on Five Priority Directions of Development of the Republic of Uzbekistan 
determines the main guidelines of these reforms in 2017-2021 (hereinafter, ‘the 
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Strategy’). 428  In this part, the third direction of the Strategy – namely, concerning the 
Development and Liberalization of the Economy – is being examined. 
At clause 3.1, titled ‘Strengthening Macroeconomic Stability and Maintaining 
High Economic Growth’ the task is to work out the Concept for medium- and long-term 
development of the financial market of Uzbekistan, aimed at attracting capital and 
developing the financial market as an alternative source of funding for enterprises, 
financial institutions and the population (cf., paragraph 9). Despite the fact that the 
deadline for the development of the Concept was the third quarter of 2017, no information 
has yet been published about the fulfillment of this task. At the very least, by November 5, 
2018, no information has been found concerning the fulfillment of the aforementioned task 
neither at the websites of the institutions responsible, including the Ministry of Finance,429 
Central Bank, 430  Ministry of Economy, 431  State Committee of Competition, 432  and the 
Institute of Forecasting and Macroeconomic Research, 433  nor at the website of the 
Strategy.434  
The only document found is related to a part of the financial market435 – namely, 
to the securities market. It is the ‘Concept of the Development of the Secondary Securities 
market in 2017-2018 in Uzbekistan (hereinafter ‘the Concept’)436developed by the Center 
for Research on Privatization, Development Problems Corporate Governance, and the 
Securities Market under the State Committee of the Republic of Uzbekistan to promote 
privatization and competition (hereinafter, ‘the Research Center’).437 
6.3.1. Opinion on the Concept of development secondary securities market in 2017-2018 
in Uzbekistan 
 
The Concept is one of the essential documents that provide official background 
information438  about the progress chronology, development obstacles, current situation, 
and the perspectives of improvement of the secondary securities market in Uzbekistan. 
                                                 
428 For further details, see: www.strategy.gov.uz   
429 For further details, see: www.mf.uz 
430 For further details, see: www.cbu.uz 
431 For further details, see: www.mineconomy.uz 
432 For further details, see: www.gki.uz 
433 For further details, see: www.ifmr.uz 
434 For further details, see: www.strategy.gov.uz 
435 No notice appears in the text of the Research Center's Concept about the relation of it to the Strategy.  
436 Resolution of the Board of the State Committee on Competition of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. 06-36-
KR of March 6, 2017. 
437 For the text of the Research Center's Concept (in Russian), see: https://research-center.uz/info/concept/ 
438 In the case of Uzbekistan, despite several liberalization reforms, it is still difficult to get reliable, on time, 
and full information about the securities market and its participants' activities.  
 127 
Recognizing all useful features of the Concept both in a theoretical and practical sense, this 
author expresses his opinion on conceptual issues for its further improvement. 
The first remark concerns the compatibility of the content and timeframe of the 
Concept. According to the title, the Concept is focused on the development of the 
secondary securities market in 2017-2018. The fact that the adoption of the Concept had 
meant to be at the end of the first quarter of 2017, the chiefly descriptive and informative 
content,439and the fact the Concept relates to far-reaching measures440in the last part of its 
content, all point towards the low feasibility level of the Concept. 
There are numerous key proposals and recommendations in the adopted Concept on 
the development secondary securities market in 2017-2018 in Uzbekistan. More 
particularly, there are measures aimed at the improvement of transparency in securities 
market relations, the institutional development of the market, the necessity of a unified 
taxation policy for market intermediaries, usage of a ‘golden share’441 opportunities aimed 
at boosting secondary market, the development of a dividend payment system, and so on. 
On the other hand, some ideas conceptually need to be reconsidered and revised. For 
instance, in the Concept, the development of speculative deals is proposed as a state policy 
on the development of the secondary securities market in Uzbekistan (cf., p.16). This 
author recognizes that risky deals are a core feature in any securities market, and it 
provides the first impulse on increasing market activity. However, the analysis of the most 
                                                 
439 Three-fourths of the Concept’s content is devoted to background issues.  
440 These measures comprise the following: state policy on secondary market development; formation of 
resource base of secondary market; working out special programs on the development of secondary securities 
market; legal bases of the development of secondary securities market; price formation in the secondary 
securities market; tax policy in the sphere of secondary securities market; improvement of disclosure 
information system of issuers; increasing liquidity level of securities; improvement of clearing operations in 
the secondary securities market; improvement of corporate actions, including payment dividends; 
development of organized and non organized OTC market; usage of ‘golden share’ opportunities; 
development of IPO projects, Company choice for IPO; and the development of infrastructural institutions of 
the secondary securities market.  
441 According to the Uzbekistan legislation the "golden share" presents being a special right of the state’s 
participation in management of certain companies which is applied on basis of a decision by the Cabinet of 
Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan at privatization of the SOEs or sales into private ownership of the 
state-owned packages of shares of the companies possessing strategic significance, and provides protection 
of economic interests of the country. The "golden share" does not possess any cost, is no t subject to 
alienation and transfer into a pledge, is not taken into account at definition of a size of the Charter Capital of 
a Company and at the dividends’ accounting. The "golden share" may be applied at companies where the 
state-owned share is absent or does not exceed twenty five percent of the Charter Fund (Charter Capital) of a 
Company. The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan establishes the order of use of the “golden 
share” by the state. See: Article 22, Law of the Uzbekistan “On the Joint-Stock Companies and Protection of 
the Shareholders’ Rights” N 223-I DATED OF 26.04.1996.  
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recent financial-economic crisis 442and of the Russian experience concerning securities 
market development443shows that relying on speculative deals in the development of the 
securities market is not a desirable alternative, especially for transition countries such as 
Uzbekistan. Here the author’s focus is mostly on artificially promoted speculation. The 
author completely agrees that the speculation based on natural economic conditions and 
collective desires of market participants will not give the illusion of market development 
indicators, instead, it would provide an opportunity to market participants to easily trade in 
their stock. 
6.3.2. Securities market development concept in Uzbekistan 
 
It would be perhaps unfair on the part of this author to criticize the efforts of the 
Research Center without providing some suggestions and sharing his own ideas. Taking 
into account contextual and formal limits, here follows only a brief overview of the 
securities market development Concept (hereinafter ‘the SMD Concept’) in Uzbekistan.  
The SMD Concept aims at increasing long-term investments through the 
modernization and development of the securities market, at improving the attractiveness of 
the securities trading platform for domestic and foreign investors and issuers, and the 
professional participants of the securities market, and at increasing the potential of the 
securities market as an alternative institution for business financing. 
This author expects to fulfill the SMD Concept in three steps. The first step, the so-
called ‘standing up’ stage, includes the institutional and legal development of the national 
securities market, implementing international standards, and at least reaching the level of 
regional peers (Kazakhstan and Russia). The second step, the so-called ‘strengthening ties’ 
stage, focuses on the development of the securities market at the regional level, and 
developing the structural and legal bases of mutual possession of stocks between partner 
companies in export-import operations444 as well as building the necessary infrastructure 
                                                 
442 For further details, see: The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Final Report of the National Commission on 
the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States, Official Government Edition the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Submitted by Pursuant to Public Law 111-21, January 2011, 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf  
443 The unique privatization experience of Russia held through the securities market caused the development 
of a speculative model of the market between 1995 and 2008, that is to be shifted towards a s tabilized and 
more balanced model. See: Mirkin Yakov, “Strategy of Capital Market Development – 2020”, Journal of 
Economic Strategies, 2011, Vol.11, 16-23.  
444 This method was widely used by Japanese companies in the 1970s and had helped the growth of their 
cooperation, and, consequently, the development of the country’s economy.  
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for a regional financial hub in Tashkent.445 And the third step, the so-called ‘realization of 
full membership opportunities’ stage, chiefly includes measures on promoting national 
companies to the listing of the world’s leading securities markets, including in the listing 
of the Tashkent Stock Exchange foreign companies’ stocks, and participation in the 
standard setting, evaluation, and dispute resolution activity of international organizations 
in the sphere of securities market regulation.   
Some main measures of the Concept comprise the following: 
I. Actions on improving the supply side (instruments and issuers) of the 
securities market  
1. Increasing volume of traded financial instruments  
- Promoting IPOs by JSCs, especially JSCs with state shares;446   
- Launching Islamic bonds – Sukuk based on the experience of 
Kazakhstan; 
- Introducing a particular type of securities for LLCs and medium 
businesses; and 
- Providing to financial instruments at least equal legal privileges, 
incentives, and status with the bank credits and deposits. 
2. Increasing quantity and quality of issuers 
- Enhancing the scope of companies that have the right to issue securities; 
- Establishing a unique platform for trade with the stocks of LLCs and 
medium businesses; 
- Improving issuers’ disclosure information system, making it more 
transparent and accessible to investors; 
- Launching alternative ways of realization shareholders ’ managerial 
rights: remote voting and e-voting mechanisms; 
- Simplifying and making more transparent dividend payment system of 
issuers; and 
- Developing activity of reliable auditor companies, including 
international ones. 
II. Measures on increasing investment potential of the securities market   
                                                 
445 Currently, Kazakhstan and Russia also announced to build similar financial centers respectively in Astana 
and Moscow. For further details, see: Decree of the President of Kazakhs tan on the establishment of the 
International Financial Center ‘Astana’, May 19, 2015, No. 24; http://mfc-moscow.com/index.php?id=41  
446 In this regard, the present author supports the recommendation about the usage of  the ‘golden share’ 
opportunity, proposed in the Research Center’s Concept (cf., at p. 26).   
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- Simplifying the procedure of trading with securities through 
implementing technology of online trading (such as forex); 
- Improving transparency of issuer companies, and information about 
paid dividends; 
- Easing the repatriation system of foreign funds invested in securities; 
- Taking measures on reducing transaction fees with securities; 
- Stimulating local companies and individuals on investing through 
securities; and 
- Providing to portfolio investments at least equal legal privileges, 
incentives, and status with other types of investments. 
III. Measures on assisting the further development of the securities market 
1. Development of market intermediaries (brokers, dealers, investment funds, 
market makers, rating agencies and others) 
- Increasing quantity of market intermediaries through providing tax 
incentives and other privileges to the business activity in the securities 
market; 
- Easing access of foreign market intermediaries in the Uzbekistan 
securities market; and 
- Supporting the creation of Uzbekistan securities market participants’ 
association and providing them with self-regulatory powers. 
3. Improving public awareness and information supply  
- Creation of mass media (TV, radio, newspaper, website, etc.) 
specialized in the securities market news and information; 
- Promoting the establishment of rating agencies, including international 
ones, providing a reliable analysis of issuer companies’ activity to a 
wide range of investors; 
- Developing particular software applications for smartphones and tablets 
for easing access to securities market information and trading; 
- Promoting individual courses and master classes on increasing public 
awareness about investing in the securities market; and 
- Supporting the establishment of private educational institutions, 
including the foreign ones that specialized in business administration, 
project management, investment strategies. 
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Due to the thematic and format limits on the present thesis, it has not been possible 
to discuss all of above listed measures in any depth within the scope of this research. They 
have been included in the securities market development Concept in order to avoid 
presenting a one-sided proposal, and to show the complexity involved in designing reforms 
for SMD in relation to CIS countries. It is hoped that the issues that could not be analyzed 
in greater depth in this thesis, yet mentioned in the SMD Concept, would be the subject of 
future research and studies.    
Summary 
 
In this part of the research, the author has attempted to outline some possible 
reforms towards SMD in CIS countries. More particularly, the measures proposed include 
specific measures on enhancing companies who have the right to invest in, and access 
funding from, the securities market, initiatives towards the diversification of the types of 
securities, and reforms on raising public awareness and public confidence. The proposals 
contained in the present thesis concerning the improvement of SMD in the case of 
Uzbekistan may also prove useful for other CIS countries. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
  In this research, it has been attempted to explore SMD issues in selected CIS 
countries from the perspective of ensuring alternative options to maintain a competitive 
environment. These alternative options cover both theoretical and practical problems of 
SMD. Notably, the findings of this research suggest that theory has a significant impact on 
securities market regulation, the current theoretical underpinning of regulation that 
focuses mostly on self- interest, wealth maximization, and microeconomic consideration 
does not adequately reflect the features of the market and of human agency/actors, and 
there should be substantive research and consideration towards supplementing business 
(including securities business) with alternative aims, market participants with alternative 
values, and securities market regulation with a balanced approach. Therefore, modern 
securities market relations need to be underpinned by a principled theoretical 
framework capable of activating and developing the moral values of market participants, 
at least up to the level that will provide some counter-balance concerning their advanced 
material interests. It is hoped that this issue will be a promising field of future research.  
As for the practical issues, this research considers improving the role of the 
securities market as an alternative financial services institution. More specifically, 
increasing the role of the securities market in business financing and fund accumulation, 
where banks remain dominant, would provide a competitive alternative financing source 
for companies. Moreover, implementing sustainable, social, and cultural based securities, 
such as green bonds, infrastructure bonds, Islamic bonds and so on, will enhance the 
financing options, as well as increase the competitiveness of financial instruments. 
This research also found an imbalance in the ownership structure of the securities 
market and economy as a whole, where public ownership has significant volume and 
influence. It is proposed that the private sector be enhanced and stimulated in order to 
foster and maintain competitive conditions in the financial market. 
And, lastly, this thesis argues in favor of balancing the material interests and moral 
values of market participants, which is crucial, both, for ensuring fair competition and for 
the development of the whole economy. Market participants are the driving force of any 
community, and the quality of relations mostly depends on the behavior of these 
participants. Unfortunately, in recent decades there are very few initiatives on the equal 
promotion of moral values among market participants. Instead, almost all measures focus 
on the artificial upsurge of material values, which often results in greediness, and has 
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provided humanity with at least three big financial crises within a century. Due to limits to 
this research limits it has not been possible to comprehensively study this issue further – it 
is hoped that future initiatives will explore these issues further. 
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